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Introduction 
Peter Larmour 
Common property has often been regarded as an obstacle to develop­
ment and best-or inevitably-replaced by private or state ownership. 
However, there are now many well-documented examples of 
successful management of open-access resources, and experiments in 
'co-management' by users, owners, and government officials. The idea 
that the government should intervene to remedy the defects of 
common property, perhaps by registration, is now contested by a 
celebration of indigenous systems of self-management (Bromley 1989, 
Bromley and Cemea 1989). Government intervention may sometimes 
make things worse. Common property claims are also part of 
indigenous peoples' defence and reaffirmation of political sovereignty. 
The following chapters offer perspectives on common property 
from different academic disciplines, and from different islands and 
regions within and around the Pacific ocean. The disciplines include 
Geography, Economics, Anthropology, Law, History, and Political 
Science. The Pacific region includes settler societies like Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada, where indigenous systems were margina­
lised, and islands like Papua New Guinea and Fiji, where they were 
conserved, and even strengthened during and after colonial rule. The 
word 'governance' in the title recognises the political context of 
property rights, and refers to the idea that order, including systems of 
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property, is the outcome of interactions between governments, 
markets and communities (Larmour 1996a, 1996b). 
What is common property? 
Bromley defines property in terms of rights and duties towards a 
stream of benefits flowing from the resource. He notes that rights to 
use private property may be qualified, for example, by zoning 
legislation. He goes on to define common property as follows 
T he management group (the owners) have a right to exclude non­
members, and non-members have a duty to abide by this exclusion. 
Individual members of the management group (the co-owners) have 
both rights and duties with respect to usage rates and maintenance of 
the thing owned (Bromley 1989:872) . 
By contrast, in non-property there is 
. . .  no defined group of users or owners and so the benefit stream is 
available to anyone. Individuals have both privilege and no right with 
respect to usage rates and maintenance of the asset. T he asset is an 
open access resource (Bromley 1989:872). 
The same resource may be treated in some circumstances as 
common property and in others as open access, or something in 
between. Common property regimes may dissolve into the free-for-all 
of open access. Equally, property regimes (common, private, or state) 
may be established over formerly open-access regimes-the creation 
of Exclusive Economic Zones would be a good example. 
The distinction between common and open-access regimes can be 
explained in terms of the characteristics of the resource, particularly 
excludability and rivalry. 
In Table 1, excludability refers to the technical difficulty and 
expense of excluding people from using the resource. Rivalry refers to 
the degree to which one person's consumption eats into another 's. 
Roads, for example, are mostly excludable. Users can be charged a toll, 
and non-payers excluded. They are also mostly non-rivalrous, except 
when they become congested. Public goods are famously non­
rivalrous and non-excludable, but there are few examples beyond 
clean air or even, perhaps, gravity (Keohane and Ostrom 1994:416). 
Common pool resources, however, are both rivalrous and non­
excludable. 
Excludability and rivalry are matters of degree, and excludability is 
a technical and economic matter. Exclusion is often technically 
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possible, but not worth the cost, for example fencing a farm. Changes 
in technology may also make exclusion cheaper---electronic sensing 
makes it easier to charge vehicles entering crowded town centres. In 
Table 1, the offshore fishery is to some extent rivalrous: if I catch a fish, 
you cannot, but many fish escape us both and die naturally. Exclusion 
is technically possible, but at the cost of maritime surveillance, patrol 
boats and so on. It may be managed as common property or left to 
open access. 
While the characteristics of any particular resource may limit the 
possible ways it may be managed, property regimes are also deter­
mined by other historical and political factors, such as colonisation or 
democratisation. 
Table 1 Excl udability and rivalry 
non-rivalrous 
excl udable 
non-excludable 
toll goods 
e.g. uncongested roads 
public goods 
e.g. clean air 
rivalrous 
private goods 
e.g. ice cream 
common pool 
resources 
e.g. offshore 
fisheries 
Hardin's powerful image of the 'tragedy of the commons' is often 
blamed for obscuring the distinction between common property and 
open access resources (McCay and Acheson 1990:6-10, Feeny, Hanna 
and McEvoy 1996) . Ostrom is particularly scathing about the policy 
conclusions typically drawn from Hardin's model: privatisation, or 
state ownership as 'the only way' (1990:8-15), and she goes on to 
identify conditions for long running self-management of what she 
calls CPRs (common pool, or open access, resources). She defines a 
'common pool resource' as 
a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large to 
make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries 
from obtaining benefits from its use (Ostrom 1990:30). 
The conditions for self-management of such a resource are 
1 .  clearly defined boundaries 
2. congruence between appropriation and provision rules and 
local conditions 
3. collective choice arrangements 
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4. monitoring 
5. graduated sanctions 
6. conflict resolution mechanisms 
7. minimal recognition of rights to organise 
8. (For CPRs that are part of larger systems) nested enterprises 
(Ostrom 1990:90) . 
Taken together, these are quite a demanding set of conditions, 
explaining why common property regimes may easily dissolve into 
open access. 
Arguments against common property 
David Hume classically put the arguments against common property 
in the form of a parable about 'draining the meadow.' 
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in 
common: because it is easy for them to know each others' mind; and 
each must perceive that the immediate consequence of his failing in his 
part is the abandoning the whole project. But it is very difficult, and 
indeed impossible, that a thousand persons should agree in any such 
action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, 
and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a 
pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense, and would lay the 
whole burden on others (1911(1 740] :239) . 
Hume raised two issues, which are now called 'transaction costs', 
which are the costs of making and keeping agreements, and the 
problem of the 'free rider', who benefits from the activity, but shirks 
from participation. The idea of transaction costs has allowed New 
Institutional Economists to explain the existence, and persistence, of 
non-market institutions which (they argue) arise in order to reduce 
transaction costs. The existence of firms, private property, and the state 
itself have been explained in this way (Williamson 1975, Demsetz 
1967, North 1990). 
The common property of indigenous people is often used as an 
example. Demsetz (1967) refers to an historical study of the fur trade 
in Labrador, noting how the local Indians began marking off and 
excluding other families from defined hunting areas as the trade 
developed. More empirically, Trosper (1978) investigated the relative 
efficiency of American Indians ranching on land leased from tribes 
through the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Trosper finds these American 
Indians as financially and technically efficient as their non-Indian 
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neighbours, but investing less, perhaps because of uncertainty over 
lease renewal (a transaction cost), or because of knowledge of large 
coal deposits under the land, and the likelihood of eventual strip­
mining. In any case he is cautious in recommending privatisation, 
recognising the political, historical and ethical point that 
the federal government has created a connection between individual 
land ownership and eradication of tribal existence (Trosper 1978: 514) . 
Clearly, there are transaction costs in making and keeping 
agreements about the use of common property, and institutions such 
as cooperatives, trusteeship, and majority voting rules may be created 
to reduce those costs-for example, the lengthy negotiations over the 
law of the sea and the institution of Exclusive Economic Zones, or the 
Forum Fisheries Agency in the South Pacific. 
Michael Taylor and Sara Singleton (1993) use ideas about transac­
tion costs to extend Ostrom' s 'design rules'. They praise Ostrom for 
isolating the features of successful common pool resource manage­
ment, but fault her for failing to provide an explanation for 'why the 
successful groups are able to monitor themselves and why 
endogenous sanctioning alone suffices' (Taylor and Singleton 
1993:207). 
They argue that the successful groups have characteristics 'in 
virtue of which the transaction costs of an endogenous solution are 
relatively low' (Taylor and Singleton 1993:199). These are 
• stability of relations among members: they expect to be 
dealing with each other for a long time, over a number of 
interactions 
• multiplex relations: they deal with each other in different 
contexts 
• direct relations: they deal with each other face to face, 
unmediated by officials 
• shared beliefs and preferences. 
They summarise these characteristics as 'community', arguing that 
it reduces the search, bargaining and monitoring and enforcement 
costs of managing common pool resources. There is less uncertainty 
about what each other wants. Tradeoffs are easier to identify and 
implement. Monitoring and informal enforcement are less costly. 
Equally, 'economic inequality, and ethnic, linguistic, religious or other 
forms of cultural heterogeneity', weaken community, and increase 
transaction costs (Taylor and Singleton 1993:200). 
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The politics of distribution of property rig hts 
While clear property rights may enhance efficiency, the allocation of 
clear rights has political implications. A good illustration is Bates' 
(1995) discussion of Coase's famous example of the railway that 
pollutes the farmland through which it travels. The example originally 
came from Pigou, who saw the 'uncompensated damage done to 
surrounding woods by sparks from railway engines' as a case for 
regulation (quoted in Coase 1960:31). Coase's criticism was that the 
harm was in a sense reciprocal, and the economic issue was the 
optimal mix of trains and woods, not the extinction of one or the other. 
The case gets more interesting if the railway cuts through customary 
land in a colony. Issues of 'who was there first', and whether govern­
ments create or merely recognise rights, would be important. 
Coase argued that a system of property rights, rather than 
government regulation, could force the railway to take into account 
these externalities. But the distribution of property rights would not 
matter: either the farmers' right to be free of pollution would force the 
railway to compensate them, or reduce train traffic. Or the railway 
company's right to pollute would force the farmers to pay the 
company to reduce its traffic in order to protect their farm income. 
Either way, if it is easy to reach agreements, the traffic is reduced to a 
level that takes into account the pollution it causes, and to an 
economically optimal mix of trains and farms. 
Bates (1995) notices the political point: the relative ability of farmers 
and railway companies to put pressure on the government to allocate 
the property rights to one, or the other. Farmers, for example, may be 
better, or worse, organised than railway owners. Authoritarian re­
gimes may be more sympathetic to concentrated interests, like 
railway owners, than to diffuse interests, like farmers. In democratic 
systems, however, farmers' votes may count. In developing countries 
the government may favour the interests of exporters, or domestic 
rather than foreign firms. The railway may run through a govern­
ment's political support base, or through that of its opponents. 
Clear (and hence efficient) property rights in the Pacific region are 
often very unevenly distributed between different ethnic groups, 
between foreigners and locals, between income groups, and between 
genders. Freehold tends to be owned by non-indigenous, higher­
income, men. Customary land tends to be owned by indigenous, 
lower-income men and women. Foreigners are generally excluded 
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from both. These categories of people differ in their political rights, 
and in their ability to organise themselves in order to influence 
government policy. 
Nor are transaction costs evenly distributed. Atwood (1990:666) 
argues that clarification may reduce transaction costs for some people 
(for instance, outsiders) but increase them for others (such as insiders, 
who now have to pay survey and registration fees whereas previously 
they could rely on the cheaper, but secure, informal methods they were 
familiar with). The cost of lawyers often weighs disproportionately on 
the poor. For example, the recent Land Commission in Cook Islands 
found a strong popular opinion that transaction costs biased outcomes 
in favour of the rich and well-educated, both within families, and in 
the courts. The Commission found that ambiguity about voting rules 
within families 'has allowed the cunning and shrewd among us to 
abuse the system' (Cook Islands Press, Sunday 7-14 April 1996). Once in 
court 
The procedural rules and courtroom environment have become more 
formal and legalistic, causing great dissatisfaction, discomfort, distrust 
and added expense to our people (Cook Islands Press 1996:2) . 
The Commission recommended reducing such transaction costs by 
specifying voting rules more clearly, relying more on written 
genealogies, excluding lawyers, and registering landholdings (pre­
sumably increasing the tax burden, which might also fall unevenly). 
Papua New Guinea's 'land mobilisation' program, though often 
obscure about its intentions, seems to be particularly aimed at reducing 
the transaction costs for outsiders. This reduction might be at the cost of 
increasing them for insiders who 'knew their way around' the 
informal system, or became insiders before they transacted-for 
example, by marriage. 
The role of the government i n  self-managed common 
property resources 
To talk of the role of government in self-management may sound 
contradictory, but all common property resources are now embedded 
in states, and the reach of states is extending into Exclusive Economic 
Zones, Antarctica, and space (though some of these states, such as 
Somalia or Liberia, have collapsed from within). Particular govern­
ment agencies are often appropriators, as well as regulators, of CPRs, 
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in what Ostrom calls the 'rich mix' (1990:184) of public and private 
agencies, such as those involved in the governance of the California 
water table. Local governments and local courts are often involved, or 
competitive with, the institutions of self-management. Indeed, it is 
hard to tell where 'the government' stops and 'non-government' or 
'self-government' begins. 
The structures of government seem to matter. Federal, or semi­
federal systems, such as those in Micronesia and Melanesia allow for 
the nesting of locally variable property systems within a supportive 
national framework, as in Papua New Guinea's experiments with 
different provincial land registration systems. Parliamentary politics 
puts a brake on centrally initiated changes in land legislation. 
Explaining the absence of much land reform in the South Pacific, 
Crocombe argued 
political leaders considered almost any modification of tenure too 
sensitive for the voting public, and too vulnerable to misrepresentation 
by any political opposition (1987: 394) . 
An independent national judiciary, however, is not necessarily one 
which would be supportive of local common pool resources. It may be 
able to provide local 'conflict resolution mechanisms' (Ostrom's rule 6), 
but at the cost of creating opportunities to appeal that may undermine 
the legitimacy of local regimes. Similarly, court support for individual 
human rights, such as freedom of movement, or freedom not to 
participate in commons-maintaining activities, may also undermine 
common pool resources. 
Government strateg ies towards common pool resources 
Government approaches towards common pool resource managers 
will depend on the constitutional and political situation, as well as the 
technical character of the resource. In colonial situations, or where 
indigenous people are a minority, the government may simply 
marginalise them. 
If the state disregards the interests of those segments of the population 
largely dependent upon common property resources-then external 
threats to common property will not receive the same governmental 
response as would a threat to private property (Bromley and Cernea 
1989:19). 
In postcolonial situations, the government may find common pool 
resource regimes politically suspect, or an obstacle to their programs 
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of nationalist modernisation, as Anderson observed in Malaysia 
the government choked off all efforts by the fishermen to help them­
selves or adapt to their situation. It replaced grassroots democracy in 
the cooperatives and elsewhere with appointed party men; it abolished 
the one political party that spoke to and for the fishermen; it stopped 
the conflict over capturing the commons; it tried to regulate fishing 
effort (Anderson 1990:334). 
Often it seems the best that a government can do is keep out. Thus 
Wade concludes from his study of the management of common 
property within 'village republics' in India, 
the less the state can, or wishes to, undermine locally based 
authorities, and the less the state can enforce private property rights 
effectively, the better the chances of success (Wade 1988:216). 
But the state may have a more positive role, too. 
If a political regime does not provide arenas in which low cost, 
enforceable agreements can be reached, it is very difficult to meet the 
potentially high costs of self-organisation (Ostrom 1990:146) . 
Several of Ostrom' s design rules for long running common pool 
resources point to more specific conditions. First, individuals affected 
by the rules must be able to participate in modify them (rule 3). Some 
minimum political rights of participation must be recognised, 
including participation by women, who are often users of common 
pool resources. The central government has to recognise the local 
users' rights to organise themselves (rule 7). 
If external governmental officials presume that only they have the 
authority to set the rules, then it will be very difficult for local 
appropriators to sustain a rule governed CPR over the long run 
(Ostrom 1990:101) .  
Even rights to get around the common pool resource regime, and 
appeal to some external authority, may undermine it. Such appeals 
might be to courts, as mentioned above, but also to political authorities 
called in to protect their supporters or constituents. More generally, 
Ostrom's rule implies that central governments should not feel politically 
threatened by local organisations, undermine or seek to incorporate 
them into the ruling party. 
Ostrom concludes that common pool resource regimes should be 
nested: organised by levels, with the smaller fitting within the larger. 
Rules at one level, without the support of appropriate rules at the level 
above, or below, may not work. This rule implies, at least, some 
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dialogue between levels, and might be threatened, for example, by 
different parties or ethnic groups being in power at different levels. 
At first sight these design rules seem unexceptionably benign, and 
consistent with devolved, democratic systems like those in place in 
most of the Pacific region. But the prohibition on appeals, and 
Ostrom' s endorsement of self enforcement, rather than using the 
police, in rule 5 already challenge some conceptions of the 'rule of 
law', and modem states' claims to what Max Weber famously called 
'the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence'. 
The chapters 
Next, I want summarise each chapter, and then discuss how they 
conceptualise common property, and what they have to say about 
governance. 
The first two chapters deal generally with the Pacific islands. 
Ward's is concerned with changes taking place to customary land 
tenure in the islands. He finds a spontaneous tendency towards 
individualisation, in spite of government declarations of support for 
traditional, communal ownership. In some cases what now counts as 
traditional was a product of colonial rule, or, in Tonga, nineteenth 
century land reform. Everywhere, the pragmatic, adaptive character of 
'custom' is stifled by codification, and people seek ways around the 
law to achieve their purposes. 
Chand and Duncan's chapter finds the Pacific island nations 
unable to support their growing populations in a condition of 
'subsistence affluence', but is optimistic about their prospects for 
growth through trade and specialisation. Customary tenure, which is 
appropriate for subsistence agriculture, must therefore give way to 
freehold or long leases that allow for trade and investment in land. 
They identify sources of supply and demand for changes in land 
tenure: opportunities for emigration, for example, may reduce the 
demand for change in tenure, while entrenched traditional institutions 
may be reluctant to supply it. They go on to propose a formal model of 
the factors that determine changes in land values. 
The next three chapters focus on mining in Papua New Guinea, 
where practically all the land is under customary ownership. Ballard 
and Lakau are particularly concerned with the moral consequences of 
large-scale mining, and the differences it opens up between what 
Ballard calls the 'resource elite' and the 'downstream majority'. 
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Ballard shows how land tenure is deeply embedded in wider political 
relationships, and is not easily reduced to a code that everyone can 
agree on. He finds landowners gaining steadily increasing shares of 
mining revenues, while mining companies provide the local services 
that the state cannot afford. 
Lakau finds that custom provides an equivocal guide to the owner­
ship of minerals. On the one hand, valuable mineral resources like clay 
and salt might be regarded as belonging to the group that owned the 
land. On the other hand, landowners might be regarded as trustees for 
a wider, public or common interest, in looking after rivers and gravel. 
The law in Papua New Guinea, however, now vests mineral rights in 
the state. 
Duncan and Duncan address the insecurity of the contracts that 
have been drawn up, and often broken, between mining companies 
and landowners. Using a model of strikes in labour negotiations, they 
notice that very different information is available to each side; that 
each side's interests change during the time of the contract; that 
contracts cannot cover all contingencies; and that the government is 
not a disinterested arbiter between mining companies and landowners. 
They go on to propose a set of recommendations that might provide 
more stability. 
The next four chapters deal with the very different circumstances 
of New Zealand, Canada and Australia where indigenous minorities 
are reclaiming rights to land and natural resources lost to trappers, 
settlers, pastoralists and governments. 
Kawharu's chapter deals with two institutional consequences of 
the recovery of the Treaty of Waitangi as the foundation of New 
Zealand's constitution. The first, which began in 1982, was the link 
between existing Maori land law and the Treaty. Kawharu describes 
how the New Zealand Maori Council sought to reverse a long process 
of individualisation of Maori title, by linking the law to the protection 
of kinship values expressed in the treaty. The second, which followed 
the New Zealand government's attempt to put a 'fiscal envelope' 
around future compensation claims, concerned Maori representation 
at national level. Kawharu describes the difficulties in reconciling the 
need for a peak body, with the more local and tribal basis of traditional 
Maori politics, and the non-tribal basis in which many Maori now live 
their day-to-day lives. 
Usher 's chapter also deals with constitutional changes and the 
renegotiation of relationships with Canada's indigenous people. His 
Introduction I 1 1  
main concern is with institutions for the co-management of particular 
resources that have been set up, sometimes ad hoe, and sometimes in 
permanent settlement of indigenous claims. Though formally advisory, 
these boards or committees include equal numbers of government 
officials and indigenous representatives. Usher finds several conditions 
for success: that the structures are negotiated, rather than invitations 
being issued to join existing structures; that aboriginal members are 
accountable representatives; that only claims-based boards are 
permanent. Usher finds co-management particularly useful in dealing 
with migratory species that cross boundaries, and in negotiating 
access for outsiders. 
Reynold's chapter points to a paradox in the Australian High Court's 
famous Mabo judgment that found, in some circumstances, 'native 
title' had survived in Australia. W hile overthrowing the idea that 
Australia was terra nullius in terms of land tenure, by allowing that 
native title had existed, and might have survived, the Court preserved 
the idea that the country was terra nullius in terms of sovereignty. It 
accepted the idea the Crown was the first and only sovereign, and that 
this sovereignty was established instantly, absolutely, and throughout 
the country (and so able to extinguish native title, by law, if it wished). 
Instead, Reynolds proposes a doctrine of aboriginal sovereignties, 
surviving until extinguished piecemeal by settlement, but persisting in 
a more plural vision of Australia. 
Rose's chapter also reflects on the Mabo decision, but in a way that, 
following the literature on common property, links management to 
ownership. The Aboriginal rights belatedly uncovered by the Australian 
High Court are related to responsibilities for environmental manage­
ment, by means that included fire-stick farming, and protecting 
the places where kangaroos foraged during droughts. Totems, she 
argues, provide the link between rights and responsibilities. 
Having traced the intellectual history of anthropological theory of 
totemism, which typically used Australian data, Rose proposes an 
ecological explanation: totems are associated with duties towards the 
management of particular plants and animals. 
Thus Rose finds governance of resources to be a matter of 
differentiated but complementary responsibilities often exercised at a 
regional scale. Restraint is as important as activity. Self-interest is not 
necessarily opposed to the interests of others, the interests of the 
collectivity, and the continuity of other species. Governance is 
achieved through common property institutions like totemism. 
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The chapters by Hunt and Oh deal with the management of fisheries 
in the South Pacific on two levels. Hunt's paper shifts between the 
intergovernmental level, and the subgovernmental level, at which 
inshore resources are managed by coastal communities (with some 
government support, perhaps through council by-laws). Hunt shows 
how these two management regimes may interact, for example when 
tuna boats collect bait from inshore fisheries. Oh' s paper looks in 
greater detail at the level at which governments have negotiated to 
manage highly migratory species within 200 nautical mile Exclusive 
Economic Zones. In this game, the small states are nominally equal 
players with much larger countries. Oh shows how this form of 
management imposes duties as well as rights on the claimants. 
Finally, Kalit and Young's paper brings the regions and some of 
the themes together in a comparison of Papua New Guinean and 
Australian aboriginal ideas about the management of common 
property, and recommends the creation of intermediate institutions 
to help landowners manage and exploit their resources in a sustain­
able way. 
Ideas about common property 
Several of the chapters adopt Bromley's definition of common 
property, as distinct from private property, and an open-access free­
for-all. But they introduce important elaborations, qualifications and 
quite different conceptualisations as well. 
Ward raises the question of equality among members of the group 
managing the resource. He notices that common property might 
involve great inequality within a group. He also is careful to 
distinguish the legal concept of 'customary land' from the implication 
that customary ownership is necessarily communal. He finds 
historical precedents for individual customary ownership, and 
alienability of customary land, and suggests that in some cases the 
idea of communal ownership may be a colonial construction, perhaps 
no longer relevant to the needs of independent citizens. 
Chand and Duncan take the traditional negative view of common 
property, noting the problem of free riders, and the disincentives that 
common property may pose for investment. They note that self­
management may work only for small groups, with effective norms, 
and see a global tendency towards clear, individualised, transfer­
able titles. 
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Ballard recognises the 'insistence' with which people in Melanesia 
identify with land, and so suggests a more reciprocal relationship 
between owners and land. Individuals and groups constitute 
themselves, as individuals and as groups, by referring to land. They 
do not exist before, or separately from it. 
Lakau's chapter makes the important distinction between group or 
clan interests, and broader 'societal' or 'public' interests. The common 
interests of a group may be just as 'selfish' as that of an individual, 
while groups may have common interests that they can only satisfy by 
acting together as members of a wider society (and face similar 
disincentives to act together, as Oh and Hunt's discussions of the two 
levels of management of fisheries suggest). Lakau then goes on to raise 
doubts about whether the state, as presently constituted, can plausibly 
act in the societal or public interest-particularly if, as in mining, it is a 
player as well as a referee. Landowning groups, he suggests, may 'free 
ride' on society. Duncan and Duncan also discuss the conflicts of 
interest faced by the state using mining revenues to fund its budget, 
and a similar suspicion of the state underlies Kalit and Young's 
argument for intermediate bodies (though these may be in conflict 
too). Similar issues about the role of peak bodies representing the 
interests of tribes are raised by Kawharu. 
Governance 
In almost all of the chapters, issues of resource management slide 
quickly into questions of governance, just as questions of land tenure 
become quickly questions of sovereignty. Ward noticed the over­
lapping claims to sovereignty that underlay competing and confusing 
systems of tenure. He also saw the legitimacy of politicians, and of 
islands states generally, tied up in sometimes unrealistic claims about 
tradition. Chand and Duncan explicitly recognises the intertwining of 
ownership and governance in traditional systems, such as Tonga. They 
see central governments as one of the causes for the breakdown of 
village level self-management, while government institutions that 
entrench custom (such as Fiji's Native Land Trust Board) limit the 
supply of change. 
For Ballard, land provides a 'foothold' from which local people 
may gain attention from the state. But the state turns out to be a 
figment ('only a concept'), franchising out the delivery of services, and 
unable to command any moral authority at local level. Lakau confronts 
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these questions more directly, questioning the private interests and 
competence of state officials. For Duncan and Duncan, the lack of 
neutrality of the government is one source of contract instability, while 
one function of an ideal state (if it could be conjured up) would be to 
provide the stable framework which long-term, sustainable invest­
ment requires. 
The chapters on New Zealand, Canada and Australia deal with 
questions of sovereignty more subtly and more directly. In Kawharu's 
reading of the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori and Europeans exchanged 
sovereignty for rangatiratanga (trusteeship or, more broadly, 'good 
government') that protected and maintained Maori institutions and 
way of life (a part of the deal that had lapsed until the recovery of the 
Treaty). Usher questions the possibility of sovereignty at subnational 
level in an era in which nation-states are in decline in the face of 
globalisation. The co-management arrangements he commends are 
explicitly not to do with self government. Indeed the idea that the 
boards are advisory to ministers goes back to very traditional concepts 
of the 'sovereignty of parliament'. Reynolds floats the idea of plural­
istic, divisible, and graded, sovereignties, against the absolute claims 
to sovereignty embodied in Australian executive, parliamentary and 
judicial institutions. 
Sovereignty and governance are also in the foreground in Oh and 
Hunt's discussions of fisheries. Sovereign power is invoked to support 
local management regimes in Hunt' s recommendations for 
conservation by-laws. For Oh, sovereign governments are themselves 
players in an international management regime (which might, 
therefore, be unprofitably excluding non-government actors). The 
United Nations' Law of the Sea Convention however, grants them 
'sovereign rights' rather than absolute sovereignty over the Exclusive 
Economic Zones. 
The government is more in the background in Kalit and Young's 
bottom-up approach, but they note the importance of a benign 
political climate for self-management, and the contradictions that 
Ward's first chapter noted between the government's role as custodian 
of custom and promoter of development. Decentralised or inter­
mediate institutions may embody these contradictions by turning 
them into intergovernmental relations. 
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Changing forms of com munal tenure 
R. Gerard Ward 
Practices in relation to customary land are changing in the Pacific 
islands. The changes include a tendency for people to want to 
privatise, or individualise, control of holdings within the realm of 
customary land; for current practice to diverge from what is stated to 
be custom; and for practice to diverge from the law where tenure has 
been codified. 
It is also necessary to question whether we are dealing with 
common property at all in Pacific island land tenure. We might also 
consider whether customary land tenure, especially as often practised, 
is necessarily the inhibiting factor for development which it often is 
said to be. 
Does any one individual or entity, anywhere, really own land in the 
sense of having full personal control over its use and its disposal? 
There are few if any places or polities within which landholders have 
absolute and exclusive rights over the control, use, or assignment of 
land. Unencumbered ownership of land is extremely rare. Crocombe 
has pointed out that it may not be 'sufficiently recognised that human 
beings do not own land: what they own is rights to land, that is, rights 
vis-a-vis other human beings' (1972:220). And different people may 
hold overlapping rights over the same land. This is true for developed 
as well as developing countries. Even if we take the case of freehold 
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land within the general realm of British-derived law, which might be 
considered to provide a particularly strong form of control or ownership, 
it may still be subject to possible resumption by the state (the Crown in 
the British case). Other parties, such as the neighbours over the back 
fence, or agencies such as electricity or sewerage authorities, may have 
easements over it. Its use may be constrained by planning regulations. 
The extent to which the subsoil (and what it contains) is included in 
ownership rights may vary. Its disposal may be constrained by laws 
which limit the right to own land to members of specific groups. 
It is often argued that some form of transferable landholding such 
as freehold tenure, or long-term transferable leasehold, is a requirement 
for successful development. Much of this argument hangs on the belief 
that land is the only, or the best, security for raising capital through 
loans, and that its transferability in the event of default is essential for 
successful development. But other mechanisms have been used 
successfully as the basis for credit, at least for smallholder farmers. 
Security and transferability of rights are certainly key features, but 
these can be provided under a variety of tenures. The extent to which 
these exist under customary tenure is often overlooked. 
Some of the land problems in the Pacific islands arise because 
different groups or agencies may assert the power to confer legitimacy 
on rights which may be claimed over land, and do so on the basis of 
quite different ideologies, legal or cultural concepts. Such groups 
include customary landholders, governments, and land management 
instrumentalities. One has only to compare the different premises 
which have been used by colonial administrations, independent 
governments, and rural clans or kinship groups to see the scope for 
confusion. Given the weakness of state institutions in a number of 
Pacific island countries, and the limited understanding or acceptance 
of ideas of national sovereignty, it is unrealistic to assume that ideas 
and laws imposed at a national level on a matter as sensitive, as 
culturally loaded, and as variable as land tenure will be uniformly 
accepted or observed by claimants to customary land. 
Thus great complexity of tenure arrangements may exist, even 
within the one state, and even where a codified version of traditional 
or customary tenure has been adopted. It is also necessary to recognise 
that 'customary tenure' changes over time, and at differing rates in 
different places, as custom itself changes in some uncertain relationship 
with technological, economic, social and political change. 
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Furthermore, practice in the allocation, holding and use of land may 
change long before it is given the imprimatur of 'custom'. Within most 
Pacific island countries it is probably misleading to speak of the 
customary system of tenure because of the differences between what 
different communities might accept as customary in their own case. 
Under a generally accepted framework of certain general principles, a 
great deal of pragmatic divergence occurs. Until the authority of the 
state is much stronger than it is in most Pacific island countries, it may 
be necessary for those who seek to foster specific development projects 
requiring long-term use and exploitation of land for agricultural, 
mining, industrial or other uses, to take heed of local attitudes and 
claims to rights over land. 
Common property or common land? 
Most land in the Pacific islands is not common property in either the 
sense of open access to all people, or equal access to all members of a 
particular community which claims ownership. The same is usually 
true of reef and lagoon fishing grounds as well (see, for instance, 
Carrier 1987). Johannes and Macfarlane point to the contrast between 
Europe and European concepts in which marine resources were 
thought of as a common good, and the Pacific islands where fishing 
grounds were explicitly the property of individuals or specific groups 
(1991 :73). It is generally true in the Pacific islands that amongst groups 
which occupy an area, all the core members will have some rights to 
exploit the products of the area, to reside within it, and to occupy parts 
of it under some form of usufruct. But it would be unusual for all to 
have equal rights within the whole area. Most groups will also include 
residents who are not core members but have been given some more 
limited, conditional rights which fall far short of equality of access. 
A generalised example, drawn largely from Fiji, but in its essential 
features common to other areas may illustrate this point (Figure 1.1). A 
community of several clans may claim an area of land as its territory. 
In places the boundaries may not be clearly defined. Within that 
territory, each clan is acknowledged or, where the system is codified, 
recorded as the controllers or owners of particular areas. The whole is 
not the common property of the community for more intensive uses, 
despite the fact that, by custom, all residents may be free to gather 
forest products from most of the uncultivated parts of the territory. 
Changing forms of communal tenure I 21  
, 
...... 
--, 
,,,,_ ; 1 � "" · ...... --- , I -- -- ,' 
-- - - ,- -- ,' 
__ ,,,,,.. -- \ : 
-- -- \ : 
,
, 
\ : 
; \ . 
/ \ l 
@ 
\ \ 
B / � 0 \  
�
 A /., Cflc \ •> ' e;J , / ' � \ B 
/
// I!!} \ \: · ' . 
a. : . \ .)/. . . . : \ 
A 
. ... ... · . · . · · : \ 
. \ 
.\ 
..... · 
.. 
: · · · · · :.:;:
\{Y;\ 
�---__.---1 
less defined I defined GARDENS OR FORMER GARDENS 
,. - - - - - ---, 
� B "' 
� \ .I 
Clan land areas - - - - --- ----
- - - Village land boundary 
- General gathering rights 
OF CLAN C M EMBERS 
LJ Planter 1 
� Planter 2 
I/ ·>/·.J Planter 3 
- Planter 4 
Figure 1 .1 Landholdings in a hypothetical vi l lage. Drawn by J. Sheehan, 
Cartography Unit, Research School of Pacif ic and Asian Studi es. 
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Although some limited rights may approach commonality within this 
forest or uncultivated land, individual trees or products may be 
recognised as the property of individuals and control of hunting and 
gathering may rest with particular people or sub-groups. Within the 
land of one clan, members may not all have equal rights to clear and 
cultivate any part because specific individuals, or families ( in Figure 
1 . 1 ,  planters 1-4) may hold residual and relatively exclusive rights to 
occupy, which stem from the last period of cultivation of the particular 
piece. The land of a house site may be very specifically under the 
control of a particular nuclear or extended family. Specific resource 
sites, such as a spring or a source of clay, although within the 
boundaries of a clan's land, may be controlled by specific members of 
that or another clan, with relatively free access being allowed to 
ahnost all, but under 'grace and favour '. 
A superficial examination of this type of system, perhaps 
influenced by a framework of ideas stemming from nineteenth century 
sociology, may note that all members appear to be able to hunt, gather, 
or collect water from any area or site within the community's broader 
territory, and that many people cultivate gardens scattered throughout 
the territory, and not only on the land of their own clan, and then jump 
to the conclusion that land is common property. Few Pacific islanders 
would accept such an interpretation. The situation is not one of free 
and equal access for all. It is not directly comparable to the forms of 
access found on, say, English common land, and even there, 
commoner 's rights are not held by all. 
Neither is it generally true that those members of the community 
who use specific pieces of land are insecure in their continued use of 
that land. Indeed the very security of that right to continued 
occupation under customary tenure is what many now use as 
validation in a process of privatisation currently taking place in a 
number of island countries. If security of occupation or usufruct is a 
feature of land tenure systems which is considered desirable for 
development purposes, then most Pacific island customary tenure 
systems have this. What may not be possible is the transfer of those 
occupation rights to others who are not community members, but in 
practice one finds many instances where such transfers have occurred 
in both former and recent times. 
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Commu nal tenure or 'customary' tenure? 
Communal land may be considered to be a variant of the category 
'common property' with the assumption that all within the 'commune' 
or the 'community' have rights of access. To apply this title to customary 
land in the Pacific islands also overemphasises the degree of shared 
access. True, ultimate control over land may be vested in a group but, 
as suggested above, that group may be a specific sub-set of the whole 
community so that, as O'Meara (1995) has suggested for Samoa, the 
phrase 'corporate family ownership' may give a clearer impression of 
the reality of some forms of customary tenure, with the role of the 
family head somewhat analogous to that of the managing director of a 
company or corporation. Therefore I think it best to avoid the term 
'communal land', preferring the vaguer term 'customary' land. The 
crucial point is that customs change, and so does customary land tenure. 
Older variations in customary tenure 
The discourse of the post-independence Pacific island nations, and 
particularly the political rhetoric, tends to imply that traditional ways 
were and are unchanging, handed down from time immemorial. That 
this is patently not so is obvious from the way Christianity has been 
incorporated into tradition. An example in the case of land tenure is 
the way the current land tenure system of Tonga, based on inheritable 
leaseholds from Crown or nobles' estates, is now thought of as 
'traditional' when in fact it is a late nineteenth century product. The 
1875 constitution abolished customary land rights as the Crown took 
control of all land, allocated much of it to nobles' estates, and gave all 
adult men the right to inheritable usufruct over holdings allocated 
from those estates. In effect these were perpetual, heritable, 
individual, but inalienable leases. It was a land reform which, in its 
sweeping nature, was almost without equal outside the old Soviet 
bloc. This recent, rather individualistic system, with European feudal 
overtones, is now Tonga's 'traditional' system. 
In Fiji the current codified system, widely accepted as traditional, is 
also a colonial creation under which the variety of pre-1874 tenure 
arrangements was reduced. The plea of a number of leading chiefs for 
individual allotments was ignored as it did not fit current anthro­
pological theories. Ownership groupings were simplified to aid 
recording and the scope for modification in the face of demographic or 
other change was virtually eliminated (see France 1969, Ward 1995). 
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Furthermore, the doctrine of inalienability of Native Land, which is a 
major plank of current Fijian tradition, is itself a product of colonial 
codification under an ordinance of 1912, rather than a true reflection of 
older practice (Ward 1995:206--8). As France noted 'permanent alienation 
of land is a common feature of Fijian culture and the concept can be 
easily and unambiguously expressed in the Fijian language' (1969:52). 
As in Tonga and Fiji, many of the changes in customary tenure in 
other countries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were 
colonial government initiatives. The Land Court in the Cook Islands, 
'owing to its misunderstanding of the significance of lineage affiliation 
in determining ownership of and succession to land rights . . .  awards 
title in common to all children of a previous owner, thus creating 
excessive fragmentation of ownership' (Crocombe 1987a:60). In this 
case the problems of 'common property' which arose, and which a 
number of attempts have been made to solve, are not so much a result 
of customary tenure, but of colonial intervention. In French Polynesia 
major changes were imposed by the French administration (Tetiarahi 
1987) often 'based on misinterpretations of how the land tenure 
system worked' Goralemon 1983:97). In New Caledonia (as in Fiji) 
ownership was registered by relatively large groups when in fact 
cultivated land was held by relatively small family groups (A. Ward 
1982:3--4). Other examples can be cited from around the region, many 
of which illustrate that what is now considered 'customary' is of 
relatively recent origin. What they also tell us is that, if political 
conditions are right, or a government is strong, major changes can be 
made, and accepted, in customary land tenure systems, and that many 
of the current problems attributed to customary tenure stem from 
European misinterpretations of the tenure forms which existed in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More thorough 
understanding might well have avoided many current difficulties, 
particularly if the variability and scope for change had been recognised. 
Current changes in custom 
Custom, as accepted behaviour, usually contains a large component of 
pragmatism. Close examination of pre-colonial events in the region 
shows that this pragmatism was reflected in many changes in land 
tenure arrangements, due to warfare, changing population or other 
pressures, migration, obligations, and even acts of grace and favour. 
Mobility was common and when people claim to have occupied an 
area from 'time immemorial' their own traditions often describe 
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movement from some other place. One result of the codification of 
land tenure systems, as in Fiji, Tonga or the Cook Islands, has been to 
impose a much more static situation, at least in legal terms. Because 
holdings were surveyed, and owning groups specified and their 
members recorded, the processes which formerly allowed land to be 
reallocated as needs changed ceased to operate (officially at least). 
Greater rigidity has also occurred or is likely, where the 'traditional' 
land tenure system has been given status in national constitutions 
without precise codification or survey. Western Samoa and Vanuatu 
are examples. Cases which come before the Western Samoa Land and 
Titles Court have tended to be settled on the basis of arguments which 
draw on older conditions rather than current practice and for many 
years it was the case that the Court could be 'regarded as a mechanism 
integral to the maintenance of chiefship' (Powles 1986:206). This is less 
true today and there are signs of a more pragmatic approach but, as 
O'Meara (1995) shows, the decisions of the Court still draw on custom 
which lags a long way behind practice. 
In Vanuatu, where the independence constitution vested the ownership 
of all land in the 'custom owners' there is an implicit assumption that 
such ownership is identifiable, generally accepted, and relatively 
unchanging over time. Rodman (1995:92-102) has shown that this is 
not necessarily the case. On the island of Ambae, for example, major 
changes occurred in the nature of customary holdings in the early twenti­
eth century in response to the reduction of warfare and the adoption 
of copra production as a road to power and as a role for big men. Such 
men established relatively large and permanent holdings, in contrast 
to the smaller and less permanent holdings of previous times. There­
fore a basic question remains for Vanuatu if recording of landholdings 
is to proceed. W hat is to be the date for which the landholdings are to 
be formally recognised by the state? Should it be the time of contact, 
the beginning of the present century or the establishment of the Anglo­
French Condominium, the date of independence or the date of survey? 
Each could be justified. Each would give a different pattern of owner­
ship. And will there be mechanisms for transfer of ownership which 
might stand in lieu of older and no longer acceptable mechanisms such 
as force? An issue under political consideration in 1995 was how to 
adapt the customary land system to the needs of expanding urban 
areas. Should leaseholds be allowed and if so, on what conditions? 
Elections and political turmoil have left the matter open in Vanuatu in 
1996 but the same questions may also be asked in other countries and 
also remain unanswered. 
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Fiji is one country where such questions were answered in the late 
1930s and the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) was set up explicitly to 
regularise the leasing of Native Land, to protect Fijian interests, and to 
make unused land available for use by non-owners amongst both 
Fijian and other ethnic groups. A system of sanctioned leases was 
introduced and is controlled by the NLTB. The Board and the recorded 
owners receive specified shares of the rents. Some other countries 
have considered introducing comparable systems. Niue is a current 
example. But there is little uniformity within the region, except that in 
a number of countries outright alienation is not permitted and 
leasehold arrangements may be complex and difficult to establish. 
Despite the rigidity which has been introduced into codified or 
constitutionally sanctioned customary systems, extra-legal change has 
occurred in many areas. Pragmatism has often outweighed legality. 
The NLTB system worked relatively well in Fiji for some decades but 
is now under strain for several reasons. On the owners' side many feel 
that the system is too rigid, the rents they receive are too low in 
relation to the land's productivity, the chiefs receive too large a share 
of the rents, and the leases lock up the land in the hands of lessees for 
too long. Some have also voiced concern that the relevant act removes 
ultimate control of Native Land from the hands of the owning groups 
themselves. Lessees or would-be lessees have concerns about the 
difficulty of obtaining land, the security of leases and particularly the 
chances of renewal as large numbers of leases expire within the next 
few years. As a result, a whole range of extra-legal arrangements are 
now found. They include tenancies arranged directly between land­
owners and farmers outside the NLTB system, with much higher rents 
and much shorter terms. Sharecropping is common though its legality 
may be questionable. Native Reserve land, which cannot be leased 
legally to non-Fijians, is rented and occupied by non-Fijians with the 
informal consent of the owners. And Fijians from outside the land­
owning group may be allowed, under pseudo-traditional conventions, 
to reside on land over which they have no traditional rights. This last 
is a modem version of the old customary right of owners to accept 
outsiders as members of their community, but today the relationship 
may be basically commercial. 
Within areas held under customary tenure and used by members of 
the owning group, change in practice has also occurred in several 
countries. The details vary but there are some relatively common 
features. Most reflect changing technological, economic and social 
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needs and are related to the changing context for individuals and 
groups who are involved in commercial rather than subsistence 
agriculture; who wish to employ wage labour rather than rely on the 
mechanism of reciprocity; who need land for urban housing; who seek 
to migrate to areas where they have no immediate kin; who wish to 
take advantage of the monetary value of land near urban areas; or 
who wish to ensure adequate land is available and inheritable by their 
immediate family. 
One of the most common changes is what may be described as a 
process of privatising the customary land. This is usually based on the 
common traditional custom that if people have cleared and planted 
land, they may continue to control it as long as they continue to have it 
planted or in use, or intend to re-use it after a current fallow period. 
The adoption of long-term tree crops such as coconuts, cocoa, or coffee 
for commercial agriculture, or of pastoralism, placed an entirely new 
time span on this convention. Where a family's coconut requirements 
in a subsistence economy could be met from a few palms, the 
convention of separation of ownership of the palms and that of the 
land on which they grew created few problems. Others might plant 
food gardens under the scattered individually-owned palms. But once 
large areas were closely planted in a monocrop, say of coconuts, which 
might continue to be harvested for 50 years or more, the process of 
return to fallow and the possibility of reallocation was interrupted. 
An old Chinese proverb states that 'long tenancy becomes 
property' (Elvin 1970:107) and this is what has been happening in a 
number of places in the Pacific islands. The usufruct of land now 
remains in the same family for decades, and as agricultural activities 
are increasingly carried out within the nuclear family, or with paid 
labour independent of the wider kin or residential group, holdings are 
increasingly seen as being under the long-term control of individuals 
or nuclear families. As Macpherson (1988) has said in the title of a 
paper on Western Samoa, 'the road to power is a chainsaw', and some 
use a chainsaw to clear a large area which is then put under pasture in 
order to gain personal, secure, family tenure. In effect traditional 
features of customary tenure are being used to produce non­
traditional results, namely the establishment of long-term individual 
holdings. The process is not new in the region. Keesing (1934:280-281) 
noted such tendencies in Samoa in the 1930s and they were more 
clearly evident in the 1950s (Ward 1962); Chatterton (1974:15) reported 
such trends in Papua in the 1970s; they were evident in some forms in 
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Fiji in the late 1950s (Ward 1960); and I have already referred to the 
emergence of such forms in Vanuatu early this century (Rodman 
1995). Elsewhere the process may be less clearly developed but shows 
signs of emerging, as in Solomon islands where Larmour (1984:8) 
suggests that 'trustees' named of behalf of their owning group may 'in 
time appropriate rights of ownership to themselves', as some have 
done in Papua New Guinea. 
In the rather different case of Tonga, practice has also diverged 
from the post-constitutional 'custom' (James 1995). An extra-legal land 
market has developed. A number of older customary practices have 
been exploited to control and channel the succession to allotments. 
Informal leasing of parts of allotments is common. To counter 
problems of the inalienable nature of allotments in relation to 
provision of credit against the security of land, arrangements have 
been made for lending institutions to take control over of the 
management of enterprises or allotments in cases of default, but only 
until the loan involved has been worked off. 
These evolutionary changes within customary systems provide a 
dilemma for governments. The individualisation of holdings of 
customary land may be extra-legal or illegal, but may reflect what 
more and more people want, and may be more in accord with the 
concepts of those fostering 'development'. But it carries the risk that a 
few will attain control of the majority of the land, and leave some 
community members virtually landless. Allied to customary ways of 
transferring control of land to others, such processes could well meet 
many of the supposed requirements for effective development. But 
few Pacific island governments seem to have the will to accept that 
customary tenure practices change, or to give some validation to such 
processes. 
Having limited the extent to which customary land could be 
alienated, usually for the good paternalistic reason of protecting 
indigenous people from the socioeconomic effects of losing their land, 
colonial and independent governments have subsequently faced the 
need to make land available for enterprises which were not previously 
envisaged under customary tenure. Because of the rigidity installed 
into customary tenures it has usually been assumed that such land 
requirements had to be met outside the customary systems. Hence the 
use of the power, taken to itself by the state, to alienate customary land 
for state purposes and arrangements, such as those of the NLTB in Fiji, 
to regularise leases. In a number of countries it has proved difficult for 
Changing forms of communa l tenure I 29 
governments to manage the dual tenure systems and provide land for 
urban expansion or other non-customary activities. Vanuatu, Western 
Samoa and Niue have all been considering the problems at a political 
level in recent years but at present only Niue is endeavouring to 
introduce a new system. 
One factor which tends to hold the official view of customary 
tenure in a backward-looking posture is the extent to which its 
maintenance has become an integral part of both the process of 
creating national or ethnic identity, and the maintenance of the status 
and power of elites, including political leaders. Politicians use 
customary land and the associated tenure arrangements as markers 
differentiating their own people from others, and as important 
components of custom and national identity. Land and tenure systems 
are seen and trumpeted as key elements in the 'Fijian way of life', 
kastom,fa 'a Samoa, and custom which has been followed 'from time 
immemorial'. In arguing the need to maintain traditional ways, 
barriers are erected to official acknowledgment of the existence of, and 
the need for, change. 
There are political risks in advocating changes in customary land 
tenure. There may also be advantage in maintaining the rather fluid 
status quo if one is able to use traditional mechanisms for personal 
benefit. How long the current divergences between custom, law and 
practice can be tolerated is an open question. Official recognition of 
the de facto changes, and their acceptance into a new widely accepted 
version of customary land arrangements, may be slow. Yet the fact that 
they are occurring shows how adaptable customary tenure can be in 
the face of new needs. Perhaps more scope exists to build on this 
flexibility, to examine current practice and try to give it recognition, 
rather than to try and replace customary systems on the false 
assumption that they allow open access and hence are likely to have 
damaging or inhibiting consequences. As McCay and Acheson 
(1987:34) say, 'by equating common property [or, I would add, 
customary tenure] with open access, the tragedy-of-the-commons 
approach ignores important social institutions and their roles in 
managing the commons. Moreover, its policy solutions-government 
intervention or privatisation--can weaken or demolish existing 
institutions and worsen or even create 'tragedies of the commons [or 
of customary land]'. 
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Resolving property issues as a 
p recondition for g rowth : access to 
land in the Pacific is lands 
Satish Chand and Ron Duncan 
The island states in the South Pacific are heavily reliant on their 
natural resources for output, employment and earnings of foreign 
exchange. W hile these countries have had poor growth performance 
over the past two decades, improvement in access to natural resources 
is one area where there is potential for significant economic gains. This 
paper argues that subsistence affluence is non-existent in these 
countries and that their future prosperity depends on engagement in 
international trade, including inflows of foreign investment capital. 
Promotion of land-based investments, such as in agriculture and 
infrastructure, is one of the preconditions for growth. It is imperative, 
therefore, that security of access to land currently under communal 
ownership be enhanced so as to encourage efficient use of this 
resource and enhance the inflow of technology and capital. A model­
ling framework is developed which captures the major factors 
believed to create pressures for change in land tenure. 
All of the Pacific island countries are primary commodity 
dependent, with agriculture being the main source of output and 
exports . If this pattern of production and trade continues, there will be 
increasing pressure on land and land-based resources. Customary 
ownership of land and the role of land as a symbol of cultural heritage 
makes investigation of issues relating to land both complex and 
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sensitive. Researchers may have shied away from working on land 
issues in the island countries because of this sensitivity. We are aware 
of these concerns and our parameters are drawn so as to confine the 
discussion to the economics of making more productive use of a factor 
of production that may be in abundant supply in some, but not all, of 
these nations. 
From an econnomist's viewpoint, land is just another factor of 
production, with the peculiarity that it is relatively inelastic in supply. 
Customary ownership of land may give rise to the possibility of the 
'free-rider' problem, an issue that traditional societies may manage via 
customary laws. However, the absence of individual rights to use of 
land creates uncertainties with respect to investment, particularly 
investments that have long gestation periods before providing returns. 
Such investment includes those involving infrastructure which has 
external benefits for aggregate output. Insecurity of access to land 
could reduce private investment in infrastructure which in tum is 
likely to retard the rate of long-run economic growth. 
Globally, countries have moved away from customary ownership 
towards freehold title or to forms of leasehold which provide long­
term security of access for use of the land. These forms of tenure 
resolve the free-rider problem and provide the security of tenure 
needed for long-term investment. Ensuring long-term access to land 
also provides the necessary incentive for sustainable use of the 
resource. What factors determine that such changes in tenure or access 
take place? When can we expect to see such changes in the Pacific 
island countries? 
Each of the above issues and questions is treated in turn. W hilst 
our analysis may not cover all aspects of the land debate, we hope to 
have covered the salient features of the problem. This chapter first 
considers support for the view that the Pacific islands have 
'subsistence affluence' and have it for the foreseeable future, making 
changes in land tenure of little importance. The evidence suggests the 
opposite. The next section reviews land tenure systems in some Pacific 
islands (the choice of countries discussed is entirely data driven), and 
subsequently presents a discussion of the factors which may lead to 
pressure for more secure access to use of land. The final part of this 
chapter develops a modelling framework which can be utilised to 
discern the contribution of various factors to increases in the value of 
land resources. 
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Is there 'subsistence affluence' i n  the Pacific is lands? 
Images of dancing youths in grass skirts, swaying coconut palms, and 
fish-filled lagoons that appear on tourist brochures support the view 
that the South Pacific island countries enjoy what has been described 
as 'subsistence affluence'. However, in recent decades there have been 
high population growth, rapidly-monetising economies, rural-urban 
migration, the trading off of future consumption for present con­
sumption and the problems of land degradation. These developments 
are not at all consistent with economies being at stable but high living 
standards derived from their immediate environments. If we assume 
that populations were in equilibrium a century ago and use half of the 
current population growth rates to back-cast this sustainable subsistence 
level of population density, the numbers suggest that the current levels 
are far above a sustainable subsistence level. Under our conservative 
assumptions, the sustainable subsistence density in Kiribati is 38 people 
per square kilometre when the current density is two hundred and fifty 
per cent higher! 
Table 2.1 Some basic indicators for the Forum island cou ntries 
Country Per Capita Agriculture Pop. Sustainable Growth Population 
GD P• in GDP densityc subsistence rate of GDP growth1 
(%)b densityd (%)• 
Fij i 4007 1 9.6  39.7 1 7. 1  2 .6 1 .7 
Ki ribati 24.3 1 00.0 38.3 -3.5 1 .9 
PNG 1 425 27.0 8.2 2.5 2. 1 2.4 
Solomon Is .  44.3 1 0.6 2 . 1 6.8 3.3 
Tonga 38.6 1 30.6 1 05.4 2.0 0.4 
Vanuatu 1 677 20.0 1 1 .7 2.8 2.6 2.9 
W. Samoa 2064 39.9 56.0 40.9 0.2 0.6 
Notes: a Data are for 1990 and in 1985 US$ (Chain Index). b Data is from Pacific 
Economic Bulletin 10(1):104. c Density is per square kilometre. Data are for 1989. d 
Subsistence population density is computed as that of a century ago with the 
assumption that population then was at a steady state and grew on average at half the 
S
= D(1 9 8 9) 
reported annual rate,that is {l + .§!->1 0 0  where d is population density in 1989 and s is 
2 
the growth rate. e Calculated from data in a. ' Annual average from 1970 to 1993 period. 
Sources: asummers, R. and Heston, A., 19'91, The Penn World Tables: an expanded set of 
international comparisons', Quarterly Journal of Economics CVI:l--45. c, d, and e World Bank, 
1992. World Bank World Tables, World Bank, Washington DC. 
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Given that the days of subsistence affluence (if any) are past for 
most Pacific islanders, the feasible economic option for these nations is 
to grow on the basis of trade and specialisation in areas of their 
comparative advantage. There is little reason why the future could not 
be bright for the citizens of these nations. The link between population 
density and income can be broken via trade and productivity growth. 
Relative to some wealthy Asian nations such as Singapore, the Pacific 
island countries are well endowed with natural wealth. Furthermore, 
as the Pacific island countries lag behind in use of technology, they 
have strong potential for gains arising out of catch-up growth. 
Landownership  and use i n  the Pacific islands 
Most Pacific island countries have a communal system of landowner­
ship. Most of today's high-income societies began with similar land 
tenure systems. When communities are self-sufficient, with stable, 
low-density populations, customary land tenure arrangements are 
appropriate to their main pursuits-hunting/ gathering or land­
intensive shifting cultivation. A subsistence economy is basically in a 
static (no growth), autarkic (no trade) situation, with no surplus to 
trade and zero or low productivity growth. It appears rational to have 
communal landownership in a situation where the land requires 
protection from invasion. Furthermore, in traditional societies, land­
ownership and governance are intertwined: there is little need for 
separation of landownership and political control over its use. 
One problem with communal ownership is that title to a particular 
piece of land is often not clearly defined. Another is the potential for 
the free-rider problem associated with global commons. The free-rider 
problem is not unique to landownership. It appears in situations 
where there is access to some commonly held property. Consider the 
case of a fishing pond that belongs to a group of individuals. It is in 
the interest of the group as a whole to preserve the yield of fish from 
the pond, but for any individual the incentives are to exploit the 
resource so long as his /her actions are not detected. If every member 
of the group follows this strategy, the pond is depleted-an undesirable 
outcome for the group as a whole. One solution to this problem is 
cooperation amongst the members so as to maintain the extraction of 
fish at a sustainable level. Traditional societies typically had rules 
('tabus') that ensured this cooperation. The clan head was charged 
with the responsibility of enforcing these rules, and encroachment of 
these tabus entailed severe punishment. Furthermore, the landowning 
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groups were generally small, making the costs of cooperation low and 
the probability of being caught for violation of the tabus high. Non­
traditional systems deviate from a number of the conditions that pre­
vailed among such societies. For example, current technology poses 
fewer constraints on the size of farm plots and far more specialisation 
in production is possible now due to both international trade and 
formal types of employment. 
The adoption of market-based institutions allows scope for more 
efficient use of land than under a cooperative system. In the former 
case, the individual who will use it most efficiently will be able to bid 
the highest price to gain access. Access to land may be gained either 
through freehold or leasehold title. However, in order for leasehold title 
to be as efficient as freehold, the length of lease must be sufficiently long 
and secure not to inhibit the titleholder to invest in the land. Security of 
tenure will be assessed in terms of the reliability of the state (in the case 
of freehold title) and the state or other owners (in the case of leasehold 
title) in guaranteeing continuation of tenure-what in economic terms is 
known as the 'reputation' effect. 
All of the Pacific islands are now essentially market-based 
economies and democracy exists in all of them except Tonga. Individual 
freedom is entrenched within their constitutions. Modem technology 
is available, people are literate and aware of their rights, and per 
capita output has been on the increase, though at a pace that is much 
lower than in neighbouring East Asian economies. The creation of 
central forms of government has led to the breakdown or dilution of 
the traditional, village-level government together with its controls 
over use of natural resources. The landownership system in many of 
these states is still based on the traditional system though the extent of 
communal ownership of land varies. 
Table 2.2 Categories of landownership in Fij i and Papua New Guinea 
(per cent) 
Fiji 
Papua New Guinea 
Freehold 
7 
State-owned 
1 0  
3 
Communal title 
83 
97 
Sources: Prasad, B. and C. Tisdell 1996. 'Getting property rights 'right': land tenure in 
Fij i', Pacific Economic Bulletin 11(1):31-46, for Fiji; and Moaina, R., 1997. 'Mining and 
petroleum', in Ila Temu (ed.), Papua New Guinea: a 20/2.0 vision, National Centre for 
Development Studies, Canberra and National Research Institute, Papua New 
Guinea :llS-35, for Papua New Guinea. 
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There exist a number of impediments to gaining tenure in land by 
trade. For example, trade in traditional land title is barred by legislation 
in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. Unclear titles to land is another 
impediment. The practice of 'handing-back' land to its traditional 
owners-which has taken place in Australia and Fiji within the past 
years-adds further insecurity to usage rights to land. These insecurities 
pose risks to investment in land. Hence an investor contemplating 
investing in land is going to factor these insecurities into the decision 
process. This may not only result in under-investment in land, but also 
could bias investment away from physical infrastructure, in tum, 
having a negative impact on long-run economic growth. We take this 
issue up in more detail in the next section. 
Land as a factor of prod uction 
To an economist, land is a crucial factor of production with the main 
issue being to ensure efficient use of this resource. Unlike capital and 
labour, land has a low elasticity of supply. Changes such as terms of 
trade gains in favour of products that are intensive in land use would 
raise demand for land. This may bring into use previously marginal 
land (perhaps reclamation of mangroves) but ultimately the supply of 
land is finite. Thus, any payment for land can be considered as a pure 
economic rent and any increased demand for land will increase the 
rent. Land is a heterogenous factor, differing considerably in terms of 
fertility and access. For example, agricultural land near an urban 
centre will command a higher price than land of the same yield some 
distance away. The difference in land value in this case is pure 
economic rent resulting from difference in location. 
Population growth may also raise demand for land. Population 
growth may take place as a result of essentially external causes. The 
introduction of clean water and improved sanitation has reduced 
infant mortality rates worldwide and led to sharp increases in fertility 
and population growth rates in most developing countries over the 
past 40 years. As Boserup (1965) argued, in traditional systems 
population growth and the resulting increase in population density 
can lead to higher agricultural productivity through farming 
becoming more labour-intensive with the fallow period in shifting­
cultivation systems becoming shorter. But there has to be 
accompanying investment, either in the short-term, such as the 
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incorporation of organic fertiliser or in the longer-term, as in infra­
structure to improve water or soil management. As a result, there is an 
increased pressure for greater security of access to land. 
But population growth stemming from such external causes is not 
likely to be a primary source of growth in agricultural productivity. 
Moreover, as Boserup argues, too great a population density can mean 
that the necessary investment may not be forthcoming and the effect 
on agricultural productivity may be adverse. Boserup's argument is 
that only in some circumstances will the line of causation run from 
increased population density to increased agricultural productivity to 
increased pressure for greater security of access to the land. The line of 
causation mostly runs in the opposite direction. Higher agricultural 
productivity and higher incomes lead, in the shorter run, to better 
health and increased fertility and life expectancy and therefore to 
higher population growth rates. In the longer run, the fertility rates 
adjust to the increased life expectancy and the population growth rate 
falls. But it could be that in some situations increased population 
density is an important trigger for traditional societies to seek changes 
in land tenure. 
Crocombe (1995) saw demand for land and land tenure changes as 
being determined in part by the mobility of the population. For example, 
if there is movement of population from rural to urban areas, there 
will be increased demand for land to be made available for housing 
and for non-agricultural productive purposes. Other forms of land 
use, for mining projects, for electricity and telecommunications trans­
mission, and for airports, roads and ports, also create a demand for 
better security of access. 
A static-equilibrium, subsistence economy may also be disturbed 
by becoming open to trade with other economies. Trade may result 
from a lowering of transport costs, or of any other transactions costs, 
which makes trade more profitable. Feeny (1988) argues that opening 
a closed economy to trade breaks the link between population density 
and the demand for land. As he sees it, in a closed economy, increasing 
population density increases land rents relative to real wages but with 
openness to trade, the relevant prices of commodities become those 
determined on international markets and not those determined within 
the closed economy. 'Real land rents are now linked to the endow­
ments of land, labor, and capital, to production technology, and to the 
external terms of trade' (Feeny 1988:276). 
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Introduction of new techniques of agricultural production can also 
lead to institutional changes in land tenure and security of access for 
use of the land. In the short run, the existing security of access will 
affect the kinds of technology which are adopted. If security of access 
is poor, or short term as with sharecropping, then farmers or other 
users will tend to adopt only those new technologies from which the 
benefits can be realised within the period of security of access. For 
example, improved fertilisers, pesticides, or crop varieties which yield 
their benefits over the crop production period will be favoured over 
investments needing greater security of access such as water or soil 
management infrastructure. Technologies requiring access to large 
areas of land, such as machinery, will not be adopted if land tenure 
and access does not allow amalgamation of contiguous land to form 
large farming areas. 1 In the long term, however, the prospects of 
productivity gains from adoption of new technologies can be expected 
to provide pressures for changes in land tenure and security of access. 
Significant gains in productivity from the 'green revolution' are 
attributed to use of chemical fertilisers, improved plant varieties, and 
irrigation. The last is an infrastructure investment, one that would be 
undertaken in a climate where security to access is assured. 
Other factors may increase or decrease the pressures for institutional 
changes in land tenure and access arrangements in Pacific islands 
countries. The opportunities for earning income from other sources 
may lessen such pressures. For example, customary landowners who 
receive income from mining projects or timber harvesting, or remittances 
from relatives overseas, could presumably see less need to increase 
production from their land, and therefore generate less pressure to 
change land tenure arrangements. Conversely, loss of other income 
earning possibilities could increase the pressure. Since New Zealand 
reduced its aid transfers to Niue, resulting in the loss of employment 
by several hundred public servants, their demand for land to allow 
them to engage in agricultural activities (primarily, growing taro for 
the New Zealand market) has led to pressure to have local landowners 
and the many absentee landowners make their land more readily 
available for use by others. 
It is also conceivable, therefore, that the large per capita aid 
transfers to Pacific islands countries are inhibiting institutional change 
in land tenure. This could happen due to the aid transfers leading to 
the appreciation of the exchange rate, thus making land-based export 
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activities less desirable. Or the 'rents' available to the political elite 
from the aid transfers could have the impact of making them uninterested 
in pushing through institutional change in land tenure. Availability of 
other income-earning possibilities from land, such as mining and 
timber royalties, may alternatively increase the pressure for more 
secure title to the land-what is at issue is security over rents from the 
land, whatever the source. Increases in land disputes can therefore be 
seen as a sign of pressure for change in titling and security of access. 
This discussion has concentrated on the possible demand-induced 
pressures for institutional change in land tenure/ access. Supply-side 
factors-what Feeny has described as 'the willingness and capability 
of the fundamental institutions of government to provide new 
arrangements' (Feeny 1988:273)-may also be highly. With central 
governments only of recent origin and generally considered to be 
'weak' in relation to the powers of clan leaders, governments may in 
fact face great difficulty in delivering change in land tenure 
arrangements. Some of the alienation of land from customary 
ownership under colonial rule in these countries was reversed upon 
gaining independence. In several cases, customary ownership was 
recognised in the new constitutions. Sutherland (1984) argues that the 
creation of the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) in Fiji, which controls 
all land use on behalf of communal landowners, was in fact a 
monopolisation of power over land use under traditional chiefs and 
has served to freeze institutional change in land tenure. Prasad and 
Tisdell (1996) agree that the formation of the Native Land Trust Board 
'provides it with absolute monopoly power in the determination of the 
land rents and the allocation of leases' (1996:26). This is a sub-optimal 
position for efficient land use and, moreover, much of the rent 
collected from land leases 'is lost in terms of administrative costs of 
the NLTB and payments to heads of mataqalis' (Prasad and Tisdell 
1996:25). The case for the NLTB is put by Ratu Mosese Volavola (1995), 
General Manager of the NLTB, who argues that the NLTB was an 
institutional response to the perceived 'chaos' of the 14,000 
landowning units negotiating their lease rents with potential tenants, 
and that it is an arrangement which makes land more readily available 
under more secure arrangements for use by non-landowners. Within 
Papua New Guinea, there is an ongoing struggle between the state 
and the landowners over the rights to the rents from the land, 
particularly from mining projects but from timber as well. 
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Transaction costs of changing land tenure can be very large, as 
many writers have recognised (for instance, Binswanger et al. 1993) . 
Land surveys and the resolution of the disputes over ownership are 
necessary before changes can be made. These procedures are usually 
very involved, time-consuming and costly. As Binswanger et al. also 
point out, customary landowners have every right to be suspicious of 
the results of institutional change in landownership as in most cases 
the better-informed and politically better-connected end up distorting 
the new system in their favour. The high costs of institutional change 
and resistance to change because of concern over the results could 
therefore provide strong reasons for the lack of change in land tenure 
in the Pacific islands countries. 
Which of these several factors is more important in leading to 
changes in land tenure and/or in developing more secure access for 
land use? 
Model l ing pressures for more secu re access 
If the ownership of all land is given to a single institution, this 
institution will act as a monopolist. If we further assume that the 
markets of all the other factors of production are perfectly competitive, 
then the monopolist will extract all the rent from economic activities 
which use the land. The monopolist could either charge a rental that is 
equal to the net yield from the land (Y) or sell the land at price (V), the 
association between these two variables being given by equation (1) 
below 
V =  y (1)  r 
where r is the sector-specific opportunity cost of capital. In this case r 
will include the nominal rate of interest, the rate of inflation and any 
sector-specific risks of investment, i.e., 
r = i - rc + p  (2) 
where i is the nominal rate of interest, 1t is the rate of inflation and p is 
the risk factor associated with investment in land. For simplicity, 
equation (2) assumes no country-specific risk.2 Totally differentiating 
(1) lets us begin to see the possible sources of changes in land value. 
dY Y dV = - - - dr (3) 
r r2 
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Yield, y, can be further decomposed as a product of price and 
quantity of output. Letting q and k represent per capita output and 
capital stock, respectively, and p the price of land-intensive products 
relative to other products, yield per worker is given by 
y = pq = pAf(k) (4)3 
where A is an index of technology and f represents the standard neo­
classical production function in intensive form. Differentiating ( 4) and 
substituting the result in (3) gives 
Ask ,.. q ,.. ,.. y dv = - k + - A +  yp - - dr (5) 
r r r2 
where a circumflex denotes the growth of the respective variable and 
sk denotes the share of capital in output. The identity in (5) tells us that 
the value of land increases with an increase in one or a combination of 
capital intensity, production technology, and the terms of trade in 
favour of land-intensive products and declines with an increase in r. 
We consider each of these components individually and discuss the 
potential role of policy in influencing these variables. 
Taking account of k = K/L where K and L are stocks of capital and 
labour, respectively, then 
k = i< - L  (6) 
Substituting equation (6) into equation (5) and letting a =  As/r, b = q/r, 
and n the population growth rate gives 
dv = a(sY - n) + /3A + yp - � dr (7) r 
In the case of a completely open economy, the first right-hand side 
term in equation (7) has no role since complete mobility of either 
factor is going to be sufficient for factor price equalisation to hold even 
in the presence of non-tradeables. The other variables will determine 
changes in the value of land. The rate of technological growth will 
depend on technological growth in the rest of the world as well as 
indigenous technological progress. Sectoral terms of trade will be 
determined by world markets. The final right-hand side variable is a 
measure of country and sector-specific opportunity cost of capital. 
In a completely closed economy, domestic savings and population 
growth together determine growth in capital intensity. In this 
economy, high population growth together with low savings will slow 
growth to the extent that it may be negative. 
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Realistically, countries will lie somewhere in between being either 
completely open or completely closed, although economies moving 
out of subsistence are likely to be nearer to the latter. Capital intensity 
can be related to scale in terms of land use, as larger farms make use of 
machines more economical. If the land tenure system does not permit 
efficient use of machines then adoption of such technology will be 
inhibited. However, the existence of such technology will create pressures 
for changes in land tenure. 
Given that all of the Pacific island nations lag substantially in terms 
of the technological frontier, A can rise through catch-up via adoption 
and adaptation of international best-practice technology. Both the 
capital intensity and technology variables would be enhanced via 
freeing up of foreign direct investment and education leading to 
human capital deepening. The rate of technology growth will also be 
enhanced by research which adapts foreign technology to local 
conditions. 
As for the terms-of-trade changes, the Pacific island countries have 
little influence on global prices. The removal of price distortions, 
including over-valued real exchange rates, against agriculture and 
other land-based products will provide gains over the transition 
period. Any economic rents, including foreign aid payments and 
overseas remittances, will also inflate the real exchange rate and hence 
constitute a bias against agriculture. Data on effective rates of 
protection for these countries is unavailable except for Fiji where it is 
shown that significant bias against agriculture exists (Chand 1996). 
The last term in (5) can be influenced by changes in any component 
of r as reflected in equation (2) above. Freeing up of capital controls 
and removal of restrictions on foreign direct investment are both going 
to lower r. Other country-specific factors such as threats of nationalisa­
tion will raise r. Finally, sector-specific risks such as those relating to 
insecure property rights in the natural resource sector will add a sector­
specific risk component. If the value of the resource is to be maximised, 
then r has to be kept as close as possible to the world price of capital. 
Conclusion 
Land has been an important resource in the Pacific islands and is 
likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Given the relatively poor 
growth performance of these economies over the past two decades 
and the desire of the population to improve their living standards, 
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strategies for more efficient use of available resources have to be 
adopted. This paper argues that one of the fronts that can be explored 
is raising the efficiency of land use. Lack of security to land has been 
an impediment to investment, providing incentives for under­
utilisation of the resource. Given that land-based projects have long 
gestation periods but generate positive externalities for the rest of the 
economy, security of access to land is crucial for raising efficiency as 
well as the rate of economic growth. If these states are to attract 
foreign capital for development, then provision of such security is 
crucial for economic prosperity. 
But providing such enhanced security of tenure does not necessarily 
imply that the Pacific island countries have to forego customary 
ownership. As Crocombe (1995) notes, it is the security of access which 
is crucial. For example, customary ownership with long-term leases 
would be sufficient for sustainable and efficient use of land. 
The modelling framework developed here is amenable to empirical 
implementation for future research. The challenge is to find suitable 
proxies for the variables in the model. The estimates from the proposed 
empirical exercise give some idea of the relative importance of variables 
which affect the pressures for change in land tenure so as to permit 
greater investment and faster growth. 
Notes 
Helpful comments from Ross Gamaut and Neil Vousden on an 
earlier draft of this chapter are acknow !edged. 
1. Prasad and Tisdell (1996) point out that sugar farmers in Fiji have 
become reluctant to invest in long-term farming techniques 
because the leases to the land expire shortly, with no guarantee that 
leases will be renewed. 
2. Incorporation of a country-specific risk will decompose r into two 
components, a sector-specific and a country-specific component. 
3. Small letters are used to denote levels of the respective variable in 
per capita terms. 
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I t's the land, stupid ! 
The moral economy of resource 
ownership in Papua N ew Guinea 
Ch ris Bal lard 
The ties that bind 
In her novel, Postcards, Annie Proulx sets about providing an identity 
for Loyal Blood, her rural American, Anglo-Saxon protagonist 
A sense of his place, his home, flooded him . . .  His blood, urine, feces 
and semen, the tears, strands of hair, vomit, flakes of skin, his infant 
and childhood teeth, the clippings of finger and toenails, all the 
effluvia of his body were in that soil, part of that place. T he work of his 
hands had changed the shape of the land, the weirs in the steep ditch 
beside the lane, the ditch itself, the smooth fields were echoes of 
himself in the landscape, for the laborer 's vision and strength persists 
after the labor is done (1994:8�). 
For those of us for whom ties to land consist of casual contacts with 
small and often infrequently tended suburban gardens, one of the 
more difficult exercises in imagination is to conceive of the 
relationship between rural communities and the lands and the 
resources that they consider theirs. Yet what is doubly interesting 
about Proulx's attempt to situate Loyal Blood in the landscape is the 
shallow history and narrow social context of his location in place. 
There are no appeals to a past which extends beyond his own life, no 
sense of his embeddedness within a community and its history of 
engagement with the land, its 'language of memory'. Instead, his voice 
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finds its ground in a personal stratigraphy, the sediment of his 
individual labour. For perhaps the majority of people commenting, 
legislating or advising on land issues in Papua New Guinea-the 
lettered elite, as it were-the construction of personal identity is at a 
double remove from that of rural Melanesians: both in its emphasis on 
the labour or performance of the individual, and in its excision of the 
latter 's deeply sedimented ties, through a community, to a specific 
landscape. 
To observe that rural communities in Melanesia enjoy some 
'special' relationship with the land is now an almost dangerously 
common act of elision, as though rehearsing this well-worn phrase 
allows that relationship then to be put aside while the main thrust of 
analysis is pursued elsewhere. But because local communities at most 
resource projects in the region will stubbornly insist on making 
repeated reference to this 'special' relationship, I want to take up the 
question of the relationship between land and identity, and to consider 
specifically the way in which landownership confers 'voice'-the right 
to speak and the ability to influence the flow of benefits from the land 
and its resources. 
'Land'-as a shorthand for ties to locality, whether terrestrial or 
marine-is the basis for membership and nationality for most 
Melanesians. A claim to land, rather than some abstract notion of 
citizenship, is how the majority of Melanesians secure a foothold on 
the political stage and gain the attention of the state. Land is both the 
prize in the process of resource development and the means of access 
to the contest between communities, who insist on their birthright and 
prior occupation, and the state, which asserts its sovereign and 
constitutional rights to certain elements of the land (Ballard 1996) . 
The terms for this debate hinge upon what Munro (1996) has 
described as the 'moral economy' of the state. How do states, and 
particularly new states such as those in Melanesia, go about identifying 
and establishing the extent of their authority? The transition from 
colonialism poses a number of problems for the sovereignty of the 
state, particularly in its role as 'the final arbiter of property 
rights . . .  Where massive coercive capacity (or will) is absent and the 
transformation or regulation of social relations is the goal, the 
establishment of common ethico-political ground is essential' (Munro 
1996:145) . If communities constitute themselves through a 'language 
of memory', then the challenge for the state, as Munro describes it, is 
to 'insert the presuppositions of state authority into that language and 
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remoralise the political forms of local authority so as to place the 
state's institutions at the centre of the community. In a sense, if the 
village is to be brought within the state, the state must be brought into 
the village' (Munro 1996:141). The capacity of newly independent 
states thus rests, to an important degree, on the extent to which the 
authority of the state is accorded recognition in the village. 
What I try to suggest in this chapter is that the problems 
confronting Melanesian governments in the development of their 
natural resources have as much to do with issues of legitimacy and 
national identity as they do with the legal resolution of property issues 
or the appropriateness of economic models. Where the institutions of 
the state have little or no presence, material or symbolic, in the village, 
the ability of the state to insist upon its sovereignty-its voice-is open 
to challenge. Currently, state sovereignty comes to the fore most 
obviously in Melanesian societies in the debate over resource 
ownership and the competing claims founded upon relationships to 
land. If we are to understand the 'moral calculus of power ' (Lonsdale 
cited in Munro 1996: 119) of Melanesian states, we shall need first to 
describe the links between land and identity that are already present 
in rural communities and then to appreciate how those links are being 
refashioned and transformed in the encounter with the state and with 
resource developers. The chapter concludes with some observations 
on the practical difficulties of land mobilisation in an atmosphere of 
limited tolerance for state intervention, and a brief foray into the 
nature of the debate over the ecological sustainability of resource 
development in Papua New Guinea. 
Land, identity, and land tenure in Papua New Gui nea 
One of the more widely cited statements about land in Papua New 
Guinea comes from three Bougainvillean students who wrote in 1974 
that 
land is our physical life [and] our social life; it is marriage; it is status; 
it is security; it is politics; in fact, it is our only world . . .  We have little 
or no experience of social survival detached from the land. For us to be 
completely landless is a nightmare which no dollar in the pocket or 
dollar in the bank will allay; we are a threatened people (Dove, 
Miriung and Togolo 1974:182) .1 
Like the presence of taro or sweet potato in a Highlands meal, no 
public statement by a Papua New Guinea leader on the issue of 
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identity is complete without reference to land (Narokobi 1980, 1986; 
Samana 1988). The basis for this link between land and identity can be 
considered through reference to the Huli people, of the Haeapugua 
Basin in the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea, who have an 
identity as Huli only through kinship ties to other Huli, and 
collectively to the landscape of the basin (Ballard 1995). 
A sense of the local landscape pervades every aspect of social life in 
Haeapugua, in clan and personal names, as a subject for speech and 
song, as the source of materials for clothing and decoration, and in the 
type and quality of foodstuffs. As elsewhere in Melanesia, this sense of 
identity-through-place finds expression in the common statement that 
water from the streams of one's own land is the sweetest-all other 
streams taste different and this taste is one of the markers of difference 
that establishes identity. If you were to take the Huli out of Haeapugua, 
as one group, they would no doubt thrive-as Huli do in all the 
metropolitan centres of Papua New Guinea. But without access and 
reference to their land, they would cease to be Huli. Urban Huli 
remain Huli largely through reference to other Huli, and particularly 
to those who remain 'in place'. Conceptions of what it is to be a social 
being are grounded in a specific territory, and the complete relocation 
of a community would offer no alternative means of reproducing that 
particular being. This is why it is difficult for rural communities to 
comprehend the notion of an outright and permanent sale or transfer 
of title to customary land-the only compelling arguments for such a 
case in the past have been those of overwhelming military force, or the 
threat of such force. 
Across Papua New Guinea, people in public conversation will 
deny that wars were traditionally fought over land.2 Instead, pigs, 
women, insults, and deaths are cited as proximate causes for conflicts 
in which land was temporarily or permanently seized. Yet it is quite 
obvious, over a longer span of time and with the benefit of hindsight, 
that many wars were fought precisely over land and resources, and 
with the specific intention of holding and occupying lands previously 
belonging to others. In the Haeapugua Basin, where I documented the 
oral history of ownership of some 3,000 garden blocks on the basin 
floor (Ballard 1995), what emerged clearly was that, while minor wars 
served to test and in some cases alter relationships with one's enemies 
and allies, the major wars periodically reconfigured the social landscape 
on a massive scale. The largest clan in the basin has systematically 
routed one neighbour after another, raising its holdings of the rich 
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swampland margin areas from some 20 per cent in about 1820 to over 
70 per cent today. But, in public contexts, people in the Haeapugua 
basin will vehemently deny that any war is ever fought for land. Thus 
the clan with the largest holdings at Haeapugua justifies its possession 
of new land on the grounds of failure to compensate for previous 
homicides (while refusing all attempts at compensation).  If land 
appears sacrosanct in this way, it reflects a form of respect for one's 
neighbours, an acknowledgement of the universal nature of ties 
between land and identity. To covet someone else's land is to threaten 
to exterminate them, to assume or consume their identity. 
Crucially, even where military conquest forces communities off 
their lands, their claims to that land are never entirely relinquished or 
extinguished. In about 1890, in one of the wars waged for territory in 
the Haeapugua basin, the Bogorali clan were dispersed, taking refuge 
with kin in the other Huli valleys. More than a century later, they still 
believe that they will ultimately return to their clan land. During the 
1980s Bogorali clan members patiently orchestrated marriages in a 
coordinated attempt to insinuate themselves into the victorious clan, a 
strategy that was quickly overturned when it was discovered. Today, 
Bogorali children are still taught the names of streams and other 
features of a landscape that they have never seen at close quarters. 
One of their leaders, Hebe Gulugu, expresses the anguish of the 
dispossessed 
The roots [of our clan] are still there, as are some of the branches; I left 
them there, for some day I will go back. Hubi Ngoari mountain is 
mine. Padabi river springs from the heart of my fathers. Where the 
Dere river runs is mine . . .  But now I am living under the arm of another 
clan and only my words go back there. 
However one cares to phrase the nature of this 'special' relation­
ship, there can be little doubt that it is manifest in a particularly 
resilient form of attachment to land, and that these ties are not seen to 
diminish swiftly over time. This is probably an accurate observation 
for most small-scale rural societies in Melanesia with at least some 
history of residential stability. For the purposes of this chapter, the 
relevant lesson is that the enduring nature of this form of connection 
must have significant implications for the long-term practical outcome 
of any attempt at land reform. 
To what extent can traditional systems of land tenure be said to 
reflect the qualities of this special relationship? A critical observation 
to be made about rural Melanesian society is that, in an important 
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sense, there are no discrete sets of principles or forms of behaviour 
that pertain exclusively to the issue of land tenure. Questions relating 
to land cannot be dissociated from a host of other social and political 
structures within a community. Principles of land tenure, carefully 
elicited and codified by legal anthropologists, can more accurately be 
described as rhetorical positions deployed in specific political 
contexts.3 In appealing to different and often contradictory principles 
of land tenure, or indeed any other aspect of social life, orators in land 
disputes are simply drawing upon a wide range of cultural norms and 
precedents as these contribute to their position in a particular debate. 
There is a sense of this processual nature of Melanesian land 
ownership that suffers considerably in the translation to legal code. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the role played by recognition 
and acknowledgement in determining rights to land. Rather than 
clearcut distinctions between landowners and land users, there is an 
infinite series of shades of grey between the two. Claims to the ownership 
of land usually rest on descent from ancestors who are held to have 
been the first to use the land; but, as a precedent, the sense of rights 
created through ownership introduces the possibility of multiple 
claims, as users who are not owners also create rights for themselves 
and their descendants. Many land disputes revolve around just this 
form of conundrum; but it is not through the application of hard and 
fast rules that such disputes are resolved. Rather, those involved in the 
dispute arrive at solutions that are most likely to receive broad 
recognition within the community. Recognition derives from a 
negotiated consensus over the general observance of norms and 
principles in the dispute process, rather than a rigorous application of 
those norms in the form of a code. 
The ownership of land is thus enmeshed in a web of other forms of 
relationship. Land cannot be 'just' land. It cannot be thought of as 
somehow free of its social and cultural contexts, its human load. The 
case is firming for Peter Sack's proposition that 'land in Papua New 
Guinea owns the people, instead of the people owning the land' 
(1974:200). In short, land cannot, under the present conditions of social 
life in rural Melanesia, be conceived of as a commodity. Much as Eric 
Wolf has observed, 'Land . . .  is not a commodity in nature; it only becomes 
such when defined as such by a new cultural system intent on creating 
a new kind of economics' (1971 :277). This is not to suggest that land in 
Melanesia cannot be commodified, but rather to make the obvious but 
no less important qualification that the social and cultural changes 
required to effect this transformation will have to be considerable. 
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The state and the uncaptured landowner 
If, as others suggest in this volume (Duncan and Duncan, Chand and 
Duncan), commodification of land is the price of engaging with the 
larger world of capital, how is this transformation to be approached, 
and what are to be the respective roles of state and community in the 
process? How have colonial and independent states asserted their 
rights to land and resources, and what sort of recognition have these 
assertions received in rural communities? A common observation on 
the postcolonial state in Papua New Guinea is that it has experienced 
a series of challenges to its authority as its 'reach' and the supply of 
services, to the rural hinterland in particular, have declined (Narokobi 
1986, Strathern 1993, Standish 1994) . 
In trying to comprehend the post-independence contraction of the 
state in Papua New Guinea, the role of state violence-or the threat of 
such violence-will require more attention than it has perhaps 
received. Certainly it was the monopoly on firearms that underwrote 
the success of the colonial administrations in the 'pacification' of the 
Highlands region from the 1920s on (Kituai 1993, Polier 1995:259). The 
significance of state coercion during the colonial period is more easily 
discerned from a post-independence perspective. Indeed, Hank 
Nelson (1995) has made it clear that anxiety about the deployment of 
force in an increasingly scrutinised environment was one of the key 
factors in the accelerated departure of Australian rule. There is no 
comprehensive overview of the state's internal use of force in Papua 
New Guinea since 1975, but my impression (gained through 
experience in the Highlands) is of a continuing but much less 
strategically guided legacy of state violence, particularly through the 
instrument of police raids. The colonial government may have been a 
military force to be negotiated with but, under the conditions of post­
Independence Papua New Guinea, the legitimacy of the State's 
monopoly on the use of violence is very much in question. As 
Narakobi (1986:6) describes it, 'in very many respects, the number one 
enemy of the village or the clan is a thing called the Independent State 
of Papua New Guinea'. This is an attitude that extends to the 
ownership of land and resources, as Narakobi again makes clear: 'As a 
Minister of State and the Attorney-General, [I have to say] that the law 
[on State ownership of minerals] is correct, but as a "native" or as a 
villager, that [it] is not correct; I will never agree to it' (Ballard 
1996:77) . 
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In his 1969 discussion of land alienation during the colonial period, 
Peter Sack wrote, somewhat ambiguously, that 'the natives still believe 
their land is not really alienated' (1969:10-11) .  By the 1990s, any trace 
of this ambiguity has been extinguished, for the 'natives' now clearly 
know this for a fact. With just over 1 per cent of the total land area 
alienated, and the remainder recognised as customary land (Larmour 
1991 :1 ), the term 'landowner ' in Papua New Guinea connotes an 
unusual degree of inclusion. Colin Filer (forthcoming) has recently 
documented the emergence of the 'landowner ' as a cultural and 
political actor in Papua New Guinea. Tracking the incidence of use of 
the term 'landowner ' in the Post-Courier newspaper, he proposes that 
the development of 'landowner ' status as 'the principal vehicle of 
national populism . .  . is a phenomenon which owes a good deal to the 
mineral prospecting boom of the early 1980s'. Papua New Guineans of 
the 1990s define themselves as 'landowners' in much the same way 
that Australians under a Coalition government now find themselves 
defined as (reluctant) 'taxpayers'. The agencies of definition may 
differ, but both imply a transformation in the fundamental orientation 
connoted by the term 'citizen' and a reduction in the role of the state. 
The rise of the 'landowner ' has been accompanied by a resurgence 
in references to that 'special' relationship with the land; from a series 
of 'landowner' letters to the Post-Courier daily newspaper which Filer 
quotes (Filer in press), the following extracts convey a sense of the 
terms in which this relationship is being expressed4 
Registration of customary land . . .  will signal the loss of power which is 
usually derived from the special bond betweeen people and their land. 
It is this power that brought giant mining companies crawling into the 
courtroom; this same power legitimises our rights to demand 
compensation from unscrupulous transnational corporations . . .  (Post­
Courier 17 July 1995). 
We know we are blessed with resources. We are a rich people with 
what we have-people who know their true connection to the land 
will understand this (Post-Courier 1 August 1995) . 
Filer and others (Gerritsen 1996, Jackson 1992) have described in 
some detail the revolution in the relationship between the state and 
those landowner communities around mining projects during the 
current minerals boom. A process of political devolution has seen the 
state increasingly withdraw from its role in the redistribution of 
resource benefits to the broader nation, turning over ever larger 
proportions of those benefits to the resource landowner communities 
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and simultaneously contracting out the provision of services to the 
resource developers. The most recent example of this form of 
'franchise administration' is the decision to transfer responsibility, for 
those services funded by the Special Support Grant that is received 
from Ok Tedi Mining Ltd, from the provincial government of Western 
Province back to the company: a fiscal trajectory which Filer (1996b) 
neatly describes as 'taxation in reverse' .  
Royalty agreements at different mining projects are a useful index 
of this process of state capitulation in the face of landowner 
communities unimpressed by claims of sovereign right to resources. 
The state maintains that it holds sovereign rights to all sub-surface 
resources, including minerals, and rights to surface access as an 
'incident' of that ownership. Peter Donigi (1994) has published a 
sophisticated challenge to the constitutional basis for this claim, but 
rebuttals have come more frequently and more bluntly from 
landowner communities contesting the division of mining benefits. 
The list of major disputes at mineral projects is familiar to many. At 
each successive project, the terms have shifted steadily towards the 
benefit of immediate landowner communities, while eroding the 
policy resources of the state (Gerritsen 1996). The plans for Ok Tedi 
included payments to the project area landowners of 5 per cent of the 
1 .25 per cent royalty rate. At the Porgera, Misima and Kutubu projects, 
agreements yielding between 20 per cent and 30 per cent of the 
royalties were negotiated. The Ok Tedi rate was then renegotiated in 
1991, settling at 30 per cent of royalties Gackson 1993). Lihir, where the 
landowner association chairman, with some perspicuity, describes the 
State as 'only a concept' (Filer 1996:68), provides the high-water mark 
in this trend, with the landowners and their Development Authority 
due to receive up to 50 per cent of an augmented rate of 2 per cent of 
royalties, and 30 per cent of the Special Support Grant to the 
provincial government (Filer 1997)-an agreement that has had flow­
on benefits for the landowners at other projects, who now also benefit 
from the 2 per cent rate. 
Other critical watersheds in this history of erosion of public respect 
for the authority of the state in Papua New Guinea include: the 
rebellion on Bougainville following the closure of the Panguna mine, 
which continues to pose the most severe challenge to national 
sovereignty; the Placer share issue, which probably did more to 
destroy public confidence in the integrity of the national elite than any 
other single event Gackson 1994); and the Mt Kare gold-rush, where 
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the inability of the state to secure either its own interests or those of 
the resource developers in the face of landowner claims was played 
out in public on a grand scale. 
Largely by default and through an institutional incapacity to 
enforce its own legislation or implement its own reforms, the state in 
Papua New Guinea has created an elite resource interest group, 
comprising the government of the day, resource companies and the 
resource-rich or 'lucky strike' (Filer 1997) landowner communities. 
Perhaps the distinction at Ok Tedi between the resource-landowning 
Wopkaimin and the downstream Yonggom can be extended to 
envisage a fundamental (but not impermeable) divide between a 
national resource elite and a 'downstream' majority, where the latter 
category includes all of those communities without significant or 
accessible resources to offer. Of course almost all downstream 
communities are also landowners and this is the basis on which they 
then attempt to gain a hold on the development truck as it speeds 
down their highway or river. The settlement of the Ok Tedi suit has 
accorded a degree of formal recognition to this category of 
relationship. It is now possible to suggest that the next series of 
stakeholder clashes will be those entered into by the downstream 
communities, such as the Duna of Lake Kopiago who perceive 
pollution by tailings, dumped by the Porgera mine into the Strickland 
river, to be entering their lakes and rivers through underground 
channels (Nicole Haley pers. comm.), or the increasingly militant 
landowners along the Okuk Highway that links the Porgera mine and 
the Kutubu oilfields to the port of Lae. 
Land mobi l isation and state capacity 
What are the implications of the fragility of this relationship between 
community and state for the possible success of Papua New Guinea's 
Land Mobilisation program? The mobilisation of customary land has 
been a stated goal of successive governments since at least the 1973 
report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters (Ward 1983) . 
Two interim methods, Tenure Conversion and Lease-Leaseback, have 
been implemented since then, with limited success. Significantly, 
Hulme, reviewing the Lease-Leaseback program, observes mildly that 
any attempt by the PNG Development Bank to assert its legal rights in 
the event of non-repayment of loans would 'almost certainly result in 
a civil disturbance. Most landowners believe that they retain their 
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customary rights . . .  and they do not appreciate the legal implications of 
the lease-leaseback arrangements' (1983:98). But the recent Land 
Mobilisation Program (LMP), funded with a loan from the World 
Bank, has served to bring issues of land to the fore in an unprecedented 
way. Though the Program has initially only addressed issues relating 
to the administration of lands that were already alienated, it has been 
the focus of a heated public debate, culminating in widespread riots 
and even deaths (Pacific News Bulletin, August 1995, 10(8) :7) .  Much of 
the argument about the current program has been conducted in a 
near-vacuum of reliable information and I do not intend to rehearse 
the debate here, or even to consider the social or economic merits of 
land mobilisation (but see Lakau, and Kalit and Young, this volume). 
Here I want to focus on the extent to which the state's authority as 
the arbiter of social good is acknowledged, and on the practical 
question of the government's infrastructural capacity to actually 
implement this sort of reform. In a commentary on the mining sector 
which has much wider resonance, Richard Jackson has put the 
following question 
Does the government have the legal right, and the capacity to enforce 
the exercise of that right, to possess its territorial minerals? Only if the 
answer is yes is it worth answering questions of optimal mode and 
size of government investment in mineral projects, planning optimal 
benefits, integrating mining projects into national budgets and 
infrastructural planning. Clearly if the government's right and ability 
to hold mineral resources is in doubt, then all these (and many other) 
issues are academic (1996:107) . 
On both of the criteria nominated by Jackson-that of the 
government's right and of its ability to implement land reform-a 
centrally planned mobilisation program would currently appear to 
have little hope of success. Two major government pilot projects over 
the last decade have sought to tackle the issue of customary land 
registration: the East Sepik Provincial Government's Land 
Mobilisation Program (Fingleton 1991), and the more informal 
attempts at land mobilisation in East New Britain Province. For 
various reasons, neither program has met with much success. To be 
fair, land mobilisation is not going to be an overnight phenomenon, 
but the East Sepik initiative has not apparently resulted in the 
registration of a single block of customary land since the Customary 
Land Registration legislation came into force in 1987 (Haynes 
1995:137), and the efforts of the East New Britain program, after a 
It's the land, stupid 57 
tentative beginning, were literally wiped out by the 1994 volcanic 
eruption (Michael Lowe, pers. comm.) .  The practical problems posed 
by a land registration program on a national scale seem insurmountable 
in the current climate of government/ community relations. Kalit and 
Young (this volume) observe that Land Mobilisation on a national 
scale has effectively stalled in the aftermath of the 1995 riots, and propose 
in its stead a wide program of education on land tenure matters. A 
final irony is that what work is being done on the 'registration' of land 
claims by rural communities is being funded by the major minerals 
projects under the Infrastructure Taxation Credit Scheme (Filer 1997), 
inevitably with their own more limited goals in mind. 
In this light, and reflecting my assertions about the embeddedness 
of land issues within other aspects of rural culture and society, the 
most attractive propositions for land reform in Papua New Guinea 
would appear to be those that emphasise a slower, negotiated and 
more organic process of transformation. Robert Cooter, the most 
articulate proponent of this position, places his faith in the 'common 
law process', arguing that the only legislation likely to achieve 
community recognition is that which emerges through engagement 
with a living, customary law (Cooter 1991) .5 The present form of 
legislative protection of customary ownership, inhibiting direct 
transactions over land, is inappropriate 'because limitations on 
customary land transaction should come from customary law itself, 
not from Parliament. Sales and leases of customary land should be 
enforceable in the land court to the extent that they conform to 
customary law, neither more nor less' (Cooter 1991 :45). Resources 
would be most usefully directed not towards a centralised, 'top-down' 
campaign for land registration, but rather towards improving the 
capacity of existing village-level institutions, such as the land courts 
and magistrates. Further support for those institutions that have the 
most experience with customary law, through a program which 
facilitated the circulation and open discussion of court findings and 
accorded greater authority to those findings, would most effectively 
promote the development and codification of common law. This 
graduated approach, Cooter argues, would have the additional effect 
of according partial legal recognition to the daily reality of 
transactions over land amongst landowners, entirely unmediated by 
the state. 
It would be surprising if this sort of view did not meet with some 
opposition from the Department of Lands and Physical Planning, but 
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then the Department has only ever really addressed the tiny fraction 
of land that is alienated, and there are questions about its capacity to 
do even that. There does seem to be value in an approach which 
simultaneously recognises the practical difficulties for national 
programs of land registration posed by limited government capacity 
and an 'uncaptured peasantry', and identifies and strengthens those 
institutions that actually continue to function at a village level-those 
institutions, in Munro's terms, that have successfully been brought 
into the village. Though this approach constitutes effective recognition 
of the fact of village-level autonomy in contemporary Papua New 
Guinea, the state would retain an important role through guidance 
and supervision of the common law process on a national scale. 
Landowners as an ecological nobi l ity? 
Given the emphasis in this chapter on the special relationship between 
rural communities and the land, it is necessary to conclude with some 
comments on the implications for resource sustainability of this moral 
contest between state and community. There seems to be a wilful slip 
in the logic of some commentators from a perception of rural 
communities in contest with resource developers and the state to the 
conclusion that these communities embody an ethic of environmental 
conservation-that they are somehow intrinsically 'ecologically noble' 
(Buege 1996) . In a recent analysis of the Kutubu oil project, for 
example, we are told that 'the natural environment and spiritual 
landscape of the Foe, Fasu and Kikori, where they lived harmoniously 
for thousands of years, has been transformed without their prior 
informed consent' and told of 'cultures who have survived for 
thousands of years without jeopardising their own existence or that of 
everyone else' (Kennedy 1996:240, 248) .  Two principal objections can 
be made to assertions of this kind. As a general observation on rural 
Melanesian societies, this sense of ecological harmony is unlikely to 
hold true, either now or in the past (Dwyer 1994, Clarke 1995:58). 
More seriously, the discourse of ecological resistance fails to appreciate 
the aspirations and the internal politics of rural communities-the 
same author writes dismissively of what he describes as the 'fanciful 
wishes of the local people seeking to be developed' (Kennedy 1996:237). 
The assertion of ecological harmony is at odds with the developing 
consensus that the sustainability of rural Melanesian subsistence 
systems appears to be a matter of scale, rather than of orientation. The 
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recent work of ANU's Land Management Project has demonstrated 
fairly conclusively that many of the agricultural systems in practice 
have contributed significantly to environmental degradation in the 
past, and that in their present form and under current rates of 
population growth, they are inherently unsustainable (Allen 1996). It 
is a moot point whether land management systems in Papua New 
Guinea have ever achieved an ecological stability such as the harmony 
attributed to the relationship between the Foe and Fasu and their 
landscapes. Certainly, those communities that adopted sweet potato as 
a staple crop, following its introduction some 300 years ago, have yet 
to find a balance in their use of the land (Wood 1984, Ballard 1995) . 
A second objection to this nobilising impulse concerns the romantic 
tendency to invoke an image of exceptional communal solidarity, to 
'sanitise the internal politics of the dominated' (Ortner 1995) . This 
tendency has a number of unfortunate consequences. First, in 
describing community action in terms of resistance to encroachment, it 
fails to credit rural communities with the dynamism and capacity for 
transformation which they so evidently possess. A further 
consequence of this 'Rousseauian' portrait of ecological nobility is its 
contribution to the stragetic exoticisation and often deliberate 
ignorance of the political complexity of communities on the part of 
resource developers (Weiner 1991 :72). 
Second, the deliberate equation of social and ecological harmony, 
which incidentally guarantees the intervention of novel stakeholders 
professing claims to the land on global ecological grounds, has the 
effect of identifying the environment as the principal concern of rural 
communities. This then obscures any understanding of the motivation 
of individuals and communities, and would read the recent Ok Tedi 
court case, for example, largely in terms of the ecological impacts and 
not as a struggle to gain access to services and to economic opportunity. 
Finally, the 'ecologically noble' perspective cannot anticipate the 
aspirations of individuals or communities in terms other than a fall 
from ecological grace. Aleida Ramos (1994) has described the cycle of 
adulation and then denigration experienced by representatives of 
Brazilian Indian communities as they first object to the lack of 
consultation about use of their land and then enter into negotiation 
with the forces of 'western seduction'. 
This ignorance of the political complexity of rural communities, 
which in itself bespeaks a fundamental lack of will to hear their 
'voice', to engage with their aspirations, is often shared in equal 
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measure by agents of the state, environmental advocates and resource 
developers. What is required of each of these parties is closer attention 
to the ways in which land, and the identities it confers, are deployed 
as terms in the debate. There is no clear distinction between rhetoric 
and keenly held belief in references to land, which carry a weight in 
Melanesian discourse whose changing significance continues to elude 
an external or urban audience. The title of this chapter derives from 
the sign that James Cavill, Clinton's election campaign director, had 
up over his desk in an attempt to keep his eye on the main game, the 
economy. For anyone following the unfolding debate over the 
sustainability of resource exploitation in Melanesia, a similar tag 
suggests itself. For the issue at the heart of the debate over the 
ownership of resources and the division of resource benefits is-and 
always will be-the land, stupid. 
Notes 
The comments of Robin Hide, Janaline Oh, Brigid Ballard and John 
Clanchy are gratefully acknowledged in the revision of the original 
text. None of them bears responsibility for the result. 
1 .  The transformative effects of large-scale mining projects on society 
in Papua New Guinea are witnessed by the contrasting fates of two 
of the authors: Mel Togolo, who is now Manager of Corporate 
Affairs for the mining company Placer Niugini, and Theodore 
Miriung, the Acting Premier of North Solomons Province, who was 
assassinated in October 1996, in the aftermath of the secessionist 
rebellion and the expulsion of CRA from the Panguna mine. 
2. Thus that most public of statements, Bernard Narokobi's The 
Melanesian Way, must insist that 'Land was something permanent. 
No one could in those days remove the ground' (1980:112). 
3 .  Merlan and Rumsey (1991) make this point more generally in 
reference to the rhetorical constitution of social groups amongst 
communities in the Nebilyer Valley. 
4. In fact these letters to the papers are so intriguing, and lend 
support so readily to his arguments, that it is possible to imagine 
Filer actually writing many of them. 
5. Cooter 's position tallies closely with one of the principal 
conclusions drawn from another major foray into the morass of 
land issues in New Britain, the Kandrian-Cloucester Integrated 
Development Project. The conclusion here was that where 
government lacked the resources and political will to enforce its 
own provisions, policy on lands and resource issues should be 
negotiated and incremental (Simpson 1998:55). 
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Customary land tenure and com mon/ 
public rig hts to minera ls  in Papua New 
Guinea 
Andrew A. L. Lakau 
Throughout Papua New Guinea a wide range of natural resources or 
substances were extracted from land, sea and waters, using a variety 
of techniques. In coastal areas coral reefs, shells and other marine 
resources have always had great value. In the highlands, there is 
widespread evidence of stone quarries and other extraction sites 
which were worked on for thousands of years. Haynes (1995:33) 
summarises the evidence on the use of natural resources 
for pre-colonial trade, significant sub-surface substances were 
extracted for use in the manufacture of items for trade, or for trade in 
their original form. These included mineral pigments of various kinds, 
edible earth (a dietary supplement of pigs), various kinds of stone and 
clay (for pottery and other purposes). Furthermore, water from 
mineral springs was used to make salt and mineral oil from seepage 
was used as a cosmetic, medicine and possibly as cooking fuel. Stone 
was the substance most extensively extracted, being used for many 
purposes which included cooking stones, hammer and anvil stones, 
drill points, awls, scrapers, knives, bark cloth beaters, axe blades and 
prehistoric mortars and pestles and naturally weathered curiously 
shaped stones were used in magico-religious rituals. 
There were also claims to the exploitation and ownership of natural 
resources. At times, there were conflicting claims asserted by neighbouring 
groups over these resources or substances. The rights to use particular 
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natural resources were guided by rituals and laws which developed 
alongside the discovery of these resources. In the postcolonial period, 
these traditional laws have been subsumed by what could be termed 
'Western' law. Peter Sack argues for a distinction between what he 
terms 'primitive' law and 'Western' law 
Primitive law being an open system, it cannot be argued that no 
rights to rock outcrops and patches of poor soil exist because the 
traditional law says nothing about them (as could probably be argued 
in Western law). Although not yet defined, these rights will be 
defined when their existence becomes a practical issue. This 
definition does not create new rights; they existed all the time, 
only in a latent form (Sack 1973:20). 
Both law and custom are subject to constant adjustment in space 
and time. It is inevitable that custom has changed in reaction to 
postcolonial settlement and contemporary circumstances with respect 
to mineral rights. 
Minerals, oil and gas can be seen in two ways. First, they are 
resources of value which naturally occur. In this case, ownership, and 
the right to use such resources would belong to the landowners. 
Second, minerals, oil and gas can be perceived as other natural 
resources such as rivers and lakes-as public or common property. 
In this case, landowning groups are merely trustee administrators. 
From a societal point of view, there is some justification in the 
state maintaining ownership rights over minerals and other natural 
resources without traditional value or use. There is a valid argument 
in the Papua New Guinea situation that resources of immense economic 
value should not be left to particular individuals or communities. 
Ownership of such valuable natural resources should be vested in the 
state, in the same way as ownership of customary land is vested in 
the clan or kinship group as a whole. Both such authorities exercise 
their roles on a trustee basis, one (the state) for the whole society and 
the other (the landowning group), for its members. 
Today, the nation-state of Papua New Guinea encompasses all 
existing tribal groups. The challenge lies in reconciling this modem 
state and the numerous tribal societies that had previously performed 
many of roles of a nation-state. However, wholly reinstating such 
traditional political units would be inconsistent with nation-building 
and anti-constitutional as well. 
I believe that society as a whole has a right to share in whatever 
socioeconomic advantages flow from the development of mineral 
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resources. Parties in a mining deal should not just be the mining 
company and the customary landowners. The state as custodian of the 
public interest must regulate the deal on behalf of society as a whole, 
as well as derive its own share of benefits. At the same time, it is the 
state which can guarantee security on an investment, ensuring fair 
bargaining and benefits to either side. 
The best scenario is one where there is maximum benefit flowing 
from mining development to society as a whole and the customary 
landowners. Such a scenario must also continue to attract the necessary 
commitment from foreign investors and mining corporations who have 
the expertise and capital essential for continued development of 
mineral resources in Papua New Guinea. 
In democratic States, where governments are representative of the 
whole society, the value of minerals far exceeds individual or sectional 
interests. To favour the interest of a minority or sectional group would 
lead to situations similar to that in the Middle East. There, the vast wealth 
generated from oil and petroleum is siphoned by a few individuals at the 
expense of the impoverished masses. 
The community or individuals in whose land minerals are found 
can benefit by way of compensation, royalty payments and various 
forms of income (Lakau 1995, Haynes 1995). Environmental considera­
tions can be part of that compensatory package. These are provided for 
all small to large-scale mining operations in Papua New Guinea. 
To leave the right of ownership of mineral resources entirely to 
customary landowners is dangerous. Although this may be acceptable 
in other countries, in Papua New Guinea, it is likely that this would 
open the floodgates for numerous claims to gain exclusive benefits 
from commercial mining, leading to disharmony between those who 
have the happy accident of minerals under their land, and most, who 
do not. Private landowners, in the name of customary rights, would 
try to dictate terms to legitimate governments and society as a whole. 
Private ownership of minerals would also lead to 'veto', where the 
landowners may refuse development of mineral resources under their 
land, virtually holding society to ransom. 
Customary landowners cannot be 'free-riders' on other benefits 
they derive from society. It is largely because of the efforts of society as 
a whole that land has an economic value. Public funding provides the 
social and economic infrastructure-roads, bridges, public safety or 
security, markets, and finance-which enables the utilisation of land 
and mineral resources. 
Customary land tenure and common/public rights to minerals in P N G  I 69 
Private and communal landownership confers on sectional groups 
the right to profit from public actions in which they have played no 
part. Such private property rights may be argued as constitutional 
rights. But when rights are concentrated in the hands of sectional and 
selected groups, this is an abuse of private property. Speculation, 
manipulation, concentration of wealth and the like are not desirable 
and were never the dreams of Papua New Guinea's founders. 
Individuals and communities within the nation-state cannot enjoy 
other privileges and subsidiary rights flowing from them, without the 
state at large safeguarding everyone's interests. Hence, even customary 
rights are not persuasive in claims to exclusive possession of minerals 
on or under their land. 
Moreover, customary land tenure systems in Papua New Guinea 
have clearly demarcated reference to individual, community and 
public or common property rights. Advocacy of exclusive possession 
carries connotations of greed, and is arguably alien to customary 
principles of land use and tenure. 
Confl ict ing roles of the state 
However, state ownership of minerals is only fine in so far as the state 
is representative of the common or public interest. What has turned 
out in practice in Papua New Guinea over the years leaves a lot to be 
desired and is a prime reason for the lack of development, the 
breakdown of law and order, and the masses being left out of the fruits 
of prosperity and nation-building (Dorney 1990, Holzknecht 1995). 
The state has become an arena of conflict. Governments are 
supposed to manage resources such as minerals which belong to the 
State on a trusteeship basis. In Papua New Guinea, the governments 
see themselves as the state. Parliamentarians and bureaucrats have 
been prone to corruption and mismanagement (Dorney 1990, 
Holzknecht 1995). Individuals and groups who entered the arena of 
resource management via the parliament or government have made it 
an established practice to further private interests, either individually 
and for their factions. They use slogans such as 'the people', 'national 
interest' and 'privatisation', when in fact the real beneficiaries are 
those who wield power and control public coffers. 
It is in the midst of these conflicting roles, corrupt practices and 
mismanagement that state ownership of minerals is being challenged. 
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More often than not, the challenge is not over the logic or the legitimacy 
of state ownership of minerals-it is over the distribution of benefits 
flowing from the development of minerals. 
Conclusion 
On one hand, ownership of minerals is a right of the state. Legal 
challenges to state ownership of minerals have had no success in 
Papua New Guinea to date. 
On the other hand, Papua New Guinea is a property owning 
democracy. It follows that customary landowners have unchallenged 
rights to ownership of their land and the development of resources 
found therein. However, the pursuit of national economic growth in 
Papua New Guinea can only be achieved with a pluralistic approach 
that contains a mixture of private and common property rights. 
Customary land tenure systems in themselves have connotations of 
individual, communal and public or common property rights. Any 
form of development should be for the benefit of people as a whole. 
Instances where many are disadvantaged from development must 
be avoided. State ownership of minerals is part of common property 
interests. Customary principles do not necessarily conflict with state 
ownership of minerals. Only when a genuine and developmental state 
owns minerals will there be a facilitation of societal development. This 
is not the case in Papua New Guinea, and this is the fundamental but 
unresolved issue that is largely to be blamed for the lack of development 
and most of the people being left out of the mainstream of national 
growth and prosperity in a mineral-rich Papua New Guinea. 
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I m proving security of access to 
customary-owned land in Melanesia: 
mining in Papua New Guinea 
Ron Duncan and Rod Duncan 
This chapter takes as its starting point that land ownership arrange­
ments in the South Pacific will continue to change very slowly. There­
fore, existing forms of customary or communal ownership will remain 
in place for a long time. This does not necessarily pose the problem for 
economic development that many perceive: that communal ownership 
means insecurity of access for potential users of the land, reducing the 
incentive to invest in the land with adverse consequences for produc­
tivity. As, for example, Crocombe (1995) says, the form of ownership 
of land is not as important for making the most productive use of the 
land as the security of access to use of the land. Communal ownership 
of land should not entail inefficient use of the land as long as security 
of access to use of the land can be guaranteed. 
Accepting that the form of ownership is not as important as security 
of access, the key question is: how can access for use, essentially through 
leasehold tenure, be made more secure? In particular, we focus on the 
situation in Papua New Guinea where access for use seems very 
insecure, with frequent claims for additional compensation arising after 
the contract between the lessee and the landowners has been signed. 
The most prominent examples of this behaviour are in mining projects. 
However, similar situations have arisen in many other forms of land 
use, such as hotel construction, timber contracts, and the siting of 
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telecommunication facilities. This insecurity of access which results 
from the post-contract signing claims for additional compensation is 
very detrimental to investment. As well as reducing the level of 
investment below what it would be with more secure access, the 
investment that does take place tends to be of shorter duration. A 
policy of 'get in and get out quickly' is encouraged. In mining and 
forestry, for example, this behaviour leads to the best ore grades and 
the best trees being taken first and with as little attention as possible 
paid to the resulting environmental effects.1 
It is a key proposition of this chapter that the solution to the 
problem of insecurity of access to use of land is to create a contract 
that is more appropriate to the situation in these countries than 
contracts presently in use, or to adopt other mechanisms that will lead 
to fewer disputes or to quicker resolution of disputes over contracts 
and therefore provide greater security to lessees and greater satisfaction 
to landowners and the government. The main characteristics of mining 
in Papua New Guinea which lead to disputes appear to be the 
following: first, at the time of the contract negotiations there is a high 
degree of asymmetry in the information available to the mining 
company on the one hand and to the landowners on the other hand 
with respect to three very uncertain variables-the size and quality of 
the ore (or oil or gas) reserves, the expected prices for the mining 
output, and the environmental damage that may be incurred during 
the life of the mine. Information about the first and last of these three 
issues becomes better known during the life of the project, especially 
to the landowners. Because primary commodity prices basically 
behave as 'random walk' processes, it is not possible to forecast them. 
However, a mining company will have a much better understanding 
of the (usually highly volatile) behaviour of primary commodity 
prices than will the landowners. Over the life of the project the 
landowners will see higher and lower prices being paid for the 
minerals or crude oil but, given the usual form of royalty payments, 
may not feel that they are sharing fairly in the fortunes of the project­
particularly in the windfall gains from high prices. 
Second, the history of land leases in Papua New Guinea shows that 
landowners are prone to take quite dramatic action in support of their 
complaints and renewed claims for compensation. The forced closure 
in 1989 of the Panguna mine on Bougainville island in the North 
Solomons Province of Papua New Guinea and the court case in 1995-
1996 over the Ok Tedi mine are the two most prominent examples. 
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The Mt Kare gold mine site in the Enga Province was subjected to 
disruption and closure over the period 1991-1992, leading to the 
mining company CRA Ltd relinquishing its exploration lease in 1993. 
At a micro level, the electricity and telecommunications bodies, for 
example, have reported damage being done to their transmitter 
stations during disputes over landowner claims for additional 
compensation. 
Third, as stated previously, because of the insecurity of tenure, the 
mining companies (or timber contractors) will, where scope exists, 
bias their activities towards short-run exploitation of the resource. In 
addition to the high-grading of ore bodies mentioned, manifestations 
of this kind of attitude include flying expatriate labour in and out of 
the mine site rather than constructing permanent living quarters, 
constructing roads and bridges without long-lasting foundations, 
minimising on waste disposal facilities, and no longer providing long­
term skills training of indigenous labour. 
Fourth, in the context of mining in Papua New Guinea, the national 
government cannot be treated as a neutral agent, simply providing the 
institutional environment within which contracts are negotiated. At 
times the government acts as a facilitator of the negotiations between 
the landowners and the mining companies. It may also form a partner­
ship with landowners in contract negotiations. But the government 
also acts in competition with landowners over shares in the mining 
rents (see Gupta 1992 on the history of the BCL mine in Panguna, 
Bougainville) and has itself made claims for additional compensation 
(royalties, taxes) and additional equity (as, for example, with the 
Porgera mine) during the course of agreements. Hence, in the analysis 
it may be useful at times to treat the government and the landowners 
as one decision-maker and at other times as competitors. But in 
looking for ways to improve the security of contracts, it is also useful 
to examine separate government roles in negotiating contracts with 
mining companies as well as in holding parties to their agreements. 
For purposes of analysis we use a framework drawn from the 
economic literature on contracts, including the literature relating to 
labour strikes. Economic analysis of strikes provides a framework 
which incorporates behaviour closely paralleling those described 
above. The analysis highlights the major deficiencies of existing forms 
of mining contracts, given those factors which are seen as leading to 
disputes, and suggests actions that should reduce disputes over 
contracts and thereby improve security of access. 
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The analytical framework 
As described above, a major problem with mining contracts in Papua 
New Guinea has been the tendency for the PNG landowners to 
demand re-negotiation of a contract during the life of the contract. 
Such actions adversely affect investment by increasing the insecurity 
of tenure. We have identified four major areas in which these 
difficulties may arise under long-term contracts for resource use in 
Papua New Guinea. These broad areas can be thought in terms of 
• asymmetry of information between the landowners/ 
government and the company over the expected profitability 
of the mine 
• time inconsistency of long-term contracts 
• incompleteness of the contracts 
• disagreements between the PNG landowners and 
government over the allocation of benefits of the mining 
contracts. 
Informational asymmetry 
Starting with Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) and surveyed in Kennan 
(1986), a popular model in the analysis of the economics of labour 
strikes has incorporated the notion that, lacking as much information 
about firms' profitability as the firms themselves, unions use strikes to 
sort out the more profitable firms from the less profitable. It is 
assumed that the strikers make the firms a decreasing sequence of 
wage offers, knowing that the more profitable firms will want to 
resolve the strike sooner than the less profitable firms as the former 
have more to lose in terms of forgone profits. 
This model appears to provide a partial explanation of why it is 
that the landowners might seek to renegotiate a mining lease. In the 
absence of full disclosure by the mining company, it seems reasonable 
to assume that the mining company has much better information 
about the expected profitability of the mine than the landowners and 
the government, and thus of the size of possible royalties. Of course, 
the mining company will have even better information about its 
expected profitability once it has begun operations. Thus it may be in 
the interest of the landowners to shut down the mine, or threaten to 
shut it down, and demand renegotiation of the mining contract once it 
has begun operation in order to determine better the profitability of 
the operation. 
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Such behaviour seems an exceedingly inefficient manner of gaining 
information on mine profitability. If the company and the landowners I 
government knew the final result of the negotiations in advance, they 
could settle the dispute immediately and both be better off than by 
undergoing a prolonged mine closure. This anomaly is known in the 
economics of strikes literature as the 'Hicks Paradox', from Hicks 
(1963) . Due to the asymmetry of information between the parties, the 
settlement cannot be made in advance because the company has an 
incentive to under-report profits in order to reduce the payment of 
royalties. The truthful revelation of company profits is only enforced 
by the actuality or possibility of a closure. 
A reinforcing reason for mine disputes may be provided by factors 
giving rise to what is known as the time inconsistency of contracts. 
Time inconsistency of contracts 
After the issue was raised by Barro and Gordon (1983) in relation to 
inflation policy, economists realised how ubiquitous problems with 
respect to time inconsistency are in economic relations. Most 
agreements will specify future actions to be taken by each party to the 
agreement. The problem may arise, however, that even if the actions 
specified are optimal for a party at the time of the making of the 
agreement, when the time comes to perform the action, the action may 
not be optimal. This problem may occur even when all events have 
been perfectly forecasted. 
If a way cannot be found to ensure that each party adheres to the 
agreement, the optimal agreement is time-inconsistent. The parties 
may have to resort to a sub-optimal agreement that is time-consistent. 
We will illustrate the problem using a simple example. 
Assume the PNG government grants a mining lease. The contract 
sets out the royalties and other payments the mining company must 
pay in return for the right to mine over the period of the lease. The 
time-inconsistency problem arises in that the government or 
landowners have an incentive to attempt to renegotiate the contract 
once the company has installed the mining equipment. The initial 
negotiations will be over the profit of the mine net of the operating 
and capital costs. Once the capital is installed, however, the company 
will keep mining as long as it covers its operating costs. Hence, the 
nature of the negotiations changes as the value covered by the 
negotiations switches to profit net only of operating costs. The pie is 
larger and so, presumably, will be the government's new share. 
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If the company suspects that the government or landowners will 
attempt to reopen negotiations once the capital is installed, the 
company will minimise its installed capital. This will lower the 
profitability and length of life of the mine and possible royalties, and 
thus the company, the government and the landowners are worse off 
than if the government could promise not to renegotiate. 
Another way in which time inconsistency may appear in mining 
contracts is in relation to the insurance role of such contracts. PNG 
landowners/government should be the more risk-averse party in 
contract negotiations with a large and diversified mining company 
which can borrow at prime rates on world capital markets. As such 
there is scope for the mining company to provide insurance for the 
PNG government/landowners in the event of a lower than expected 
mineral price or a poorer ore quality. This difference in risk preference 
could be accommodated in a mining contract by having a larger 
portion of the benefits of the contract made in payments that do not 
depend on the profitability of the mine, such as in lease payments for 
the land or in infrastructure investment. 
If mine profitability turns out to be low, the PNG government/ 
landowners will be pleased that they took a larger part of the 
payments from the mine in a manner that was not affected by the low 
profitability. However, if the mine is more profitable than expected, 
the PNG landowners/ government would have preferred not to have 
taken the insurance in the first place, but rather to have negotiated a 
higher share in the equity of the mine. In that case we would expect to 
see demands for renegotiation of the contract and a larger share of the 
mine equity on the part of the PNG landowners/government. This is 
exactly what happened in the case of the Porgera mine. 
Knowing that the PNG landowners/ government will want to forgo 
the insurance if the mine is highly profitable, the mining company will 
be less willing to provide insurance in the 'bad' state. As the provision 
of insurance in such a contract is to the benefit of both parties, this 
time inconsistency will mean that both parties are worse off than if 
demands for renegotiation could be prevented. 
The problem of time inconsistency on the part of the government 
could be circumvented by a device that allows a present government 
to bind future governments not to renegotiate the mining lease. The 
sovereign nature of governments and the wide-ranging powers that 
they wield, however, means that binding future governments is 
exceedingly difficult. A usually effective restraint on governments 
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reneging on contracts is the adverse impact that such action would 
have on investment in the country. As was seen following the PNG 
government's decision in late 1992 to increase unilaterally its share of 
equity in the Porgera mine (although allowed under the Mining Act), 
such behaviour can result in considerable loss in investor confidence 
and in capital flight (see ANUTECH Pty Ltd 1995 for estimates of 
capital flight from Papua New Guinea in the early 1990s) . Once 
governments learn this lesson, it is easier for existing governments to 
bind the actions of future governments. 
It is more difficult for current generations of landowners to bind 
the actions of future generations of landowners. The dispute over the 
Bougainville mine is a case in point. It was triggered by a younger 
generation disappointed in the benefits that they perceived themselves 
receiving from the mine on the one hand, and the environmental 
damage which they saw being inflicted on their land on the other. 
Thus the possibility of inter-generational competition among 
landowners adds further elements of time inconsistency. Not only may 
the later generations of landowners place different values on 
environmental factors than the generation negotiating the contract, but 
the initial generation may place less value on the happiness of later 
generations and so attempt to bring forward the payments under the 
mining lease at the expense of later generations. The later generations 
may thus desire that the earlier generations had made a different 
contract, and not act under the contract as the earlier generations 
would have wished them to act. Both of these problems played a role 
in the Bougainville dispute. 
The appearance of a new set of decision-makers with different 
desires not taken into account under the contract is an example of 
what is called an incomplete contract, which is another common 
difficulty of long-term mining contracts in Papua New Guinea. 
Incomplete contracts 
Incompleteness of contracts arises when an event occurs that was not 
detailed in the contract, either due to the undue cost of making a 
complete contract or the inability of one or both of the parties to 
foresee the event. Typically with mining contracts, such 
incompleteness arises due to the resource price being much higher or 
lower than the parties expected or the ore body being richer or poorer 
than expected. However, unforeseen environmental damage or inter­
generational conflicts may also give rise to this problem. 
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In practice, it would be hard to differentiate disputes arising from 
this source from the more opportunistic disputes due to the time incon­
sistency problem. Unless the contract specified bounds for the resource 
price or ore quantity I quality, a party could claim that some event had 
occurred for which it was not prepared and ask for a renegotiation. 
As detailed in Deaton and Laroque (1992), the distribution of 
commodity prices over time is highly skewed downwards with a 
small probability of very high price spikes. They explain the form of 
the distribution as due to the existence of inventories and the long lead 
time required to increase production. When demand is very high and 
new production will take some time to reach the market, the price 
rises to clear the market at the given stock of inventories. When 
demand is very low, however, inventory will be accumulated and 
suppliers will not sell, so the price will have a floor. 
The occurrence of upward price spikes, sharply increasing the 
profit of the mine, has brought about several demands for increased 
compensation or renegotiation of mining leases in Papua New Guinea. 
Improved prospects of ore bodies and observation of environmental 
damage have also led to changes or demands for changes in contract 
terms. The increase in the government's equity share in the Porgera 
mine was as a result of the discovery of the ore body being larger than 
initially believed. The Bougainville dispute was triggered in large part 
by observation of the large profits being earned by the mining 
company in a period of high prices, as well as by perceptions of 
environmental damage from the mine (Gupta 1992). The Ok Tedi 
dispute arose largely as a result of concerns over environmental 
damage, particularly outside the mine lease area. The role played by 
international political groups exerting influence through international 
media and foreign governments also has to be acknowledged. 
While a price spike may merely provide an excuse for 
renegotiations for the reasons outlined earlier, another rationale is that 
the price rise has driven the mine profits out of the region anticipated 
by the PNG landowners/ government in the initial negotiations. The 
PNG landowners/ government may then feel that they do not have a 
fair share of the windfalls from the price rise. The contracts have 
provided for landowner royalties involving a payments schedule 
which is linear in the commodity price. It may be the case that outside 
of the anticipated range of the commodity price, the PNG landowners 
would prefer a nonlinear payment schedule, gaining more than 
proportionately for very high prices. 
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Contracts have indeed provided for this nonlinearity as far as the 
government is concerned. PNG mining and petroleum contracts 
include an Additional Profits Tax which takes effect when the rate of 
return of a project (for a Special Mining Lease only) exceeds a speci­
fied level. The rate of return is calculated on the basis of the cash flow 
of the project up to and including the year of income. The determina­
tion of the cash flow includes development and, within certain limits, 
exploration expenditure. The government's holding of equity also 
ensures participation in boom prices. There is not a similar provision 
for landowners to share in extraordinary increases in revenues as a 
result of increases in prices of mine products or improvements in mine 
output except where the landowners hold an equity share. The Mining 
Act gives the state an option to take up to 30 per cent equity (on a pro­
rata basis) in new projects. Beginning with the Lihir mine, the govern­
ment decided in 1995 to provide 5 per cent equity to landowners out 
of the government's equity share. The landowners' equity share will 
be provided to them free of charge with the cost to be covered by the 
other equity holders in proportion to their shares. As discussed above, 
royalty payments and equity are mechanisms for sharing in high 
profitability situations; however, they do not provide insurance in the 
event of low profitability situations. Equity shareholding also internal­
ises disputes by creating a link between land ownership interests and 
company interests and could be one of the most effective means of 
curbing disputes raised by landowner interests. 
Large-scale mining contracts may have environmental impact 
much worse than that envisaged by the parties at the signing of the 
contract, or the impact may be of a type that was completely 
unforeseen. In the case of Ok Tedi it seems fair to say that the mining 
company did not have a full appreciation of the difficulty of building 
and maintaining a tailings dam in that mountainous area. Moreover, it 
may not have been possible for it to have a good appreciation prior to 
undertaking mine construction. It is certain that the landowners in the 
Boungainville and Ok Tedi areas would not have had full information 
about the environmental effects of mining. 
Another possibility is that the landowners will change over time, 
and the new landowners may place different values on environmental 
factors. Later generations of landowners may be willing to pay for a 
tailings dam, where earlier generations did not value cleaner water 
enough to warrant the construction of a dam. If the mining contract has 
not specified what would happen in such events, conflicts may arise. 
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Disagreements between PNG landowners and government 
It is important to realise that each of the above difficulties can occur at 
either the level of the PNG landowners or at PNG governmental level 
or at both levels, although they have been much more frequent on the 
part of the landowners. One feature of the Bougainville conflict was 
that while the government was satisfied with the agreement, the 
Bougainville landowners felt that their share of the profits of the mine 
was too small. 
An example of the interaction of these problems is that of the 
Additional Profits Tax (APT) put forward in the previous section as a 
solution to the nonlinearity of desired payments. While the higher 
profits tax may satisfy the PNG government in its demand for an 
equitable share, unless the government passes on at least part of the 
payments from this tax to the PNG landowners, the landowners may 
feel unfairly treated. 
Another reason for this problem being particularly severe in Papua 
New Guinea is that landowners as a whole do not feel that the govern­
ment represents their interests, or that certain landowner groups feel 
that they are left out of consideration in the contract negotiations. It is 
fair to say that the ownership of below-ground resources is highly 
contested in Papua New Guinea. While the government is able to 
appropriate most of the mining rents, its right to do so is hotly dis­
puted. Current mining laws grant the state rights of ownership of 
below-ground resources but at the same time acknowledge rights of 
landowners by granting them rights to royalties and equity. This 
ambiguity is probably one of the greatest sources of insecurity in 
access rights and needs somehow to be removed. Further, there is not 
necessarily a single, cohesive landowner group. Landowner groups 
may exist within the project area with different interests in the mining 
project wishing the government to pursue their different interest. As 
well, those landowners living outside the mining site and not sharing 
directly in the equity and royalty proceeds, can be adversely affected 
through environmental damage. They may also feel aggrieved at the 
government for not protecting their interests. The Ok Tedi court case 
was instigated as a result of such dissatisfaction. 
Sol utions/recommendations 
In this section we address each of the above four difficulties in tum, 
suggesting means by which the government and the mining 
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companies may alleviate the problems giving rise to disputes. It must 
be recognised that doing so is in the interest of all parties concerned. If 
foreign companies perceive the PNG investment climate as uncertain, 
or even capricious, levels of foreign investment will suffer accordingly. 
These recommendations are made on the basis of the following 
three considerations 
• PNG land and mining claims are not secure 
• none of the parties involved can be bound absolutely by 
contract 
• up to a point it is cheaper to forestall difficulties than it is to 
face disputes later. 
The problem of asymmetric information can only be solved by 
increasing the information flow and degree of trust between the 
mining company and the PNG landowners and the government. It 
should be recognised by companies operating in this environment that 
problems of mistrust can only be resolved by ensuring that the PNG 
government and landowners perceive the companies as being honest. 
This problem could be addressed by 
• regular and timely release of information by the company 
• placement of PNG representatives within the structure of the 
mining company 
• use of a third-party auditor to assure the truthfulness of the 
reports by the company. 
Implementation of Development Forums (see McGavin 1993) is a 
process put in place by the government to assist in imparting 
knowledge about each projected mining venture to the landowners 
and provincial and national governments and as a forum for 
negotiating the mining development contract. McGavin discusses 
ways in which the Development Forum process could be enhanced to 
generate stronger commitment to economic development processes. 
Mining companies have placed PNG nationals within the company 
structure. But probably more could be done to establish a reputation 
for honest dealings through regular publication of information on 
mining operations and independent auditing of that information. 
The problem of time inconsistency is hardly unique to Papua New 
Guinea. The ultimate form of time inconsistency is the nationalisation 
of foreign company capital, a common experience for mining compa­
nies in developing countries in the 1970s. One reason why such 
activities are not more common is the chilling effect that such actions 
have on other investments, as experienced in Papua New Guinea 
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following the 1992 decision to increase government equity in the 
Porgera mine from 10 per cent to 30 per cent. The demand for renego­
tiations from one mining company can lead other companies to 
suspect that similar demands will soon be made on them. The fear of 
loss of reputation will normally be sufficient to guarantee that govern­
ments will honour the contracts they sign. However, the emphasis 
within the political class in Papua New Guinea on distribution of the 
resource rents rather than on economic growth-with one result being 
the rapid turnover of politicians at election time and another the 
instability of political parties-means that such reputation effects are 
lessened. Hopefully, the important lesson from the Porgera decision 
has been learned. Mining companies, as well as the PNG population, 
should be crucially concerned with the development of a stable political 
framework within Papua New Guinea. 
While the stability of PNG governments can only be enhanced by 
constitutional and social change, reputation effects can be strength­
ened by creating bodies which will monitor contracts and make public 
the likely impacts of governmental misbehaviour. The creation of a 
body reporting to the parliament rather than to the government on the 
fiscal activities of the government, similar to the German Economic 
Commission, has been suggested as a means of ensuring sound fiscal 
behaviour (ANUTECH Pty Ltd 1995). Such a body should restrain 
government misbehaviour by being in a position to draw public 
attention to the difficulties it creates for economic development. 
For very long-term mining leases the problem of time inconsistency 
introduced by disputes between generations of landowners becomes 
especially pronounced. Again it is in the interests of the company and 
the PNG government to prevent these disputes from occurring. The 
front-loading of lease payments by current landowners at the expense 
of later generations can be avoided by the use of a trust fund for 
landowner benefits. 
The PNG government already has a trust fund for holding mining 
royalties and other government revenues from mining, the Mineral 
Resources Stabilisation Fund. These funds are basically held in trust 
for the society as a whole. Mining companies and Landowner Incorpo­
rated Groups have also set up trust funds. Ok Tedi Mining Ltd man­
ages a trust fund for future generations of landowners and for villages 
outside the Ok Tedi mine lease area. The creation of a trust fund with 
specified draw-down rules for the lease payments to landowners 
would prevent the current landowners from benefiting at the expense 
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of future landowners. The BCL mine at Panguna (Bougainville) did 
have a landowners' trust fund in place but its mismanagement was one 
of the sources of dissatisfaction of the younger generation. Guidelines 
for ensuring good management and effective draw-down rules for 
public trust funds are set out in Duncan et al. (1995). 
McGavin (1993) advises that lease payments from resource 
extraction projects be invested in the infrastructure of the same region 
from which the resources were extracted through Development Trusts. 
The problems with this course of action are 
• restricting investment to particular areas does not 
necessarily maximise the country's social rate of return 
• there is no guarantee that benefits will flow from these 
projects to later generations 
• such investment projects are easily corrupted, producing 
benefits only for the current generation of landowners and 
politicians. 
The incompleteness of contracts can only be addressed by widen­
ing the scope of the original negotiations, specifying the payments that 
will occur under even quite unlikely levels of ore prices and ore quality 
and environmental damage. Parties must consider what actions will 
be taken in such circumstances and cannot claim to have been taken 
by surprise if such events do occur. It is also important that all parties 
likely to be affected should be brought into the negotiations. 
There is a requirement for a fully public and widely-framed 
environmental impact statement for any proposed mining project. 
However, not only should the possibility of widespread environmental 
effects be taken into account under a proposed mining lease, but also 
the mining company and the government should ensure that 
compensation for any damage flows on to those landowners affected. 
The inability of the government to enforce compensation arrangements, 
and to change these where necessary, has proven to be a problem. To 
assist resolution of such disputes at low cost it seems advisable to 
appoint an independent mediator to rule in environmental disputes. 
The problems associated with not undertaking this kind of action are 
illustrated by the adverse impact that the OK Tedi compensation claim 
had on the mining company involved and the government. 
But no contract can specify all possible future events. Accepting 
this, all contracts should specify a method of arbitration and airing of 
grievances by all affected parties. This procedure would allow for 
periodic review of the terms of the contract, given changing economic 
Improving security of access to customary-owned land in Melanesia I 85 
and other conditions, and hopefully lead to grievances being taken up 
within the specified arbitration sphere and not against the mining 
company capital. Such arbitration should include the possibility of 
changing environmental preferences of the landowners. Of course, this 
review process is less necessary when the contract is more widely 
drawn initially. 
The Panguna mine contract which was renegotiated in 1974 
following Independence provided for renegotiation at seven-year 
intervals. There was an extended process of review in 1981 and 1982 
but, as McGavin (1993) argues, political distractions facing the national 
and provincial governments allowed the later review period to be 
bypassed. 
Conclusions 
This chapter illustrates the problems leading to insecurity of land 
tenure in mining in Papua New Guinea in terms of asymmetry of 
information, time-inconsistency of contracts and incompleteness of 
contracts as well as the areas of conflict between the landowners and 
the PNG government. These difficulties are not confined to land use in 
mining. Likely solutions to the insecurity of tenure in mining, which 
can have such adverse impacts on investment, can be applied to 
contracts for land use in other activities. Resolution of the difficulties 
with mining contracts would appear to be assisted by implementation 
of the following measures. 
1. Increasing the information flow between the mining 
company and the PNG landowners/government and trying 
to develop a greater degree of trust in the information 
provided. 
2. Widening of the issues covered in the contract and including 
all parties likely to be affected in the negotiations. The terms 
of the contract should cover events such as unusually high 
prices, new discoveries of ore bodies and environmental 
effects which may be seen to have only a low probability, 
and agreement reached on what should be done if they do 
occur. In particular, landowners should share in the windfall 
gains of high prices just as the PNG government does 
already. Equity shareholding by landowners in mining 
ventures is one mechanism for achieving this objective as 
well as being a means of internalising disputes by aligning 
land interests and voting interests in the mining company. 
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Landowner royalty payments could also be enhanced by a 
similar mechanism to the Additional Profits Tax. 
Intergenerational competition between landowners should 
be catered for through adoption of trust funds which would 
pay an income stream to future generations. 
3. Contracts should allow for formal arbitration procedures to 
handle grievances rather than attempting to resolve these 
through the courts. 
4. Contracts should specify periodic reviews of fees and 
royalties. However, the wider the terms of the contract are 
drawn, the less will be the need for reviews. 
5. The government should take action to improve its reputation 
with investors. A body to review fiscal behaviour has much 
to commend it. 
ThP.se recommendations may also have application to forms of 
land use other than mining. It should be stressed, however, that a 
necessary condition for Papua New Guinea, and other Pacific island 
countries, to be able to provide greater security of access to use of land 
is better identification of landownership, which will entail surveys 
and registration of land. But saying this is not the same as saying that 
forms of land tenure have to be changed. As we said at the beginning, 
communal ownership of land does not necessarily mean that access to 
use of the land is insecure. 
Notes 
Our thanks to Rohan Pitchford for pointing to the parallels 
between behaviour over mining contracts in Papua New Guinea 
and the assumptions underlying the 'strike model' in labour 
economics and for other comments on the draft. Very useful 
comments were also made by Satish Chand, Ross Gamaut, 
Desh Gupta and Ila Temu. 
1. Pitchford (1994) finds that Victorian and Tasmanian policies of 
short forest tenure and small or uncertain size of forest leases in the 
early years of this century led to inefficiently low levels of capital 
and high levels of labour, and likely encouraged timber-cutting 
firms to adopt poor silvicultural practices. 
2. In August 1996, vehicles and sheds were burnt near the Porgera 
mine by villagers claiming compensation in excess of the US$2.4 
million agreed for the loss of access to alluvial gold deposits. The 
incident occurred a few days after the announcement that the 
mine's gold reserves had been re-estimated at a 35 per cent higher 
level than previously-an increase worth about US$1 billion. 
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3. The Mining and Petroleum Working Committee, set up in 
November 1988 in response to the outbreak of the Bougainville 
dispute, in fact recommended that the landowners share in APT 
(Gupta 1992) . 
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Com mon property, Maori identity and 
the Treaty of Waitang i 
Sir  Hugh Kawharu 
In the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand became a British 
colony and the Maori people, together with their lands and estates, 
were given Crown protection as well as the rights and privileges of 
British subjects. In 1975, the New Zealand Parliament, for the first time 
since 1840, gave statutory recognition to the Treaty by setting up a 
tribunal to hear claims by Maori people that the Crown had failed to 
honour its guarantees under the Treaty. Claims lodged since then have 
been made mostly by kin-based tribal groups. They depend heavily on 
recitals of history, tradition and relations with Crown authorities since 
1840. 
In 1983, the Crown, bearing in mind this 1975 statutory recognition 
of the Treaty, invited the New Zealand Maori Council to suggest 
principles which could be used to guide much needed amendments to 
existing Maori land laws. The Council's response has been 
instrumental in reaffirming customary relations between tribal 
(kinship) groupings and ancestral Maori land. It is now the 
philosophic basis for legislation that was passed in 1993. This is the 
first matter I shall deal with. The second matter involves the issue of 
compensation. 
Up to 1994, events put the spotlight on the tribe (iwi) or sub-tribe 
(hapu) as the valid units to engage in dealings between Crown, Maori, 
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and the marketplace. However, at the end of 1994, the Crown in consid­
ering how best to deal with Treaty claim settlements, decided to propose 
a financial limit of NZ$1 billion for all compensation. This led in 1995 to 
a nationwide Maori rejection of the proposal, and at the same time to a 
call for a Treaty-based constitution as a precondition for considering any 
claim settlement policy at all. The Treaty has now become the cause of a 
search for a post-Treaty definition of Maori identity-one, however, that 
does not at the same time exclude the traditional Treaty definition based 
on kinship and land. This development recognises that 
• the majority (more than 80 per cent) of Maori people no 
longer live in tribal communities 
• many of these people form non kin-based interest groups 
where they live 
• nevertheless, this has weakened neither a sense of tribal 
identity nor effective tribal groupings throughout the Maori 
population at large. 
It is a matter in which the National Maori Congress has performed 
a facilitating role. 
Finally, I shall offer a comment on the way these events are 
changing the meaning of a key Treaty-derived symbol of Maori 
identity. More broadly, the Treaty of Waitangi has once again become 
the principal charter for Maori identity in the non-Maori world. 
The New Zealand Maori Cou nci l proposals 
The Crown's invitation to the New Zealand Maori Council to propose 
amendments to the existing Maori Affairs Act might well have been 
received merely as an invitation to join in the periodic ritual of modi­
fying Maori land legislation, parts of which had remained fundamen­
tally flawed for over a century. In the event, the Council saw much 
more in it than that. By the time they had held three major meetings in 
different parts of the country there was evidence enough for them to 
show that no further amendments to Maori land law could be justified 
without such amendments first being reconciled to the Treaty of 
Waitangi. No broadly representative Maori organisation, statutory or 
otherwise, had ever had such an opportunity to present to govern­
ment views on the interdependence of ancestral land, cultural identity, 
and the nation's founding document. They took the opportunity and 
two years later delivered their discussion paper, the Kaupapa, Te 
Wahanga Tuatahi. 
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In the beginning, the Council subcommittee delegated to prepare a 
draft paper engaged in some soul-searching. Certainly the Treaty of 
Waitangi had at last come on to the statute books in 1975, but neither it 
nor even the Treaty's three articles could be posted as a heading for 
their views, with relevance simply left to the imagination. The Treaty 
had never been designed as a banner for protest or as a basis for 
grievance claims against the Crown. On the contrary, it had been 
meant as a contract which, from the perspective of those ancestors 
who had signed it and now those who had inherited it, stated what 
ought to have been the constitutional relationship between Maori and 
the Crown and the basis for the preservation of Maori culture and 
identity. In the end the Council saw no reason to be equivocal. It said 
plainly that the Treaty was a quid pro quo. It was about the granting of 
sovereign power and the guaranteeing of rangatiratanga. It said 
Each of the two parties to the Treaty invested it with expectations 
about the exercise of power. T he Maori expected his 'rangatiratanga' to 
be protected; the Crown expected to gain sovereignty over New 
Zealand . The purpose of the Treaty, therefore, was to secure an 
exchange of sovereignty for protection of rangatiratanga. 
In the event, the Treaty was drawn up by amateurs on the one side and 
signed by those on the other side who understood little of its 
implications. Yet for both it was a symbol of mana, imbued with the 
spirit of hope that sovereignty, so simply acquired, would solve all 
problems of ambition: the Maori would retain their rangatiratanga, and 
the Crown would add New Zealand to its empire. 
This unique juxtaposition of bicultural concepts triggered the 
development of the Kaupapa's thesis, one which resulted in a focus on 
rangatiratanga as the primary theme, with the Crown, in the role of the 
Maori Land Court, providing a counterpoint. Since the constitutional 
significance of the Treaty had only recently been uncovered (Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1 975) and the meaning of rangatiratanga in government 
circles was virtually unknown, the Council went to some length to 
discourse on Maori kinship and tribal cultural values. In doing so 
several concepts of cardinal importance in addition to rangatiratanga 
were introduced, such as tangata whenua, turangawaewae, whangai and 
ahi ka which were not in the Treaty, and others which were, such as 
whanau and hapu, all being used in ways designed to illuminate their 
politico-economic significance. Given the Council's brief, the Kaupapa 
had to focus on land. It said 
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The rights and privileges granted to the Maori people in the Treaty 
apply in the fullest sense to land. The protection afforded by the 
Crown-the guarantees-are needed as much today as ever. 
Maori land has several cultural connotations for us. It provides us 
with a sense of identity, belonging and continuity. It is proof of our 
continued existence not only as a people, but as the tangatawhenua of 
this country. It is proof of our tribal and kin group ties. Maori land 
represents turangawaewae. 
It is proof of our link with the ancestors of our past, and with the 
generations yet to come. It is an assurance that we shall forever exist as 
a people, for as long as the land shall last. 
But also land is a resource capable of providing even greater support 
for our people-to provide employment-to provide us with sites for 
our dwellings-and to provide an income to help support our people 
and to maintain our marae and tribal assets. 
It concluded by declaring 
Our objective is to keep Maori land in the undisturbed possession of 
its owners; and its occupation, use and administration by them or for 
their benefit. Laws and policies must emphasise and consolidate Maori 
land ownership and use by the whanau or kin group. 
At the heart of this was the principle of reciprocity-rights and 
duties between kin, between groups of kin, between these groups and 
the natural world, and, not least, between them all and their ancestors. 
Rights and duties were couched, therefore, in terms both of the sacred 
and the profane. Such a system of beliefs constituted the scope of 
rangatiratanga, compressed by the Kaupapa into the concept of 
trusteeship. Trusts and incorporations, it said, should therefore be 
assisted to expand and become more flexible, more responsive to 
market opportunity-but never at the expense of being accountable. 
Accountability in fact epitomised Article 2 of the Treaty for the 
Council, for here there was a double trusteeship, a double 
accountability. On the one hand there was the fiduciary role of the 
Crown towards the Maori people and their rangatiratanga, and on the 
other rangatira 's fiduciary role towards his or her kin group. It is in this 
sense that sovereignty and rangatiratanga might be seen in their 
reciprocal relationship as defined by the idea of exchange: that 
between the intent of Article 1 and that of Article 2. In a narrow sense, 
that is, in particular cases, the superior authority of the Court can act 
as a benign check on the performance of trustees acting in the interests 
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of their beneficiaries. Equally, the Treaty-prescribed protection of 
rangatiratanga, for example for a whanau, hapu or perhaps iwi to be 
consulted by the Crown, can serve as check on the latter 's legal 
sovereignty or more simply, on good government. 
At all events the Council believed that ancestral land should be 
seen as a taonga, to be retained as such rather than as a personal 
possession. It was argued that there can be no rangatiratanga in respect 
of land and its whanau or hapu if they are not all kept together. 
'Uneconomic interests', 'multiple interests' and the like were thus 
terms to be expunged from policy and practice and replaced by ahi ka 
and statutes consolidating ownership by whanau and hapu. And by this 
time (1983) the most urgent mode of consolidating whanau and hapu 
was marae-centred housing. Here again the Council sought a proactive 
role for the Court in planning and implementing (papakainga) housing 
schemes and subdivisions. 
Throughout this remarkable document there is the Council's 
expectation that the Crown would accept its assertion that 'justice will 
remain in jeopardy so long as Maori values are not included in that 
range of values by which the laws of this country are framed and 
upheld', and accordingly that it would indeed try to come to some 
understanding of what these values meant. It was an expectation that 
it was still not too late to put a brake on more than 100 years of 
individualisation of land and much else besides, and therefore that the 
emphasis should be returned to those first principles upon which 
Maori identity was grounded. The Council was to wait exactly ten 
years for a statute-defined response. 
And so it was that in 1993 Parliament passed the Ture Whenua 
Maori Act, and in the preamble to it there is the following 
Na te mea i riro na te Tiriti o Waitangi i motuhake ai te noho a te iwi me te 
Karauna: a, na te mea e tika ana kia whakautia ano te wairua o te wa i riro atu 
ai te kawanatanga kia riro mai ai te mau tonu o te rangatiratanga e takoto nei 
i roto i te Tiriti o Waitangi: a, na te mea e tika ana kia marama ko te whenua 
he taonga tuku iho e tino whakaaro nuitia ana e te iwi Maori, a, na tera he 
whakahau kia mau tonu taua whenua ki te iwi nona, ki o ratou whanau, hapu 
hoki, a, he whakamama i te nohotanga, i te whakahaeretanga, i te 
whakamahitanga o taua whenua hei painga mo te hunga nona, mo o ratou 
whanau, hapu hoki: a, na te mea e tika ana kia tu tonu he Kati, a, kia 
whakatakototia he tikanga hei awhina i te iwi Maori kia taea ai enei kaupapa te 
whakatinana. 
Whereas the Treaty of Waitangi established the special relationship 
between the Maori people and the Crown: And whereas it is desirable 
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that the spirit of the exchange of kawanatanga for the protection of 
rangatiratanga embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi be reaffirmed: And 
whereas it is desirable to recognise that land is a taonga tuku iho of 
special significance to Maori people, and, for that reason, to promote 
the retention of that land in the hands of its owners, their whanau, and 
their hapu: and to facilitate the occupation, development, and 
utilisation of that land for the benefit of its owners, their whanau, and 
their hapu: And whereas it is desirable to maintain a Court and to 
establish mechanisms to assist the Maori people to achieve the 
implementation of these principles: 
BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED by the Parliament of New Zealand -
And in a note on the interpretation to be given to the Act is said 
(1) It is the intention of Parliament that the provisions of this Act shall 
be interpreted in a manner that best furthers the principles set out in 
the Preamble to this Act. Without limiting the generality of subsection 
(1) of this section, it is the intention of Parliament that powers, duties, 
and discretions conferred by this Act shall be exercised, as far as 
possible, in a manner that facilitates and promotes the retention, use, 
development, and control of Maori land as taonga tuku iho (sacred 
heritage) by Maori owners, their whanau, their hapu, and their 
descendants. In the event of any conflict in meaning between the 
Maori and the English versions of the Preamble, the Maori version 
shall prevail. 
Thus the Preamble of the Act encapsulates precisely both in Maori 
and in English the Kaupapa's thesis that, in terms of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, there was a ceding of sovereignty to the Crown in exchange 
for the latter 's protection of rangatiratanga. While amendments had 
been made to the previous Act at regular intervals since it first came 
into existence 40 years earlier, none had recognised the Treaty, let alone 
the values inherent in the Maori version signed by 90 per cent of the 
Maori signatories. Even ignoring the sanctions of the Treaty, no 
legislative amendment had ever found a place for such concepts as 
wairua, taonga tuku iho, tikanga, ahi ka, and so forth. 
It can doubtless be claimed that Maori Land Courts have always 
been able to exercise, not only their discretion, but also their initiative 
in helping owners to achieve their stated goals within the law. The 
Council's hope, however, was for legislative amendments that would 
provide firm and more explicit guidelines for the Court, grounded for 
the first time in Treaty guarantees and some cardinal Maori values. In 
the last analysis the justification for that hope lay less in the 
diminution in the per capita ratio of land holding among the Maori 
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people than in the sheer scale of land loss since 1840 and with it loss of 
capacity to exercise rangatiratanga . Notwithstanding that justification, 
however, whether any government would ever divest itself of a 
measure of its sovereign power and allocate it to some pan-Maori 
authority in fulfilment of its fiduciary obligations under Article 2 of 
the Treaty is, in my view, the decisive question that remains at the 
heart of Maori-Pakeha relations today. 
The fiscal envelope 
I tum now to the Crown's fiscal cap proposal on compensating 
successful claimants before the Waitangi Tribunal. The following 
excerpts from the proposal convey something of the intent 
The Treaty of Waitangi is the foundation document of New Zealand . 
• It acknowledged the Crown's right to govern in the interests of all 
our citizens 
• It protected Maori interests 
• It made us all New Zealanders. 
The spirit of the Treaty required the Crown and Maori to act with the 
utmost good faith to one another. 
Many believe the Crown, in various ways, failed to act with the utmost 
good faith and that as a result Maori were seriously disadvantaged. 
Over the past 150 years Maori have sought redress to settle these 
grievances. Attempts to resolve some of them have been made during 
that time with varying success, but many grievances remain 
unanswered. 
Later it said 
Over the past few years, the Government on behalf of the Crown has 
attempted to approach the claims in a rational, cohesive and 
constructive way. It has had to work out what it believes can be done, 
taking into account its responsibilities to all New Zealanders. This has 
led to the development of some basic principles 
• the Crown will explicitly acknowledge historical injustices 
• in resolving claims the Crown should not create further injustices 
• the Crown has a duty to act in the best interests of all New 
Zealanders 
• as settlements are to be durable they must be fair, achievable and 
remove the sense of grievance 
• the resolution process must be consistent and equitable between 
claimant groups 
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• nothing in the settlements will remove, restrict or replace Maori 
rights under Article III of the Treaty 
• the settlements will take into account fiscal and economic 
constraints and the ability of the Crown to pay compensation. 
And finally, the 'money' bit, 
The Crown has many demands to meet and has to carefully assess 
how much can be put aside to settle claims. The Crown has 
accordingly decided to set aside a settlement sum of NZ$1 billion to be 
available of a period of about 10 years. This has become known as the 
'Fiscal Envelope' or the 'Settlement Envelope' and confirms the 
Crown's commitment to settle claims. 
At the first of two major meetings in 1995 held under the patronage 
of Sir Hepi Te Heuheu and with the National Maori Congress acting as 
facilitator, the Fiscal Envelope proposal was rejected outright. The 
report of the meeting said 
The proposal is not explicit on how a sum of 1 billion has been 
calculated but it is justified as a political decision largely on the basis 
of affordability and acceptability to the wider community. It is also 
suggested that the amount should be sufficient to redress claimants 
sense of grievance. There is an assumption that 1 billion dollars is fair 
and affordable. However, neither the methodology used to calculate 
the amount, nor the basis for deciding viability has been disclosed. 
The cap is simply stated as a given even though most claims have not 
yet received due consideration while others have yet to be filed . 
Several submission made at the first hui considered that without a 
wider contextual backdrop, Government proposals to settle claims 
simply foster the impression that Treaty matters have become irksome 
and that a piecemeal consideration of each article will eventually do 
away with the Treaty altogether. Hui participants agreed that any 
mechanism for the settlement of Treaty claims will only make sense if 
it is premised upon a wider Treaty framework and that settlements 
which purport to be full and final will never be durable unless they are 
formulated within that wider context. In this sense the Proposal is 
premature. It should have been preceded by the careful development 
of a constitutional covenant regarding the Treaty and the position of 
Maori as tangatawhenua. 
Congress then declared its hand on terminology. First, 
rangatiratanga can be said to be about mana whenua and mana rangatira, 
namely, the right of iwi and hapu to exercise authority in the 
development and control of resources which they own, or are 
supposed to own, and to interact with the Crown according to their 
own needs and inclinations. 
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Second, and to an increasing extent, rangatiratanga has relevance to 
the right of all Maori, individually and collectively, to determine their 
own policies, to participate in the development and interpretation of 
the law, to assume responsibility for their own affairs and to plan for 
the needs of future generations. Such a right reflects a Maori constitu­
tional element which has assumed increasing importance over the past 
155 years and especially since post-1945 urbanisation. It recognises 
that not all Maori are linked to tribal structures and networks, and also 
takes into account the fact that there are many policies which impact 
on all Maori people but which are not appropriate or relevant to tribal 
authorities. Further, because hapu and iwi are particularly concerned 
about their own areas of responsibility, they do not always give high 
priority to issues of broad regional or national importance. 
The establishment of a national body which allowed for both iwi/ 
hapu and Maori community representation would go some way to 
providing a foundation for a more coordinated approach to Maori 
policy, appropriate to the twenty-first century. 
The National Maori Congress thus came to the conclusion that 
there should be a national focus for Maori people which is capable of 
providing a structure for Maori representation at a national level in 
order to advance Maori interests. However, it said, enthusiasm for 
establishing a national Maori organisation is not shared by all Maori. 
Many iwi see it as an unnecessary and undesirable step. They are 
concerned that the formation of a national Maori voice could 
undermine the authority of tribes if it began speaking on behalf of 
the tribes. 
On the other hand, it argued, without a broadly representative 
national body, it would be difficult to agree on national Maori policies 
or to formulate strategies or Maori development. Essentially iwi are 
concerned about their own interests rather than national Maori 
interests. Moreover, in the pursuit of rangatiratanga Maori people will 
remain vulnerable if there is no body politic which can represent all 
their interests at constitutional and political levels. First, energies will 
be dissipated in several directions with a lack of coordination and a 
dilution of resources, including human resources. Second, by default 
as much as anything else, various independent groups will assume the 
role of a national body even if they do not have a mandate. And third, 
in the absence of a national body able to articulate a national Maori 
voice, the Crown will continue to fill the perceived gap by itself 
making policy for Maori people. 
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It then considered a number of models for a national Maori body 
politic. One which it had earlier supported in principle took the form 
of a National Maori Assembly of 40 to 80 members representing both 
iwi and Maori community interests. The Maori electoral roll would be 
a starting point for determining eligibility to vote and a formula for 
representation, taking into account the size of the population, iwi, and 
existing Maori community structures. It assumed that an Assembly 
would be supported by an infrastructure and that all Maori policy 
units in the State sector, including Te Puni Kokiri, would be retained as 
Assembly staff, at least in the initial years. The main functions of the 
Assembly would be the development of Maori policy, Maori 
appointments (for instance, to Te Ohu Kaimoana, the Waitangi 
Tribunal, the Maori Land Court), monitoring Government policies in 
terms of best outcomes for the people. This, now, is rangatiratanga and 
the catchword is 'self-determination'. 
The 'chal lenges' in the Treaty?1 
The challenges in the Treaty are twofold. The first lies in the structural 
disjunction between centralised government on the one hand and 
tribal and non-tribal groups on the other. I add in parenthesis here that 
this disjunction is not between urban and rural categories, notwith­
standing the process we call urbanisation. 
The second challenge lies in the two-sided question facing the 
Maori people-is national political unity desirable, and if it is, is it 
achievable? 
In addressing this challenge let us consider to begin with the 
options offered by Council and Congress. The Council has a good track 
record of representing Maori interests at a national politico-legal level. 
Perhaps the initial all-embracing issue it tackled was the Prichard­
Waetford Commission's report on Maori land and the consequent Maori 
Land Amendment Bill of 1967, when it organised a national hui on these 
matters and later acted as a clearing-house for submissions to govern­
ment. One of its more recent and dramatic interventions occurred in 
1987 where it sought to negate a government ploy to rid itself of the 
means to compensate successful Treaty claimants. But, as I have said, it 
is a statutory body, pakeha in structure, lacks clear independence from 
government and cannot itself speak for one or more tribes or sub­
tribes. The lack of a local vested interest could, of course, be seen as an 
advantage in promoting issues at a national level; but while objectivity 
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is one thing, authority is another. Furthermore, while it has a formal 
nationwide structure in place-its hierarchy of committees-it lacks 
administrative capacity to make it function. 
As to Congress, it seems to me that it is still finding its feet. It has 
profited greatly from the patronage of one who symbolises a 
quintessential rangatiratanga, Sir Hepi Te Heuheu of Ngati Tuwharetoa, 
one who, without promoting either his own or his tribe's view at the 
expense of others, has provided Congress with an opportunity to 
bring into being a unified independence for the Maori people. 
Congress, however, still has to grapple with the conundrum that if for 
centuries tribal emulation has been the Maori people's strength in 
peace and war, will that strength be compromised through 
unification? What has yet to be found for this is that elusive factor, 
incentive. 
And for both Council and Congress there is the added problem of 
one or the other making themselves relevant to a burgeoning number 
of non-tribal groups-committees, trusts, clubs and so on. It may be 
that here the Maori Womens Welfare League (MWWL) which for the 
past 45 years has organised itself on the basis of family-centred 
interests such as education, health, and housing rather than tribal­
resource based interests, can serve as a catalyst in producing a unified 
Maori voice. 
However, there may be another dimension in all of this, that of 
scale. In 1840 when the Treaty was signed the Maori outnumbered the 
non-Maori by at least 50 to 1 .  Well within two decades, the populations 
were equal. Today disparate units of the Maori population comprise a 
mere 10-15 per cent of the country's total (depending on the statistics 
you prefer). Against that level of discrepancy in numbers (let alone 
capital assets) there is, nevertheless, a notion of partnership between 
Crown and Maori engendered by the Treaty and almost codified by a 
recent edict of the country's Court of Appeal. 'Partnership' is beguil­
ing. On the one hand it suggests equality, but talk of political equality 
is idle. Yet, talk about equality before the law between Crown and a 
particular hapu or iwi on a Treaty grievance is anything but idle, as a 
few recent multi-million dollar settlements would indicate. 
Accordingly, while a pan-Maori body like a national assembly is a 
logical goal to consider seriously, it may also be that governments and 
the Maori people can just as well discuss global issues such as justice, 
health, and land, by means of an established circuit of hui: a circuit 
that would include all groups of whatever persuasion without any 
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sacrifice of that vital ingredient mana. This has been tried a number of 
times over the past 20 years. While the ineptness of the practice has to 
a large extent ensured failure of outcome, it has not, in my view, 
negated the principle. 
So much for some options for a unified approach to a sovereign 
Maori identity. But what more might be said about the status quo, over 
and above Council and Congress? At the moment a small number of 
tribal and sub-tribal groups are accumulating quite substantial levels 
of capital assets. This has come about for a variety of reasons: 
diversification, increasing levels of managerial and entrepreneurial 
skills, and compensation from the Crown following successful Treaty 
negotiations, to name a few. And as there are now some 500 Treaty 
claims waiting to be heard, the present small number may well grow. 
While individuals in some of these groups have yet to benefit from 
their group's recently improved economic fortunes, their trustees are 
understandably protective of their trust estate and loath to risk 
engaging in enterprises that might threaten their independence. And 
on the face of it what applies in the economic field also applies in the 
political. It is not that bilateral or limited regional arrangements 
cannot work. Rather it is the prospect of total or near total unity that 
seems remote at this stage. And neither should it be forgotten that 
many tribes are engaging successfully in joint ventures with non­
Maori commercial enterprises thereby adding another imponderable 
to pan-Maori unification. 
Having said that, there are indeed examples of nationwide unity 
among Maori people-a unity on other than party political, religious, 
or tribal grounds. I would mention the MWWL and the Kohanga Reo 
(pre-school Maori language) Movement, both of which operate among 
tribal as well as non-tribal groups. Another is the ex-28 Maori 
Battalion Association, a poignant reminder of what might have been. 
But these fall into a social welfare category where the capital asset is 
humanity. Unfortunately governments so far have failed to recognise 
such capital as a fundamental ingredient in the exercise of 
rangatiratanga, and therefore to be seen as a valid potential claim on 
the Crown in terms of its Treaty obligations. Nevertheless if the tribes 
were, for that purpose, to set one side their material asset-based 
enterprises they might well find common cause with one another and 
with those disengaged from tribal concerns and so force government 
recognition of a Maori unity. At least all Maori accept the aphorism: 
What is the most important thing in this world?-1 say to you it is 
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people, it is people, it is people. (He aha te mea nui i tenei ao? Maku e 
mea atu ki a koutou, he tangata, he tangata, he tan gaga . )  
Concl usion 
Does the Treaty of Waitangi have relevance for a Maori political 
identity today? The best answer given by the limited data I have been 
able to refer to is 
• that the key symbol of identity and unity vis-a-vis the Crown 
since 1840 has been rangatiratanga 
• that its meaning has been, and still is, 'trusteeship' 
• that its referent is the hapu 
• that at present rangatiratanga is also being developed as a 
demand for self-determination, namely, control over 
government Maori policy and practice 
• that its referent is the Maori nation 
Whether, finally, a Maori nation will ever receive practical, let alone 
constitutional, recognition remains to be seen. At the least the Treaty is 
providing a context for Maori debate-the outcome of which no New 
Zealander can ignore. And it is this Treaty context that provides 
opportunity for a considered response to the question of a Maori 
identity. If the opportunity is taken with due regard to history it will, I 
think, ensure an identity viable both in the Maori and in the non­
Maori worlds that will satisfy those who need it most. 
Notes 
1. Before turning to the 'challenges' in the Treaty I should add a word 
of explanation about the two Maori organisations I have been 
referring to. The New Zealand Maori Council represents several 
layers of committees beneath it, which themselves ultimately 
represent a network of electorates into which the country is 
divided. The latter were brought into existence with the passing of 
the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act of 1945 and have a 
non-party, non-sectarian Maori welfare orientation. The apical 
body, the Council, was formed and recognised by the Maori Welfare 
Act 1962. Initially it had a mandate from the tribes, but largely due 
to post war urbanisation that mandate has shifted to the Congress. 
The National Maori Congress, seems to have acquired its early 
impetus from an ad hoe grouping of relatively well-endowed 
central North Island tribes in the mid-1980s. At all events since 
land was, and still is, the major source of tribal wealth and identity, 
the apparent inability of the Council to represent these interests 
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resulted in the formation of the Congress in 1990. Its constituency 
are the 30 or more tribes in New Zealand, and in comparison with 
the Council it has deliberately abstained from seeking parliamentary 
recognition. While it has an executive committee and holds general 
meetings it is more in the nature of a forum than a powerful well­
organised pressure group. 
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Com mon property and reg ional 
sovere ignty: re lations between 
aborig inal peop les and the Crown in 
Canada 
Peter J. Usher 
In a world where even nation-states have declining power and 
authority in the face of global markets, international trade agreements, 
and harmonised laws and regulations, what does sovereignty mean at 
the subnational level? And what is the connection between common 
property and sovereignty at the subnational level? What challenges 
and opportunities confront minority indigenous populations in these 
contemporary circumstances? The situation of aboriginal peoples in 
Canada provides distinctive perspectives on these questions. In our 
country, new understandings are being reached, new arrangements 
forged and implemented, but also, new difficulties and challenges are 
emerging. 
Recognition and disregard of aboriginal property and 
sovereignty 
Aboriginal peoples not only used and occupied their territories, they 
also regulated access to their lands and resources by outsiders and 
access within them by members. Aboriginal property in lands and 
resources existed in at least three forms: as a discrete physical space, as 
a set of relations among the landholding group, and a right in the eyes 
of others. Property relations are, of course, rules about who has rights 
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to what, and how they can exercise those rights. They are thus a 
fundamental element of sovereignty or self-government. 
In 1763, a Royal Proclamation declared British recognition of 
aboriginal title and rights in what is now Canada, although the specific 
content of this recognition, and of Canada's obligations in respect of it, 
have been much debated politically and in the courts. At the least, we 
can say that the Proclamation recognised title insofar as it established a 
lawful process for obtaining aboriginal lands by negotiation and treaty, 
and that until this process had occurred, aboriginals were to remain 
unmolested in their use of their land and under the protection of the 
Crown. It also, by implication at least, recognised aboriginal sovereignty 
insofar as it acknowledged treaty-making partners capable of acting 
politically on behalf of landholding groups. 
How the recognition of aboriginal title and rights evolved in 
practice in Canada is a sorry story, which can only be highlighted here.1 
Canadian courts have from time to time acknowledged the existence of 
aboriginal title, but characterised it merely as usufructuary, or more 
recently as sui generis, which gives the appearance of recognition while 
at the same time emptying it of practical content and effect. So it came 
about that in the eyes of the law, aboriginal rights in land and resources 
(when acknowledged) were not exclusive, provided neither defence 
nor remedy against nuisance, trespass, or expropriation, and did not 
bind or encumber third parties granted competing land or resource 
rights by the Crown. 
The treaty-making process, as it evolved for over a century and a 
half after the Royal Proclamation, was intended by the colonial 
government and later Canada to clear the way for settlement and 
development. According to the English language versions as published 
by Canada, these treaties constituted surrenders of vast territories in 
exchange for limited hunting rights on unoccupied Crown lands, cash 
payments for supplies and personal annuities, and reserve lands which 
typically amounted to no more than one per cent of the ceded territory. 
What Indians regarded as their own lands on which they would be 
self-governing, Canada cast as Dominion lands 'set apart for Indians' 
(Indian Act, s.18(1)), temporarily it hoped, as places of confinement 
and assimilation. The effect was to set aside property for Indian use, 
but not to recognise Indian relations of property, and certainly not 
their communal nature or its implications. 
Further, the division of powers between the Dominion Government 
and the provinces at Confederation (British North America Act 1867) 
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was considered to have fully allocated sovereignty in Canada, leaving 
no room for the exercise of aboriginal sovereignty, perhaps least of all 
with respect to the disposition and management of land, water, and 
natural resources. 
Canada's unilateral intepretation of the treaties, its Constitution, 
and the Indian Act, combined to deny completely aboriginal sover­
eignty and self-government. Two hundred years after the Royal 
Proclamation, Canada was firmly committed to an assimilationist 
policy, and regarded the treaties as quaint anachronisms that could 
and should be disregarded if they stood in the way of the public good 
(which government regarded as also the aboriginal good). The idea 
that aboriginal rights might persist and have substance outside of the 
treaty areas (the substantial part of Canada not yet included in the 
treaty-making process when it ended in 1930) was simply not considered. 
Reclaiming property and soverei gnty-two directions 
When the movement to reclaim aboriginal and treaty rights gathered 
momentum in the 1970s, there was a range of approaches based in no 
small measure on aboriginal peoples' specific historical experience. In 
the southern, settled areas of Canada, the focus was on the 
development of self-government on the reserves. There was little 
interest in (or hope for) the 99 per cent of land that had been lost. 
Other than exercising hunting and fishing rights, there was little 
assertion of territorial rights on settled and alienated land. In the far 
north, where Inuit and Indians had experienced little impact from 
settlement and development, and where the use of land and water 
continued largely uninterrupted, the assertion of rights was over the 
entire territory. In the mid-north, where although use of off-reserve 
lands continued, there had been progressive encroachment and 
restriction by development activities, government regulations, and 
settlers, the assertion of rights was also territorially extensive, but 
there was much emphasis on seeking remedies for past damages. In 
the northern treaty areas, Indians saw these incursions and damages 
as a long history of treaty violations, and signs of a treaty partner no 
longer to be trusted. 2 
The effect was that in the south, and to a large extent in the mid­
north, Indians pursued autonomy and sovereignty, even if over 
limited territories, whereas in the far north, Inuit and to some extent 
Indians sought to retain a range of rights over their entire territories 
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but were more prepared to enter into relations of partnership and 
cooperation. On the one hand, coexistence in separate spheres, on the 
other, cooperation and participation. This is necessarily an over­
simplification, but it provides some insight into different outcomes in 
the north and south of Canada, and to the successes and limitations of 
comprehensive claims agreements. 
Modern comprehensive cla ims ag reements 
As a result of certain political and judicial events in the early 1970s, 
Canada acknowledged that there were outstanding aboriginal 
interests in unceded land and that it was prepared to negotiate 
modem treaties on the basis of them (Chretien 1973) . The Office of 
Native Claims was given a mandate to negotiate, in exchange for 
extinguishment, certain land and resource benefits, title to a limited 
quantum of lands (including subsurface rights to a small proportion 
thereof), preferential or exclusive access to fish and wildlife, and 
limited participation in the management of these resources, and 
monetary compensation. Other benefits not related to lands and 
resources were also offered, but the overall package did not include 
self-government (Canada 1981).3 
The new policy included some significant departures from the old 
treaty pattern, with respect to lands, resources, and environment. For 
our purposes, these were 
• the land quantum to be negotiated was far greater than what 
was provided for (although not necessarily greater than 
what Indian signatories had understood they would get) in 
the numbered treaties, although much of this would consist 
of surface title only 
• the lands selected would be held in freehold directly by an 
aboriginal corporate entity, rather than by Canada for the 
benefit of aboriginal people 
• cash compensation for lost lands would be substantial, and 
would be paid to an aboriginal corporate entity rather than 
to individuals 
• hunting and fishing rights would be exclusive or 
preferential, and to some extent compensable 
• aboriginal people would have some involvement in wildlife 
and environmental management. 
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The land, resource, and environment regimes established under the 
comprehensive claims process provide some measure of protection of 
land and resources from the adverse effects of development, and also 
for mitigation and compensation where such effects do occur. These 
modern treaties thus address problems perhaps not foreseen, and 
certainly not explicitly dealt with, in the historic treaties. They do so 
by acknowledging and balancing both aboriginal and non-aboriginal 
interests throughout the traditional territory. Some incidents of 
aboriginal title are formally recognised on all lands (except the very 
limited areas in freehold tenure), more in some categories of land than 
in others, yet nowhere are they complete. 
The modern treaties also provide an institutional framework for 
the continuing negotiation and mutual accommodation of aboriginal 
and non-aboriginal interests in the governance of land, resources, and 
environment. They provide for aboriginal involvement in the 
management of the entire territory, but not their exclusive governance 
or sovereignty over any of it. This is a vision of integration and 
participation, of a continuing and evolving relationship between 
partners, rather than of separation and coexistence (Usher 1997).  
What follows is a description of what happens when aboriginal 
rights have been recognised and codified, and must then be exercised 
in a situation where the presence, interests, and rights of others, both 
within the territory or 'settlement region' and outside of it, must be 
acknowledged and negotiated. In most of the cases referred to, the 
primary economic orientation of the aboriginal population is a mixed, 
subsistence-based economy, based on local-level subsistence and 
commercial exploitation of fisheries and wildlife, employment, and 
transfer payments. Industrial employment, where it occurs, is in the 
minerals, oil and gas sectors. There is no agriculture, and with few 
exceptions, no forestry or pastoralism. 
The provisions for co-management 
The principle of co-management is perhaps the most innovative and 
yet least understood elements of the modern treaties. It applies not 
only to wildlife and fisheries -the so-called 'traditional' resources­
but also to environmental protection and regulation, and land use 
planning.4 
The basic structure of co-management consists of boards or 
committees responsible for specific management areas such as 
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wildlife, fisheries, impact screening and review, land use planning, 
and water management. Members are usually appointed in equal 
numbers by governments and beneficiary organisations. 
Geographically, the jurisdiction of these boards extends to all of the 
lands within the settlement area, whether in aboriginal, Crown, or 
private tenure. The boards are technically advisory to the appropriate 
minister, and do not replace existing government agencies. They are 
intended to guide the overall direction of policy, and have a range of 
powers from making binding decisions, approvals, advice, and 
research direction. Here, for example, is how the role of the Nunavut 
Wildlife Management Board (NWMB) is described in the Nunavut 
Land Claims Agreement 
Recognizing that Government retains ultimate responsibility for 
wildlife management, the NWMB shall be the main instrument of 
wildlife management in the Nunavut Settlement Area and the main 
regulator of access to wildlife and have the primary responsibility in 
relation thereto (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development 1993:5.2.33) . 
Comprehensive claims have not been the only basis for the 
development of co-management. Some important and enduring 
examples pre-date many of the claims, and limited forms of co­
management have been implemented outside of the comprehensive 
claims areas. However, the claims-based regimes are the strongest and 
most enduring, not least because they are constitutionally protected 
under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. They cannot be 
unilaterally disbanded or ignored by Canada, or by its provinces and 
territories. 
At the time that co-management options were first seriously 
negotiated in comprehensive claims, the alternative was continued 
and more comprehensive devolution to the territorial governments. 
Instead, at least a nominal form of power-sharing was the outcome. 
Governments were not entirely averse to this compromise, and 
certainly preferred it to aboriginal self-government with respect to 
lands and resources. The Supreme Court's Sparrow decision5 also 
provided an impetus for co-management---consultation has become 
one of the key tests of constitutionally acceptable conservation 
limitations on aboriginal harvesting rights. The co-management 
boards provide a useful 'single window' for governments to deal with 
specific resource issues. With respect to wildlife and fisheries, co­
management is a means of enlisting harvester cooperation to ensure 
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conservation, as an alternative to deploying draconian and expensive 
(but often unsuccessful) enforcement measures. 
From an aboriginal perspective, co-management establishes a 
principle completely ignored (if not explicitly rejected) in Canada's 
interpretation of the historic treaties. It is that aboriginal people retain, 
as a result of claims settlements, some rights not only of use but of 
management, and in effect governance, that apply on all Crown lands 
and in more limited respects on private lands, throughout the 
traditional territory or 'settlement region'. The modem treaties create 
an institutional basis for cooperation and coexistence, for problem 
solving and for the harmonising of mutual interests, with respect to all 
lands and resources. This is quite different from the traditional denial 
of all collective aboriginal rights save residual hunting and fishing 
rights outside of reserve lands. In most cases where it has been 
implemented it has been a counterweight and buffer to the 
progressive encroachment and restriction on the use of customary 
lands and resources, to harvest disruption, and to the loss of social and 
cultural as well as economic values. 
On the other hand, the emerging pattern is not one of self­
determination or autonomy. It would certainly appear, based on the 
structures and mandates established by the comprehensive claims, 
that the state management system has been retained. The general 
pattern is that allocation and licensing is delegated to the boards and 
the local harvester organisations, but management for conservation is 
reserved to governments, with the boards having only an advisory 
role (although in practice their decisions are rarely if ever varied or 
rejected) .  The boards are technically institutions of public government, 
on which aboriginals are guaranteed equal representation with 
governments. The co-management boards thus do not replace existing 
resource management agencies-at most they provide guidance to 
them. This is less than what many, and perhaps most, harvesters 
wanted. 
Co-management in practice 
Co-management has been implemented in Canada in a variety of 
situations since the early 1980s. Some of these have been claims-based, 
others have been cobbled together as ad hoe solutions to land and 
resource management crises. In both cases, there have been notable 
achievements in conservation through self-regulation, community 
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land use and conservation planning, co-management of national 
parks, impact screening and review, negotiating interjurisdictional 
agreements on resource access and management, and in problem 
solving generally. 
Most co-management boards, and especially the claims-based ones, 
are bilateral arrangements between aboriginal peoples and govern­
ments, and hence do not necessarily include all interested parties. That 
is probably one reason that boards have often been able to achieve 
consensus over basic management objectives, for example, manage­
ment for subsistence in the case of the Beverly-Qamanirjuaq Caribou 
Management Board (BQCMB) (Usher 1993) . As well, the boards are 
mandated to implement the objectives of the claims agreements, 
which in the case of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA), for example, 
clearly link aboriginal harvesting rights with conservation (Staples 
1997) .  However potentially competing interests such as resident sport 
hunters or the guiding industry are not directly represented on the 
boards (although governments may choose in some cases to nominate 
such individuals as their representatives). While this has not been a 
significant problem in the Northwest Territories (NWT), it accounts for 
some of the differences in board structures in the Yukon, and for some 
of the resistance to co-management in the provincial North (see, for 
example, Brooke 1997, Larcombe 1997, and Penn 1997) . Where third 
party interests are well established, multi-party approaches at the local 
level as in the Shuswap pilot project in British Columbia (Pinkerton, 
Moore and Fortier 1997) or the Barriere Lake agreement in Quebec 
(Notzke 1997) are likely to be essential elements of success. 
Some observers have suggested that co-management 
offers a potential bridge between indigenous and state systems of 
knowledge and management (Usher 1987, Osherenko 1988). The record 
of achievement in this regard is mixed, but co-management has 
provided a forum or venue for continuing negotiation over matters 
crucial to both aboriginal peoples and governments. Whether the 
integration or bridging of traditional and scientific knowledge is always 
an appropriate or achievable objective of co-management remains to be 
seen. One substantial achievement in most cases has been agreement on 
research objectives and methods, and the sharing of data. The scientific 
research on which management is based is undertaken with the 
knowledge and consent of harvesters (for example the BQCMB) and 
often the research priorities, design, and budgets are effectively directed 
by the co-management board and, for example in the IPA, the 
1 1  O I The governance of common property in the Pacific region 
Inuvialuit Game Council. In the NWT, the boards have their own 
secretariats with technical as well as adminis-trative capacity, hence 
aboriginal representatives have access to expertise outside of the line 
management agencies. The composition of boards is quite similar in 
all of the agreements, in particular the provision for equality of 
representation. What is crucial to the outcome is who in practice 
appoints (or which set of interests appoints) the members, the effective 
mandate and accountability of the members, and the actual operating 
procedures. These factors can either serve to paper over and suppress 
real differences, or give proper recognition and expression of them. 
The experience of most boards shows that consensus often builds 
over time among board members, and the agencies they represent. As 
already mentioned, co-management board decisions are rarely if ever 
varied or rejected by the ministers they advise. However this is not 
sufficient, at least on the government side, to bind all those whose 
actions (or inaction) may have an impact on management. For example, 
support for IPA implementation on the part of local or regional govern­
ment agencies is not necessarily sustained at headquarters, and there 
are some government departments not directly represented on the 
boards who are indifferent at best, or hostile at worst, to board 
recommendations (Staples 1997). 
The costs of implementation and of effective participation are 
proving to be substantial: consistent attention, expert research and 
advice, and extensive travel are required. The final agreements them­
selves do not specify what human and financial resources are required 
to implement their provisions. That has been a matter for subsequent 
negotiations, and has sometimes proved the source of fundamental 
disagreement or dissatisfaction between parties and beneficiaries. 
There has been a range of responses to co-management initiatives 
by aboriginal groups. Some have found that their co-management 
arrangements suit their needs well, and that they can use them to their 
advantage. Others find co-management at least acceptable in as much 
as it is a significant improvement over the former closed-door system 
of management. Still others have no desire to co-manage resources 
with outsiders but seek exclusive management authority within a 
limited geographical area. In assessing co-management, it is necessary 
to consider the diversity of circumstances surrounding its negotiation 
and implementation. 
There is some evidence that co-management is more likely to be 
preferred where migratory or transboundary populations are 
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involved. In such cases, governments and users from several 
jurisdictions are brought together in a single forum. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, those groups (such as the Inuvialuit) most dependent on 
migratory species such as caribou, waterfowl, whales, and polar bears, 
are co-management's most convinced advocates. They regard it as the 
key to resource conservation, and to social and political stability 
respecting resource harvesting, despite some day-to-day problems and 
frustrations. By contrast, the Anishinabe of northwestem Ontario 
historically relied on fish and wildlife resources with quite restricted 
ranges, or even non-mobile resources such as wild rice. These 
resources could be and were managed exclusively within a limited 
area, hence the benefits of co-management are less obvious (Chapeskie 
1995). The differences in environmental circumstances between these 
two aboriginal peoples is compounded by both ideology and historical 
experience-certainly, in the case of the Anishinabe, of a much more 
thorough and devastating history of progressive encroachment and 
restriction (Usher et al. 1992). 
There is no one answer to the question of whether co-management 
has proven an advantage more to governments or to beneficiaries, or 
for that matter, whether it has been to the equal advantage of both. 
Nor is it clear whether it is better to have single, comprehensive 
boards dealing with large areas (such as the NWMB which covers 
about one-fifth of Canada), or several more specialised boards (as in 
the case of the IFA boards), or local, community-based boards in which 
non-aboriginal residents participate (such as the Renewable Resource 
Councils in the Yukon). 
Nonetheless, three features of the claims-based regimes appear to 
be critical to the successful implementation of co-management (Usher 
1995). First, the co-management structures, and their mandate, 
objectives, and mode of operation, are themselves negotiated. This is 
very different from inviting people to sit on a body whose mandate 
and operations have already been determined unilaterally. Second, 
aboriginal members of claims-based boards are politically accountable 
appointees of one of the parties to an agreement, not simply 'stake­
holders' or 'users', as is the case on the ad hoe boards. In some of the 
latter type of boards, (including the well-known BQCMB), only 
governments are signatories to the management agreement. The rights 
and powers of users are specified but not guaranteed; they are granted 
by governments and do not constitute a recognition of existing rights. 
Third, only the claims-based arrangements are permanent. The ad hoe 
1 1 2 I The governance of common property in the Pacific region 
arrangements are in place only for a limited period, subject to discre­
tionary renewal and funding by government. 
Co-management may work best when the parties have similar 
interests in and objectives regarding the resources in question. Ideally 
each contributes its own knowledge to achieve a shared objective of 
sustainability. If objectives are not shared, then knowledge may not be 
shared and communication will be impaired. This problem is likely to 
increase as the number of parties to co-management increases. 
Benefits of co-management 
The key elements of the modem treaties regarding land tenure, 
resource access, and co-management provide for enforceable rights of 
property and governance. The resulting security of tenure, access, and 
management regime provide essential conditions for local economic 
growth and social development. Typically, where co-management has 
been implemented, local and regional economies can be characterised 
as mixed, subsistence-based economies. They are certainly not tradi­
tional in the sense of being antiquated or undeveloped, but northern 
aboriginal communities have quite distinctive social, cultural, and 
economic objectives and needs that are not fully addressed by the 
standard models of economic development. The security achieved by 
the claims agreements is important not so much for capital investment 
by lending institutions, as for the investment in social capital by abo­
riginal people themselves in the form of the skills, knowledge, and 
values required for harvesting. For the most part, such communities 
are quite prepared to work with outside resource development interests 
if they can maximise the economic benefits, minimise environmental 
and social damages, and retain their renewable-resource based 
harvesting economies for both subsistence and commercial purposes. 
Under the modem agreements, not only are aboriginal priorities 
with respect to harvesting guaranteed, but co-management 
arrangements provide the tools of cooperative governance necessary 
to secure both harvesting and marketing in a national and inter­
national context. Aboriginal peoples have been involved in 
international markets for centuries, and have no interest in returning 
to some imaginary pristine autarky. Yet this market access is now 
under unprecedented assault from an urban public increasingly 
divorced from, and sometimes hostile to, the realities of the 
sustainable use of living resources. 
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Through implementing co-management regimes, aboriginal people 
not only continue harvesting but are learning new and quite different 
skills: negotiating, marketing, finding out how the larger world works 
and how to operate in it, directing research, setting priorities, and in 
general defending and advancing their interests in a positive way. In 
doing so they reinforce their collective sense of the role and import­
ance of their common property arrangements and subsistence systems, 
and their culturally-based know ledge, values, and skills that are 
required to make these things work in contemporary conditions. 
Scientists and administrators also learn how to expand the knowledge 
inputs required to operationalise modem systems of conservation and 
development to include traditional environmental knowledge and 
understanding. 
Another feature of the modem agreements is the provision for 
negotiating impact benefit agreements where third parties seek to 
exercise their resource rights on aboriginal lands (where aboriginal 
entities hold surface but not subsurface titles, or where prior Crown 
grants survive). These agreements may include such matters as project 
mitigation, environmental monitoring, compensation for loss of use or 
direct damages to the environment as well as to property, all of which 
require continuing cooperative arrangements between the parties and 
which may also be characterised as a form of voluntary co­
management. 
Such arrangements are increasingly (although by no means 
universally) accepted by large resource companies as good business 
sense in that they provide for certainty with respect to development 
and investment which the state, on its own, is unable to fully 
guarantee except by the most draconian and publicly unacceptable 
methods. 
One feature of co-management is that it brings people together in a 
way that they can learn to respect each other and understand their 
interests, priorities, and perspectives. When this happens, people are 
more likely to make accommodations, and more likely to see the 
process as mutually beneficial rather than as a zero-sum game. 
The process of co-management is costly, but it is also necessary to 
look at avoided costs. Direct actions, disruptions, and court challenges 
are also costly. In the historic treaty areas where these issues remain 
unresolved, when aboriginal people want to do things they believe 
they have a right to do, they act. When charged and prosecuted, they 
defend themselves in court on the basis of their aboriginal or treaty 
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rights. Some of these cases have significantly enlarged both the legal 
content and the public understanding of these rights, but there have 
also been some significant losses. Any major case that eventually goes 
all the way up to the Supreme Court is likely to take years and cost 
millions of dollars, all of which creates uncertainty for both customary 
common property holders and potential investors. 
On balance, experience suggests that contemporary co­
management arrangements between aboriginal peoples and Canadian 
governments, as well as third parties, meet the tests of conservation, 
equity, and efficiency, and therefore provide the conditions for 
sustainable development. Experience also suggests that the principles 
of co-management can be applied to other spheres, ranging from the 
international (such as the recently established Arctic Council and its 
role in environmental protection, and the standing it provides to 
aboriginal political organisations) . They can also be applied to other 
resource management issues at the regional level such as non­
renewable resource development and to program delivery relating to 
such matters as health and education. 
There is a new way of doing business in the Canadian North, and 
many are recognising its useful and beneficial aspects. Nothing is 
permanent, however, and the maintenance of effective co­
management requires ongoing vigilance and the solution of new 
problems. 
Challenges for co-management 
In the long run, co-management arrangements and agreements will 
only be as good as the parties are prepared to make them. There is a 
special requirement for vigilance on the part of the weaker party, 
which is invariably the aboriginal party. Comprehensive claims 
agreements are protected under section 35 of the Constitu tion Act, 
1982, and their provisions are paramount over any other federal, 
provincial, or territorial legislation which may be inconsistent with 
them. Nonetheless, governments must constantly be reminded of 
these facts, especially when drafting new legislation. Although there 
are arbitration provisions under the claims agreements, there are no 
enforceable penalties for federal non-compliance. 
It is up to the aboriginal party to ensure that the rest of the world 
complies with their agreements. The costs and complications of 
effectively administering such large tracts of land bring both problems 
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and opportunities. The slowness of actual demarcation on the ground 
has been a problem where development pressures are great, as in the 
case of forestry adjacent to southern Cree lands in Quebec (Penn 1997) . 
Overly prescriptive regimes which cannot evolve and adapt to chang­
ing conditions will ultimately fail to address key problems, and the 
parties will eventually bypass them (Brooke 1997, Wilkinson and 
Vincelli 1997). 
Although the courts in recent years have led the way in reinterpret­
ing the historic treaty provisions in a more liberal and expansive 
fashion, this cannot be relied on in the case of the modem treaties. 
Canadian courts already regard these as more equitable contracts in 
which the aboriginal parties had full capacity to negotiate agreements 
and to understand the consequences of what they had agreed to. 
There has to be political will to implement agreements. The oppor­
tunities for slippage in the first few critical years of implementation, 
when operational patterns are getting established, are substantial. It is 
the aboriginal party that must seize the initiative and ensure that 
implementation is effective. 
Co-management thus clearly requires mutual respect and equitable 
political relations. But it also requires substantial resources to 
implement. Without adequate resources, there can be no effective 
participation in co-management regimes, which requires (among other 
things) travel, translation, access to information, and continuity of 
representation. The seats may be there, but that is not much help if 
people have neither the money nor the capacity to fill them, or if for 
these and other reasons they are discouraged from filling them. 
The pattern of modem comprehensive claims settlements was set 
in the 1980s when governments still spent money freely, and took an 
activist role in land and resource management. Periodic renegotiation 
of implementation funding (which after initial one-time implementation 
tasks relates largely to the co-management system) will get tougher. 
Disputes may now more likely occur not over differing legal inter­
pretations of substantive obligations, but what expenditures are 
required to meet these obligations. New measures and practices of 
management effectiveness and efficiency will be required. How to trade 
off higher costs of doing business, and of conducting research, against 
reduced enforcement costs, crisis avoidance, and enhanced sus­
tainability? Co-management can become a victim of its own success: to 
the extent that it reduces conflict, it becomes less noticeable in the eyes 
of those who ultimately allocate the funds. 
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Another area future disagreement may be the role of government 
in land and environmental management. In an era of downsizing and 
privatisation, what are the implications of government withdrawal? It 
is hard to continue to implement an agreement when one partner gets 
up from the table and walks away. Problems may also emerge in the 
maintenance of the essential character of common property, with the 
creation of corporate and state-like entities under comprehensive 
claims, although it is too early to assess actual developments. 
Modem treaties have secured a legal base for aboriginal property. 
The collective title is held by corporate entities, with certain important 
limits with respect to transfer or alienation to non-beneficiaries. Is 
there a risk that in the long run collective property can be converted to 
private tenure? I believe that aboriginal property systems are in 
principle recognisable by the common law system even if they are 
different, but it will be a challenge to characterise them in this way 
without undermining them. There is also the question of whether, 
under conditions of scarcity or economic difficulty, limited entry and 
tradeable resource rights could emerge even in the face of fundamental 
values of universal access. Customary property relations do evolve 
and change as new conditions arise. 
Boundary issues may also be problematic. Traditional use and 
occupancy are the basis of aboriginal claims in law and policy. What 
are the implications of using this concept to define the territorial limits 
of jurisdiction of 'state-like' institutions? The modem treaty process is 
creating subnational (or sub-territorial) political and administrative 
units, with mandates and responsibilities organised along state or 
corporate lines. This is very far from the recognition and entrenchment 
of traditional aboriginal forms of socio-territorial organisation. By 
reifying what were formerly fluid and imprecise boundaries according 
to contemporary requirements of state administration (even if an 
aboriginal government is in charge), there is a probability of separation 
of title and use over time, contrary to aboriginal principles and 
traditions. Some evidence of the social difficulties this poses with 
particular respect to registered traplines have been reported in the 
Cree area of Quebec (McDonnell and La Rusic 1987) and the Yukon. 
The emergence of 'overlap' and boundary disputes among neighbour­
ing claimant groups is also an indication of the effect of creating state-like 
jurisdictional boundaries. 
Finally, there is the question of how far the model can spread. The 
most successful examples of implementation come, not by coincidence, 
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from the territorial North. The conditions conducive to success there 
have not held to the same degree in the provincial North, where third 
parties are more involved, and more numerous and varied resident 
interests and property rights are at stake. Because aboriginal people 
are constitutionally a federal responsibility, provincial governments 
have historically represented settler interests, and still do. Crown land 
disposition and resource management are provincial responsibilities, 
south of the 60th parallel, and there is much more resistance to co­
management which is seen, perhaps especially in Quebec, as an attack 
on provincial sovereignty and territorial integrity. Land claims agree­
ments are meeting increasing resistance in the provinces from a 
growing sector of the public that attacks them as 'race-based privilege', 
as a form of apartheid, and as contrary to democratic and egalitarian 
principles. 
Conclusion 
Where aboriginal groups have embraced co-management, they have 
embarked on a path of partnership and cooperation with government, 
sometimes the private sector, and in effect with other Canadian 
citizens. There is an alternative, but it implies the maintenance of 
distance, isolation, and to some extent social if not economic autarky. 
While aboriginal and historic treaty rights are protected under the 
constitution, in the absence of negotiated agreements it is still left to 
the courts to determine what they are. This is a slow, uncertain, and 
uneven process, and it is possible that the high-water mark has 
already been reached in Canada, and the tide is ebbing. Waiting to 
negotiate until formal recognition of certain principles occurs, or until 
certain processes are in place, is also risky. True equality cannot be 
achieved by declaration alone, and it cannot be wished into existence. 
Imbalances of demographic and economic power are facts of life in 
Canada and will continue to be such for a very long time. None of this 
is to deny the tremendous symbolic importance of formal acts of 
recognition, but rights, once acknowleged, have to be exercised in a 
real world where neither property nor sovereignty are unbounded. 
What Canadian aboriginal peoples have achieved through the 
comprehensive claims process and through the implementation of co­
management regimes is far from perfect. In comparison to the situation 
of indigenous peoples in other countries, however, much has been 
achieved by at least some Canadian aboriginal peoples to secure rights 
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of tenure, access, and management of their lands, resources, and 
environment. 
Co-management is not autonomy or self-determination. But it is 
much more than consultation or participation. Property and 
management rights have not simply been defined and defended by 
the law of the state, but also by agreements which were negotiated, 
not unilaterally imposed, and which are constitutionally protected. 
Co-management is not a separatist or isolationist vision, but one of 
cooperation and sharing. These are values not to be dismissed in 
today's world. There will always be hostility and resistance from some 
quarters. There will always be a need to form alliances to protect one's 
interests, and co-management can help people to do that. The struggle 
continues, but on new and higher ground. 
Notes 
1. This section is a condensation of Usher, Tough, and Galois 1992. For 
a useful legal interpretation of the process of conversion of Indian 
lands to Crown lands, see Slattery 1987. For a more expanded 
discussion, see Canada 1996, especially vol. 2, eh. 2, 'Treaties', and 
vol. 2, eh. 4, 'Lands and Resources' .  
2. Canada also acknowledged limited responsibility for dealing with 
past failures to honour its treaty obligations under the Specific 
Claims Policy (Canada 1982), which applied to the treaty areas. 
However, policy implementation has been unilaterally and narrow­
ly determined by Canada. Loss of use of off-reserve resources, 
subsistence or non-market resource values, and resource manage­
ment issues, are all excluded from consideration. 
3. Developments in aboriginal self-government are beyond the scope 
of this paper, but have also taken two directions. One is the creation 
of public government in territories in which aboriginal peoples are 
the majority (Nunavut and Nunavik) . The other has been to assert 
an 'inherent right of self-government' whose content would be 
negotiable or justiciable (which was a part of the unratified 
Constitutional proposals of 1992). This discussion focuses entirely 
on the regimes established by comprehensive claims and related 
processes and does not address the constitutional debates. 
4. This and the following sections are based on the results of the 
Land, Resource, and Environment Regimes Project undertaken for 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, consisting of eight 
case studies of contemporary co-management regimes established 
by the comprehensive claims process and other circumstances, and 
a synthetic analysis (Usher 1997) . The entire set of reports is avail­
able on CD-ROM (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 1997) .  
5 .  R .  v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
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Property, sovereignty and 
self-determination in Austral ia 
Henry Reynolds 
The concept of national sovereignty is under siege in many parts of the 
world as states lose power from above to global markets and global 
organisations and are challenged from below by regions, minorities 
and entrapped nations. Such developments are particularly apparent 
in Europe with the break-up of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia, and with the ceding of power within the European 
Union to the Commission, the Parliament and the Court. At the same 
time regions are asserting new or rediscovered identities. 
John Keane, the British political scientist and biographer of Thomas 
Paine, has called for a decentring of the institutions of the nation-state 
and the return to the more complex pattern typical of the late medieval 
and early modem periods when Europe was divided into 500 or so 
political units (Keane 1992:10). Two other commentators have recently 
advanced arguments of more direct relevance to the Australian scene. 
The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur observed that 'in modem repub­
lics, the origin of sovereignty is in the people, but now we recognise 
we have many peoples. And many people mean many centres of 
sovereignty . . .  ' (Ricoeur 1995:35). 
The second argument was put forward by the prominent British 
Conservative politician Geoffrey Howe who wrote 
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I believe sovereignty is not some pre-defined absolute, but a flexible, 
adaptable, organic notion that endures and adjusts with circum-
stances . .  . In exactly the same way as property rights of an individual, 
sovereignty may be seen as divisible and exploitable in the interests of 
the nation (Howe 1990:679). 
To date Australia appears to be untroubled by debates about the 
nature, extent and the exercise of sovereignty. Aboriginal challenges to 
absolute Crown sovereignty have been summarily dismissed by 
Australian judges. The traditional view was reaffirmed by the High 
Court in the Mabo case as was the so-called Act of State doctrine which 
upholds the view that an extension of sovereignty is an act of prero­
gative power which cannot be questioned by the courts. 
Two key assumptions underpin the conventional view about the 
imposition of British sovereignty over Australia. They relate to 
sovereignty itself, on the one hand, and to traditional Aboriginal 
society on the other. 
The traditional British view of sovereignty was summed up by 
William Blackstone in his classic work Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, published just before the first settlement of Australia. 
Blackstone argued that in any state there must be 'a supreme, 
irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority' (Blackstone 1773, 1:30). It 
was this view of authority which was brought to Australia where it 
was commonly believed there was no government, no law and no 
ownership of land in the sense understood by Europeans. Several 
things followed from this situation. 
• British sovereignty in Australia was original, not derivative 
• the Crown was therefore both the first and only sovereign 
• sovereignty applied immediately and everywhere in the 
absence of any competing sovereign. 
But how did this concept of the Crown's sovereignty relate to the 
idea of terra nullius? In the Mabo case the High Court rejected the idea 
in relation to property while confirming it in relation to sovereignty. 
The bench determined that, contrary to previous assumptions, the 
aboriginal tribes were in possession of their traditional lands. They 
had a form of customary tenure. When the Crown annexed Australia it 
acquired the radical title but not the beneficial ownership of the land 
which remained in the possession of the indigenous people. Much 
land was lost by extinguishment but it happened in a piecemeal 
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fashion over a long period of time. Native title had survived on 
Murray Island because nothing the Queensland government had done 
between 1879 and 1992 had extinguished it. Traditional Murray Island 
property law survives as part of the common law. It is the local law, 
the lex loci of that place. 
What we have now, then, is two stories in conflict. Terra nullius 
applies in respect of sovereignty, but it has been overthrown in rela­
tion to property. Can this situation be sustained? Must there be a new 
jurisprudential story which treats sovereignty in the same way as 
property? What would that story be like? 
1. Before 1788 the Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders 
exercised a form of sovereignty, albeit rudimentary, over 
their traditional territories. The tribal groupings, however 
defined, were small nations. 
2. The original British claim of sovereignty by discovery was a 
claim of priority against rival European powers. It was a 
claim for external sovereignty only. 
3. Within Australia, sovereignty was asserted very slowly as 
settlement advanced gradually over the vast land mass. 
4. Colonial Australia had many sovereigns and many systems 
of law although there were far fewer in 1900 than in 1800. 
5. Remnant sovereignty survives among those communities 
which still exercise traditional law. 
What we have, in sum, is a typical colonial situation where the 
common law applied but only as the circumstances of the colony 
allowed. This brings us back to Geoffrey Howes' view that sovereignty 
was imposed, in practice in a complex way and that in Australia it 
changed considerably over the colonial period. 
Such a new story would have major implications for Australian 
law and Australian politics. It would dramatically change the relation­
ship between indigenous Australians and the state. It suggests that 
like the First Nations of Canada the Aborigines and Islanders have an 
inherent right to self-government arising from the survival of their 
original sovereignty. 
In seeking to find support for self-determination indigenous 
Australians will turn not just outward to international law and docu­
ments but also inward to our own society and backward to our own 
historical experience. 
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Com mon property regimes in 
Aboriginal Austral ia:  tote mism revisited 
Deborah B i rd Rose 
In the closing years of the twentieth century, debates in Australia 
about Indigenous institutions of common property ownership and 
management are inseparable from the highly political issues of Native 
Title. In this chapter I intend to move beyond debates about the 
politics of land tenure and toward an analysis of a dynamic juris­
prudence of duty in which responsibilities and rights are considered 
together. I will examine totemism as a common property institution for 
long-term ecological management. The purpose is to describe and 
analyse this Indigenous regime in order to examine some of the 
principles which inform it. The implications of this analysis speak to 
the sustainability of life on this arid continent. 
The fundamental divide in debates about common property has 
been whether common property is to be understood as an absence of 
institutions for the management of territory and resources, or whether 
common property is to be understood as a type of communal manage­
ment (Berkes and Farvar 1989:7, Eythorsson 1995:7, Maurstad 1995). 
Thanks to Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons' article, debates about 
common property make a vital link between systems of ownership 
and systems of management. It is now established that there are many 
forms of common property institutions for management of resources 
including those of land and sea. The terms 'resource' and 'regime' can 
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be used to distinguish between the resource itself and the set of 
institutions (or absence of institutions) by which it is held and man­
aged (Berkes and Farvar 1989:9). In many parts of the world common 
property institutions are not officially recognised by formal legal institu­
tions. Several regimes may coexist, and common property regimes may 
be hidden from or invisible to formal institutions; coexistence may be 
complementary or contradictory (Maurstad 1995). The coexistence of 
different property regimes frequently correlates with the coexistence of 
different forms of production and different productive groups (for 
example, Berkes et al. 1989, Berkes 1989). 
Common property concepts in Austral ia 
Hunter-gatherer peoples, perhaps more than any others, have been 
until very recently disregarded as land and resource owners and 
managers. Only within the last fifteen years have questions of land 
management emerged as a key component of research with Indigenous 
people in Australia (Williams and Hunn 1982) . The long historical 
silence on these issues is connected with the settler view that Aboriginal 
people were parasites on nature. Elkin (1954:15) gave the mark of 
scientific authority to this view in a book first published in 1938 
The food-gathering life is parasitical; the Aborigines are absolutely 
dependent on what nature produces without any practical assistance 
on their part. 
This view of parasitism was intricately connected to the view of terra 
nullius. The idea that the land was untransformed led directly to the 
idea that land was unowned. Locke's famous statement on property 
and ownership could have been written precisely to justify the 
dispossession of Indigenous peoples in the European settlement of 
Australia 
Whatsoever then he moves out of the state that Nature hath provided 
and left it in he hath mixed his labour with and thereby makes it his 
property (quoted in Shiva 1993:25) . 
The reversal of the parasite view dates to Rhys Jones's (1969) work 
on the use of fire as a tool of land management. He called this system 
fire-stick farming, and his use of the term 'farming' was deliberate 
Gones 1995) .  It was provocative precisely because it hit a cultural/ 
political nerve. It indicates that, like farmers, Aboriginal people 
intervened in their ecosystems to transform them in predictable, and 
to them desirable, ways. They consciously managed their ecosystems 
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for long-term objectives that included the long-term productivity of 
the land and the long-term fertility of resources. There has been a 
degree of debate about Jones's analysis, and there are still some 
adherents to the parasite view, but the evidence is quite clear that 
Aboriginal people managed resources in definable and observable 
ways in order to produce long-term productivity in their 
environments (for example, Bowman 1995; Latz 1995b). 
The official view that Indigenous people did not own the land at 
the time of European conquest has been overturned by the High 
Court's 'Mabo' decision (1992) which gave formal legal recognition to 
the fact that at the time of conquest Indigenous people did own the 
land. In theory, Indigenous people continue to exercise rights of 
ownership-now labelled 'Native Title'--except in areas where 
conquest and appropriation have formally extinguished those rights. 
The more recent Native Title Act (Commonwealth 1993) provides a 
legislative framework within which the continuity of Native Title can 
be asserted, and the High Court's recent 'Wik' decision (1996) 
provides further articulation of how Native Title can be understood 
legally to survive. Where Native Title continues to exist, land cannot be 
alienated from Indigenous use and management without negotiation 
with the Indigenous title holders. It is likely that cooperative 
management agreements will increase as the Native Title Act begins to 
have a greater impact. 
Issues of Indigenous land tenure have thus acquired a special 
urgency in Australia. The analysis of common property regimes brings 
to these issues a vital perspective: that usufructuary rights are 
embedded within regimes of responsibility, and that regimes of rights 
and regimes of management are inseparable. Without rights, resources 
will not be managed; without management, resources will be degraded 
and depleted, and rights will become meaningless. 
If there are Indigenous regimes of common property ownership 
and management, what institutional forms do they take? How might 
they be discerned? In what ways can they be understood to be systems 
that are produced through time, rather than just the fortuitous out­
comes of actions performed by individuals? There can be no single 
answers to these questions, but I believe that an instructive start can 
be made by considering totemism as an institution for the manage­
ment of common property resources. In addition, an examination of 
the history of anthropological and philosophical analysis of totemism 
also helps explain why serious consideration of common property 
regimes has been so long delayed. 
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Land tenure and common property reg i mes 
Aboriginal cultures across Australia (with the possible exception of 
some urban people who have been severed from their homelands for 
generations) construct identity, social relations, and spirituality in 
relation to local place. In Aboriginal English the term is 'country'. 
Economic, social and cultural development is articulated most 
profoundly and productively in the context of country. The Australian 
continent prior to conquest was articulated as a cultural landscape 
through the conjunction of local countries (for example, see Peterson 
and Long 1986) . Countries related to each other regionally through 
marriage, trade, ritual relationships (summarised in Rose 1996) . 
Across the continent articulations of countries were accomplished 
through major trade systems and the extensive 'Dreaming tracks' 
which are the travels of creative beings, impressed upon the landscape 
and told, sung, and performed in contexts of ritual (Mulvaney 1976). 
Countries were (in most areas still are) associated with social 
groups in a reflexive relationship of ownership and belonging. The 
social organisation of landowning groups has been debated with vigour 
for decades by anthropologists, and in recent years the Aboriginal Land 
Commissioner has conducted inquiries into traditional ownership 
under the Land Rights Act (NT) 1976 which have enabled Aboriginal 
people to place their views into the debate. Local land-based groups, 
recruited though descent, are generally called clans by anthropologists, 
and the term has moved into Aboriginal and other Australian English 
vernaculars. Clans are linked into larger clusters, with those sharing a 
language are often referred to in the non-technical literature as tribes. 
Clans are also linked through marriage ties, trade relationships, shared 
responsibilities in religious ceremonies, and alliances for war-terms 
like community, tribe, and nation have been used by different observers 
to refer to clusters of clans that interact on a regular basis. In many areas 
the devastating loss of population brought about by colonisation has 
resulted in people's primary identity being framed at the level of 'tribe' 
or 'community' rather than at the level of a fragmented and devastated 
clan structure.1 
Debate has focused on the composition of the clan (patrilineal, 
cognatic, or some other form of recruitment), and about which level of 
organisation-clan or larger community-is best considered to be a 
landowning group (Gumbert 1984 provides a useful summary for the 
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non-specialist). The Land Rights Act (NT) 1976 defines Aboriginal 
traditional owners (section 3[1])  as 
a local descent group of Aboriginals who have common spiritual 
affiliations to a site on the land, being affiliations that place the group 
under a primary spiritual responsibility for that site and for the land, 
and who are entitled by Aboriginal tradition to forage over that land. 
It thus designates the local group ('clan') as the landowning group, 
focuses on spiritual responsibilities, and treats foraging (use-rights) 
almost as an afterthought. And it is something of a blessing that 
foraging is not central because in twenty years of land claims it has 
been shown conclusively that rights to forage are not restricted to local 
groups such as clans. On all the evidence, use-rights in respect of 
resources are not restricted to, or best articulated through, small 
groups such as clans (see Ingold 1987 for a pointed discussion of this 
issue). 
In contrast to the Northern Territory legislation, the Native Title Act 
1993 speaks primarily to the right to forage: 'The expression "native 
title" or "native title rights and interests" means the communal, group 
or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait 
Islanders in relation to land or waters (233.[1 ]); and "rights and 
interests" includes 'hunting, gathering or fishing rights and interests' 
(233.[2] ) .  Clearly the framers of this Act had usufructuary rights in 
mind. 
Indigenous philosophies assert that social life is most properly 
directed toward ensuring that the past and present of a people and 
their country be brought into the future. Continuity is a key value 
(Stanner 1979). To return, therefore, to my original point about the 
inseparability of regimes of rights and regimes of responsibilities, my 
contention is that these Native Title rights and interests are not 
parasitical-they include not only the right to take resources, but also 
the responsibility to ensure that resources will be there in the future. 
Totemism appears to constitute just such a jurisprudence of 
responsibility and right. 
Intel lectual h istory 
'Totemism' was one of the cornerstones of emergent social science and 
related disciplines around the tum of the century. Sir James Frazer 's 
Totemism and Exogamy (four volumes, 1 910) and Freud's Totem and 
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Taboo (1918) testify to the grasp of 'totemism' on the minds of these 
key thinkers. Debated regularly from decade to decade, totemism has 
become a palimpsest of western social theories. I will not linger in the 
history of thought concerning totemism, but rather will summarise 
extensively in order to elucidate some of the assumptions that have 
hindered an understanding of totemism in the material world, and 
thus have hindered an understanding of Indigenous common 
property regimes. 
Definitions of totemism vary enormously, as I will discuss, but at 
the core the phenomenon labelled totemism posits a non-random 
relationship between particular humans and particular non-humans. It 
is this human/non-human link that exercised the thinking of early 
theorists such as Frazer (1910) and Freud (1918) (discussed in 
Levi-Strauss 1963:2-3). I believe that we must consider that this 
project, of distinguishing civilisation from savagery, and culture from 
nature, was given special urgency by the pressure placed on key 
concepts of western thought under the intellectual revolution taking 
place in conjunction with secularisation and Darwinian theory. A key 
feature of western thought since the Enlightenment, the disjunction 
between nature and culture, was powerfully threatened by evolution­
ary theory, for if humans are descended from animals, where is the 
boundary between them? 
Hayden White (1978) has shown that these boundary questions 
become urgent when concepts of humanity are threatened. Totemism 
filled a wonderfully useful role in providing an answer to the question 
that was not explicitly being asked. The question was that of boundary 
maintenance. The answer was that if civilisation is marked by 
separation of culture from nature, it follows that a religious outlook 
which posited a relationship between culture and nature must be 
understood as an absence of civilisation, and must therefore constitute 
an evolutionary stage at which humans were not fully separated from 
nature. Analysis of totemism could thus confirm the superiority of 
western civilisation and the inferiority of the savage, defining and 
ordering their difference, while simultaneously linking them together 
as moments in a global history of progress. As Stanley Diamond 
asserts of anthropology 
We study men, that is, we reflect on ourselves studying others, because 
we must, because man in civilisation is the problem . . .  The questions 
we bring to history come out of our own need. The task of 
anthropology is to clarify these questions (Diamond 1974:100) . 
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In 1912 Durkheim wrote that 'the totem is before all a symbol, a 
material expression of something else. But of what?' He would go on 
to assert that the totem is a symbol of god and of society, brought 
together, in his view, in the clan (quoted in Lessa and Voigt 1979:34). 
Subsequent social scientists did not devote works specifically to 
totemism, probably as a result of a number of critiques which cast 
doubt on the view that totemism constituted an analytically discrete 
phenomenon (discussed in Levi-Strauss 1963). Nevertheless, the 
question 'a symbol of what?' provided an opportunity for people to 
inscribe their particular theories of society and culture on the tabula of 
totemism. 
Malinowski, for example, accepted the first part of Durkheim' s 
assertion-that a totem is a symbol of something else. In good 
economic fashion, he found a consumption value: 'the road from the 
wilderness to the savage's belly and consequently his mind is very 
short', he wrote in 1948, 'and for him the world is an indiscriminate 
background against which there stand out the useful, primarily the 
edible, species of plant and animal' (Malinowski 1948:44). He would 
go on to characterise Australian Aboriginal totemism as the most 
'elementary' form, and would note that totemic cults had as their 
purpose the provisioning of abundance (Malinowski 1948:46) . He was 
thus able to draw Aboriginal Australians into his general theory of 
science, magic and religion. Magic, he contended, is a set of techniques 
used by people to effect control of nature to their own ends when their 
practical know ledge and technology are inadequate (Malinowski 
1948: 19, 29) .  Radcliffe-Brown developed this view in more elegant 
manner, suggesting it was a common characteristic of hunting peoples 
to elaborate a major food item. While Radcliffe-Brown would initiate 
analysis into the logical properties of totems, both he and Malinowski 
are expressive of the theory, stated so succinctly by Levi-Strauss, that 
totems are 'good to eat' (1963:62) . 
Levi-Strauss himself found another meaning in totemism. In his 
view, totemism answers a universal question of the mind: 'how to 
make opposition, instead of being an obstacle to integration, serve 
rather to produce it. '  Natural species, he claims, are chosen because 
they are good to think, not because they are good to eat' (1963:89) . 
Rather than positing a one-to-one correspondence, Levi-Strauss looks 
to contrasting relationships between totems, and rather than 
considering that totems index the world, he held that they articulate 
the mind. 
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Levi-Strauss' s work only makes sense if one accepts as universal a 
number of dichotomies that have been characteristic of western 
thought since the Enlightenment, and that have been subjected to a 
range of excellent critiques (for example, Young 1990). 
• mind vs body this dichotomy promotes the view that totems 
can be good to eat or good to think but not good both to eat 
and to think. Reading this dichotomy back into Malinowski's 
work, we see that he inscribes savagery in that short distance 
between the savage belly and the savage mind. The lack of 
mind/body split is held to be characteristic of savages, and 
by implication, to differentiate them from civilised man. 
• culture vs nature this dichotomy promotes the view that 
culture is more evolved to the extent that it distinguishes 
itself from nature. Reading this dichotomy back into 
Malinowski, the distance between the wilderness and the 
savage is an index of savagery itself, differentiating that state 
from civilisation. 
• difference is oppositional Levi-Strauss talks about 'opposition' 
when he quite clearly means difference, and he takes it as 
given that difference is oppositional and is in need of 
transformation. He further presupposes that integration is a 
desirable social goal in and of itself. Such a view generates 
its own paradox. On the one hand it seeks to close the 
distance between savagery and civilisation by claiming 
universalities of mind. On the other hand, it oppresses those 
who find that they are socially positioned as different from 
those who are socially positioned as not-different, for it 
indicates that they /we are problems to be overcome. As 
Diamond so succinctly adverts, 'man in civilisation is the 
problem' (1974:100). 
Dreaming ecology 
Thus far I have looked at unifying and universalising theories of 
totemism. I now tum to the Australian context. Data from Aboriginal 
Australia, especially that compiled by Spencer and Gillen (1899) were 
drawn on by all the early theorists of totemism and 'primitive' religion. 
Subsequently, most of the critiques of attempts to generate unified 
theories of totemism were supported with evidence from Australia. 
Thus, virtually every major proposition concerning totemism was 
supported in part by reference to Australian data. At the same time, 
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virtually every critique of attempts to universalise was also supported 
with reference to Australian data. As Levi-Strauss indicates through­
out his study, although not with this intention, every general theory 
can be both supported by, and contradicted with, evidence from 
Aboriginal Australia. 
Anthropology in Australia has not sought unified global theories, 
but rather sought to analyse specific instances of totemic organisation, 
action, and thought. Lloyd Warner 's pioneering ethnography of 1939 
A Black Civilisation, based on research he conducted in the 1920s, 
signals in its title the author 's distance from the oppressive savagery­
civilisation dichotomy. Warner stated that the totemic system of 
northeast Amhem Land was 'highly elaborated and permeates all the 
activities of the group and all of its concepts of life in the world about 
it' (Warner 1969:378). He found it to be a system of ritual relations 
between clan members and certain species of plants and animals. 
Totemism in north east Amhem Land, Warner contended, 'is intelligible 
only in terms of the social organisation, the relation of the technological 
system to society generally, and the ideas which surround the society's 
adjustment to the natural environment' (Warner 1969:234). 
In light of Warner 's emphasis on both the religious quality of 
totemism and its pervasive, indeed foundation, relation to religion, 
society and the environment, it seems odd that decades were to pass 
before these ideas were reformulated in other parts of the continent. 
In the early 1960s Stanner took a phenomenological approach to 
totemism and religion, emphasising the mystical quality of totemism 
(1979 [1962] ) .  He also linked totems with clans and with country, 
asserting that the group has a corporate title that covers not only the 
country or site, and a mystical relation to the totemic creators, but also 
non-material property associated with the country (Stanner 1965:13) .  
Stanner 's study was closely followed by T.G.H. Strehlow's study of 
Aboriginal religion in Central Australia. He documents a totemic 
landscape in its social, spiritual and geographical complexity. He uses 
the term 'totems' to refer to the creative beings ( 'totemic ancestors') 
who made the world2 
Because the whole landscape of Central Australia was studded with a 
multitude of sacred sites where supernatural beings had lived and 
moved and gone to rest, and because these sacred sites were in tum 
linked by an interesting network of mythological trails left behind by 
these supernatural beings, every tribal subgroup area . . .  was filled with 
a large number of sacred sites associated with a diversity of totems 
(Strehlow 1978:26). 
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Briefly but tantalisingly he proceeded to discuss some of the ritual 
which ensured the continuance of each totemic species or other existent. 
Primarily, however, Strehlow was seeking to draw out the religious or 
spiritual significance of totemic religion and to bring it into dialogue 
with contemporary spiritual concerns. In a later study, which I discuss 
shortly, he turned his analysis more closely to resources and land tenure. 
In the same time frame Worsley's (1967) study of totemism, derived 
from his Groote Eylandt research, followed the tradition of Malinowski 
in seeking to distinguish totemism from logic and science. Like 
Malinowski, he shows that non-Western people do possess systems of 
logic, classification, and explanation which can be loosely equated 
with western science ('proto-scientific' in Worsley's terminology [1967: 
154] ) .  Totemism is distinguished from science, he concludes, by its lack 
of system; it is 'agglomerative, arbitrary and fortuitous' (Worsley 
1967: 151). Peterson (1972) follows on from Durkheim, Stanner and 
Strehlow in examining totemism as a link between person, group and 
country. He found totemism to be a mechanism for ordering sentiment 
toward home place, and thus to be a key mechanism in territorial 
spacing (see also Strehlow 1970) . 
Ted Strehlow's 1970 article 'Geography and the Totemic Landscape 
in Central Australia' marks a major turning point. His foundational 
assumption was that while totems can and do represent many things, 
they also, perhaps centrally, are themselves. Strehlow thus brings the 
material world into the analysis in a way that previous scholars, with 
the exception of Warner, had not done. Like others, Strehlow agreed 
that the totem and the clan are connected to each other and to an area 
of land (this was Stanner's point too), and he went on to look to the 
organisation of ritual life oriented toward sustaining the life of the 
species, and other totems. Each clan, according to Strehlow' s analysis 
of Aranda societies, is associated with a number of totemic beings, 
with one of which the clan is most intimately associated and for which 
it bears a central responsibility. Ancestral tracks, or the Dreaming 
tracks of these beings link groups along the way 
. . .  each Aranda local group was believed to perform an indispensable 
economic service not only for itself but for the population around its 
borders as well. Thus, the Eastern Aranda Purula-Kamara local group 
of Ujitja was believed to have the responsibility of creating rain for the 
whole of the surrounding countryside by the performance of the Ujitja 
rain ceremonies. Other Aranda rain totemic clans . . .  were credited with 
performing identical services for the populations in their local areas. In 
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the same way, the members of kangaroo, euro, emu, carpet snake, 
grass seed, and other totemic clans were regarded as having the power 
of bringing about the increase of their totemic plants or animals not 
only within their local group areas, but throughout the adjoining 
regions as well (Strehlow 1970:102). 
The remainder of this pivotal article is devoted to issues of 
authority (see Rowse 1992) . Strehlow laid out the relevant data for 
ecological analysis, but chose to proceed in another direction. Thus, it 
was possible for a 1979 textbook on cultural anthropology that took a 
deliberately ecological approach to assert that 'since, as far as I know, 
no one has investigated the ecological functions of totemism . .  . it is 
impossible to assess the ecological relevance of Australian totemism' 
(Kottak 1979:201) .  
Newsome's 1980 study of the Dreaming track of the red kangaroo 
in Central Australia initiated the work of analysing the ecological 
relevance of Australian totemism. This sacred track traverses some of 
the toughest desert country in the world, and the sacred sites coincide 
with the most favoured areas for kangaroos. In particular, there is a 
strong correlation between Red Kangaroo Dreaming sites, and the 
permanent waters which are the sources of fresh herbage during 
drought. The red kangaroo relies on fresh green herbage; after rains 
the animals forage widely, but in drought they must rely on restricted 
areas. As the sites are protected, so too are the kangaroos at these sites. 
These are places to which living things retreat during periods of stress, 
and from which they expand outward again during periods of plenty. 
Clearly, opportunistic predation at these sites, especially during 
periods of stress (when humans, too, are stressed), would have long­
term negative effects on red kangaroos and other species. 
Aboriginal people in this part of the world approach a sacred sites 
with a respect that includes forbearing to hunt. Spears are left at a 
distance, and the caretaking of the site is accomplished without 
interfering with the red kangaroos whose site and refuge it is. Peter 
Latz, a botanist who has carried out extensive work in Central 
Australia, notes that the most sacred/protected places are likely to be 
places where a number of Dreamings meet up or cross over. He 
describes them this way 
. . .  there's a lot of dreaming trails which cross over, these are really 
important places. They are so sacred you can't kill animals or even 
pick plants. And of course you don't burn them. You might burn 
around them in order to look after them (Latz 1995a:70) . 
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Not only in Central Australia, but across the whole continent, there 
are similar structures of restraint, management for long-term 
productivity, control of sanctuaries, protection of permanent waters, 
refugia, breeding sites, and of certain plant communities. As well, 
there is shared responsibility (Rose 1996) . Responsibilities appear to lie 
with the local group in the first instance, but ritual life extends and 
develops these responsibilities. In land claims held under the Northern 
Territory Act, claimants in ecological zones from desert to semi-arid 
savannas to coasts and islands assert that they can only fulfil their 
responsibilities to their country with the help of various categories of 
kin. 
While the right to forage is widespread, the responsibilities that go 
with that right differ depending on one's relationship to the country: a 
major difference is whether it is one's father 's country or one's 
mother 's country. For example, in parts of Arnhem Land, men cannot 
visit the sacred/dangerous sites in their father 's country without the 
men for whom it is their mother 's country. They have to make gifts to 
the matrifiliates, and only matrifiliates can take food and water from 
the area (Peterson 1972:19). In parts of the Victoria River country (NT), 
to give another example, patrifiliates are responsible for burning the 
country; matrifiliates are responsible for organising the burning, and if 
the patrifiliates bum badly or wrongly they are accountable to 
matrifiliates who will punish them (see also Bradley 1995). Thus, in 
many areas it is simply not possible for the patrifiliates of a country to 
fulfil their obligations without the complementary cooperation of 
other kin, and in many land claims the claimants have asserted that 
the patrifiliates and the matrifiliates are all owners of the country as 
Aboriginal law defines 'ownership'. 
A system of complementarity is part of a system for organising of 
difference in the service of producing interdependence. Difference is 
organised to be complementary rather than oppositional, and thus is 
constitutive of cultural, social and ecological life rather than, as Levi­
Strauss suggests, an obstacle to be overcome. The result is that 
individuals and groups hold sets of a complementarity of 
responsibilities at numerous local and regional levels. The broad 
complex of responsibilities well matches the rights people have of 
harvesting and consuming resources both locally and regionally. 
Responsibilities, like rights, are differentiated in structure but not 
necessarily in substance. Both are held and exercised across spiritual, 
social and ecological domains. Indeed, it is a western convention to 
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separate the spiritual, the social, and the ecological. Indigenous people 
hold these domains as integral parts of the long-term management of 
life on earth. 
Conclusions 
It is now possible to begin to look afresh at totemism as a common 
property institution. To do so we must set aside the oppressive 
dichotomies that Levi-Strauss's work highlighted. We must, for a start, 
propose that subsistence activity and intellectual activity are not 
necessarily dichotomous or opposing activities. We must ask whether 
difference might not be a desired characteristic rather than a problem 
to be resolved, and we must learn to consider interdependence. We 
must start to look at difference played out not only in the local but also 
in regional frames. Finally, we must not allow the study of ritual to 
eclipse the analysis of ecological pragmatics. 
The questions I have broached in this chapter are points of 
departure for analysis which I hope will be carried further in 
numerous contexts. I conclude with highlighting some of the major 
implications. 
Responsibilities are differentiated and complementary. They are 
held and exercised both locally and regionally. It follows that no 
country is self-sufficient. The people of each country depend on others 
for the proper management of the relationships which sustain them 
all, and each group depends on others for the very pragmatic practices 
of land management. The burning, the preservation of species, the 
preservation of permanent waters: these constitute a sample of the 
responsibilities which are carried out at the local level, but which have 
regional implications. 
Restraint is equally part of this system. There are sanctuaries where 
people do not hunt or fish or gather, and places where burning is done 
with extra caution or not at all. There are responsibilities based on 
totemic relationships: the kangaroo people can forbid others to kill and 
eat kangaroo, for example. As a general rule, totems are linked to taboos 
that enforce restraint and that are managed by the appropriate people. 
Differentiated and complementary responsibilities sustain regional 
interdependencies. There are few hard and fast boundaries, but rather 
strong ecological, social and spiritual links that are reproduced 
through the generations. Further, as Strehlow said, to promote the 
well-being of that which is your responsibility is good not just for you 
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but for others in your region. Restraint from hunting, eating, and 
burning, for example has wide implications. Proper exercise of 
responsibilities benefits other species as well as broad systems. The 
use of fire is the best pragmatic example of symbiotic action toward 
systemic productivity in time and space (see Rose 1996) . 
What this means to issues of ownership is thus quite different to 
Hardin' s original proposition. While Hardin contended that private 
ownership would be the key to responsible land management, an analysis 
of Aboriginal systems suggests that responsible land management is best 
accomplished through systems of interpenetrating rights and responsi­
bilities. In this type of Aboriginal system, self-interest is constructed to 
stand in linked and complementary fashion to the self-interest of other 
people, groups, species, and ecological systems. In this system, living 
beings truly stand or fall together. Self-interest is thus accomplished 
through promoting the interests of others as well as one's own. 
The High Court's Mabo and Wik decisions, and the Native Title Act, 
all point in this direction-toward coexisting property regimes, 
including common property regimes. While some sectoral interests 
hold that regimes of exclusivity are essential to the full maximisation 
of their purposes, evidence drawn more broadly from ecological and 
social analysis indicates that co-management is likely to have long­
term advantages for the survival of ecosystems and species, including 
the human species. Native Title thus constitutes a unique opportunity 
for the Australian nation to develop long-term strategies for the 
survival of life on this arid continent. 
Notes 
1. It is impossible to know what Aboriginal Australia was like prior to 
invasion, although there are numerous techniques for 
reconstructing models of probability. I am assuming a multi­
layered set of identifications among families in these kin-based 
societies, but it is by no means certain that all Aboriginal people 
once were organised into clans, or that clans, if they existed, were 
organised along one model of descent to the exclusion of others. 
2. Often referred to as Dreaming or Dreamtime ancestors. 
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Cooperative approaches to marine 
resource management in the South 
Pacific 
Col i n  H u nt 
New cooperative approaches to the management of marine resources 
are imperative in the delivery of sustainable incomes and livelihoods 
in the South Pacific. While recent international agreements have 
strengthened the sovereignty of states over their adjacent ocean 
resources, the actual development and implementation of 
management regimes for tuna, arguably the region's most important 
renewable resource in terms of income-generating potential, will 
require a much more concerted approach by Pacific island states. This 
will need to be matched by a willingness on the part of the non-coastal 
states that traditionally harvest the bulk of the region's oceanic 
resources to cooperate in tuna management. The alternative is the 
eventual depletion of the great tuna stocks. 
In the case of inshore resources, there is a new assertiveness being 
demonstrated by local communities toward customary tenures. In 
some instances, local tenures are being reinforced by regional and 
national governments. Such cohesion between governments and 
communities, in the face of increasing resource exploitation, is enhancing 
the prospects for sustaining the livelihoods of coastal communities. 
In this chapter, common property issues concerning South Pacific 
marine resources will be divided by location-offshore and inshore-­
and their use will be categorised as either commercial/ industrial or 
subsistence. 
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Com mercial and subsistence uses 
The value of commercial fishing in the South Pacific is in the order of 
US$2 billion annually, with tuna alone having a total market value of 
some US$1.5 billion. About half the world's canning tuna comes from 
this region. 
One way of measuring the importance of fishing sectors to Pacific 
island economies is to express fishing revenue as a proportion of total 
government revenue. In the case of Kiribati and Tuvalu, the 
proportion is between 30 and 50 per cent. It is also high in the 
Federated States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands. This is expected 
because these countries receive significant licence fees from foreign 
vessels. Kiribati and Tuvalu also receive significant repatriated 
revenues from their citizens that crew foreign vessels. 
If we measure fishing by share of GDP, we find that it is 9-10 per 
cent in Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu but only 1 .5 per cent in 
Fiji. The latter economy is diversified and fishing is just one of several 
important sectors. The developed industrial fisheries and export 
canneries of both Solomon Islands and Fiji mean that formal 
employment is significant in their fisheries sectors. 
The inshore waters of the Pacific islands are relatively abundant. 
This fact, and the ease of access for vessels, means that coastal waters 
are the locus of fishing and gathering activity that provides a large 
proportion of dietary protein. However, most inshore species are 
vulnerable to overfishing. 
The majority of the population in most of these countries are still in 
a subsistence economy. Despite the increase in fishing for cash, a large 
proportion of the catch is still consumed by the fishers, or shared, and 
does not enter markets. Subsistence fishing's importance or domin­
ance means that the true importance to the island states of their marine 
resources is not reflected in budget estimates or national accounts. 
Commercial fishing in inshore waters includes prawns (in Papua 
New Guinea), reef and deep slope fish, as well as beche-de-mer and 
molluscs such as trochus and greensnail. There is also a substantial 
bait fishery in Solomon Islands coastal waters supplying the pole-and­
line tuna fleet of canner Solomon Taiyo. 
Figure 10.1, by showing estimates of the value of fish taken in the 
coastal waters of selected Pacific island countries, provides a more 
comprehensive appreciation than national accounts of the importance 
of commercial vis-a-vis subsistence fishing and also of the relative size 
of the coastal fisheries by country. It is clear that the value of subsis-
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tence fishing is significant in most countries and that in several 
countries it has a value of many millions of dollars. 
Figure 1 0.1 : Coastal fis heries value (mean of 1 989-1 994) 
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Note: 1. While the source of data for this figure does not provide a definition of 'coastal 
waters' the term is assumed to be synonymous with territorial seas, ie; within 12 
nautical miles of the coast. 
2. Details of the method of imputation of the value of subsistence fishing are not given 
by the source therefore the actual and relative values of subsistence fishing shown in 
Figure 2 should be used only as guides. 
Source: Dalzell, P., Adams, T., and Polunin, N., 1995. 'Coastal fisheries in the South 
Pacific', paper to the joint FFA/SPC workshop, Management of South Pacific Inshore 
Fisheries, 26 June-7 July, 1995, South Pacific Commission, Noumea, unpublished:149. 
UNCLOS and its provisions 
Tenure over, or access rights to, marine resources is crucial to their 
management. However, 'open access' has characterised the 
exploitation of all ocean resources outside the 3 nautical mile (nm) 
territorial limits. Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the high 
seas said that freedom of fishing was one of the established freedoms 
of the high seas. The implication was that coastal states could not 
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exclusively appropriate or manage marine resources adjacent but 
outside their territorial waters. 
Under open access, marine resource users are unrestrained and 
competitive, maximising their present harvests to the detriment of the 
resource, the ecosystem, themselves, society, and future generations. 
The potential to control open-access fishing was radically enhanced by 
the UN's adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) on 30 April 1982 (UN 1982) . From its adoption to its ratifi­
cation, in late 1994, the major provisions of the convention have in fact 
been in force, being interpreted as representing 'customary ocean law'. 
The UNCLOS agreement expanded territorial seas to 12 nm and 
created 200 nm zones (exclusive economic zones, EEZs) around 
coastal states. The 'sovereign rights' of the coastal state apply to the 
exploitation and conservation of living and non-living natural 
resources (UN 1982, Article 55) .  The extended rights and jurisdictions 
of several South Pacific coastal states were enhanced by the 
application of EEZs to islands no matter what their distance from the 
coast. With the rights go responsibilities, however. Coastal states are 
required to determine total allowable catches in their exclusive 
economic zones. They must also implement management measures in 
cooperation with relevant regional organisations. For their part, 
fishing states must contribute fishing statistics (UN 1982, Article 61). 
All island states have declared extended maritime zones. Table 10.1 
sets out the area of EEZs for South Pacific states. It shows the great 
variation in size of EEZs and in industrial tuna catch. The reluctance 
of several island states to ratify UNCLOS and to sign the agreement 
for the implementation of UNCLOS relating to conservation and 
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, is probab­
ly related to the costs of implementation of the laws and agreements. 
In the light of total allowable catches and management plans, 
coastal states that do not have the capacity to harvest the entire total 
allowable catch shall give other states access to the surplus in their 
EEZs. In providing access to other states, a coastal state shall consider 
the significance of the resource to its economy on the one hand, and 
the needs of nations that have habitually fished in the EEZ on the 
other. The nationals of other nations must however comply with the 
conservation measures and other terms and conditions of access (such 
as licensing and licence fees, provision of catch and effort statistics, 
port landings and enforcement) established in the laws of the coastal 
states (UN 1982, Article 62). The access rights of geographically 
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disadvantaged states-coastal states whose position makes them 
dependent for supplies of fish from resources of the EEZs of other 
states-are catered for in Article 70. 
Table 1 0.1  Mari ne sector profi les, South Pacific 
States EEZ or Tuna Ratified(r) Signed(s)/ 
EFZ• harvest UN CLOS ratified(r) 
area (industrial) USS & HMS 
'OOO kmsq 1 992, tonnes Agreementt> 
Cook Islands 1 830 10 
F S M  297 8 1494 1 6  
Fiji 1290 447 
Kiribati 3 5 50 1 1395 1 
Marshall Islands 2 13 1  2 4959 s 
Nauru 320 2 1200 
Niue 390 n.a.c s 
Palau 629 53 17 
P NG 3 120 93374 s 
Solomon Islands 1340 40 689 
Tonga 700 1 8 1 s ,  r 
Tuvalu 900 5 495 
Vanuatu 6 80 329 
Western Samoa 120 27 s 
Other 2 42 13 
sub-total 1997 8 47960 8 
Dependent Territories 
American Samoa 390 U S  s ,  r 
French Polynesia 5030 Fr r 
Guam (U S) 2 1 8 
New Caledonia ( Fr) 1740 
N. Marianas (U S) 1 823 
Pi tcairn Island (U K) 800 U K s 
Tokelau ( N Z) 290 NZ r NZ s 
Wallis & Futuna ( Fr) 300 
sub-total 10 5 69 
Total 305 69 
Notes: a EFZs, Extended Fishing Zones, are precursors of the EEZs and also have a 
breadth of 200 run. hAgreement for the implementation of UNCLOS relating to 
conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. 
Sources: Ron Duncan and Ila Temu, 'Trade, investment and sustainable development of 
natural resources in the Pacific: the case of fish and timber', paper presented to the 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Expert Group Meeting on 
Enhancing Cooperation in Trade and Investment Between Pacific island Countries and 
Economies of East and South East Asia in the 1990s, Port Vila, Vanuatu, July, 8-12, 1996, 
unpublished; United Nations Internet site, http:/ /www.un.org/Depts/los/losg4st.htm; 
Tsamenyi, B., and Mfodwo, K., 1995. 'South Pacific island states and the new regime of 
fisheries: issues of law, economy and diplomacy', in J. Crawford and D. Rothwell (eds), 
The Law of the Sea in the Asian Pacific region, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht:121-53, Table 1 .  
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Where the same fish stocks are found in more than one coastal 
state, the states must cooperate for the conservation and development 
of the stocks, directly or through regional organisations (UN 1982, 
Article 63). Where highly migratory species are present, their con­
servation and optimum utilisation is to be achieved by cooperation 
between the coastal state, fishing states and appropriate organisations 
(Article 64) .  And even in the case of the high seas-areas outside 
EEZs-states are bound to conserve stocks through cooperation and 
establishment regional organisations (Article 117) .  
UNCLOS has formally endowed Pacific island states with extensive 
marine resources and has formulated internationally recognised 
frameworks to manage them. 
The agreement (UN 1995) governing straddling and highly migra­
tory fish stocks, commonly known as the 'Implementing Agreement', 
reinforces the Law of the Sea provisions. It has important implications 
for the Pacific because tuna stocks straddle and migrate through EEZs 
and the high seas. The agreement charges coastal states and fishing 
states to agree upon measures for the conservation of stocks and, with 
respect to migratory species, their optimum utilisation (Article 7) . The 
agreement was signed by 44 countries and at 16 September 1996, it 
had been ratified by three nations of the thirty required to bring it into 
force (Table 10.1) .  
The implications for the regional organisations, the Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FFA) and the South Pacific Commission (SPC), are that the 
vehicle for conservation measures is envisaged by the agreement to be 
regional or sub-regional management organisations. The fishing states 
are expected either to become a member of the regional organisations 
or to agree to apply management measures established by such 
organisations. Moreover, coastal and fishing states should participate 
in the work of such organisations (Article 8). 
The implications for the collection and analysis of data are 
important given that states are charged with the provision of 
comprehensive catch and effort data to regional authorities covering 
both target and non-target species for EEZs and high seas areas 
(Articles 3 and 5). 
Even though some are published by SPC (1994a), data from foreign 
tuna longline vessels (which account for over half of the total value of 
the South Pacific tuna fishery) is presently deficient for purposes of 
management of the stocks of yellowfin, bigeye, albacore and of 
associated by-catch species. The status of bigeye, albacore and by-
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catch species is particularly uncertain under heavy fishing pressure 
(SPC 1994b, SPC 1996) . Data is also deficient for EEZs and for the 
adjacent high seas areas. The latter yield approximately half of the 
longline catch, but only the Japanese fleet presently provides the SPC 
with statistics on its high seas catch and this is in aggregated rather 
than logbook form (personal communication, Dr Antony Lewis, 
Oceanic Fisheries Coordinator, SPC). The intergovernmental 
management of tuna is analysed in more detail in Oh's chapter. 
E nvironmental issues 
The ratification of UNCLOS also requires countries to adopt, 
implement, and enforce the rules and standards applying under global 
treaties governing the marine environment. An example is the 
International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL), in place since 1983 and supported by the London Dumping 
Convention, governing the disposal of ship waste (dumped plastics are 
particularly dangerous to many marine animals). However, the 
provisions of this treaty will be effective only if coastal states install 
shore-based facilities to deal with ship waste. In their absence, ships will 
pollute the oceans by discharging or incinerating waste at sea. 
Land-based pollution is, however, by far the most deleterious to the 
marine environment, with productive inshore waters bearing the 
brunt. And, while UNCLOS (Article 207) specifies that such pollution 
should be prevented or controlled, its provisions are unlikely to be 
effective for two reasons: the thinness of the recommendations, and 
the cost and difficulty of pollution control. 
Although few countries in the South Pacific are industrialised and 
populations and densities are relatively low, pollution is serious in 
some coastal locations, lowering the productivity of resources and 
causing health problems (Hunt 1996) . A regional cooperative approach 
to deal with coastal pollution is being undertaken by the South Pacific 
Regional Environment Programme. Problems have been identified 
through 'state of the environment' reporting and are being addressed 
through the National Environmental Management Strategies. 
But progress in pollution prevention and control in the South 
Pacific will depend on the application of resources and political will. 
The worst violators are government agencies who, on the one hand, 
promote government protection but not at the cost of the developing 
project, such as mining and tourism development (UN, undated, cited 
by Boer 1995:91). 
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Inshore management 
In the case of the inshore waters of Oceania, the most widespread and 
important measure for the conservation of marine resources has been 
controlled access through customary marine tenure arrangements. The 
rights to fish are controlled by a clan, chief or family. Traditonally, 
there was no 'ownership' by one group of all rights, but rather a 
system of allocation of access and use rights. In customary marine 
tenure, social boundaries are as important as physical boundaries but 
harder for outsiders to define (Crocombe 1994) . 
Seasonal closure is one of the measures adopted under customary 
marine tenure to conserve stocks. The conservation of stocks through 
such restraints yielded substantial benefits to the right holders 
Oohannes 1978). However, while acknowledging the management 
implications of restricting access, Hyndman (1993) argues that tenure 
systems were probably not developed with conservation per se in 
mind. The purposes were rather to embed aquatic resources in the gift 
economy and the kinship modes of production, or as Carrier 
(1987: 164, cited by Hyndman 1993) succinctly put it '[customary 
marine tenure] made it possible to be generous'. 
Thus, while customary laws are the basis for decision-making 
concerning access and the sanctions that might apply in the case of 
breaches, such laws are flexible in that there are constant negotiations 
at the community level regarding access and use. And the principles 
underlying customary marine tenure are subject to continuous 
interpretation, transformation, and redefinition (Scheffler and 
Larmour 1987). Indeed, the customary marine tenure of today has 
very little in common with that of 200 years ago (Crocombe 1994) . 
Change and erosion of traditional customary marine tenure has 
occurred largely because of coastal population decreases in the early 
stages of colonisation, and subsequent population increases (about 3.5 
million people now live on the coast in the South Pacific), adoption of 
technology (fishing power and mobility), the intrusion of the cash 
economy and a breakdown of chiefly authority Oohannes 1978; 
Crocombe 1994) . 
Scientific methods of fisheries management require a know ledge of 
the biology of target species and the availability of catch and effort 
data. But, except in a few cases, the data required for scientific 
fisheries management for inshore waters in the Pacific is not available. 
Much time-consuming and expensive research is required before 
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Western-style management can be effected widely, indeed, 'from a 
management perspective it is unlikely that the Pacific island reef 
fisheries recruitment processes will ever be sufficiently understood to 
be incorporated into management initiatives' (Dalzell et al. 1995:80) . 
The task is exacerbated by the archipelagic nature of many Pacific 
island countries. Moreover, centrally imposed scientific management 
for inshore fisheries increases the monitoring and regulatory 
responsibilities of governments. But the fisheries departments in 
Pacific island countries are typically understaffed and underfunded. 
Given the pressing need to manage inshore fisheries and the 
scarcity of resources, alternative management models have been 
proposed (Dalz.ell et al. 1995; Johannes 1994a; 1994b; Petelo et al 1995). These 
alternative models strengthen rather than weaken customary marine 
tenure. Legislative support for local tenure arrangements allows the 
reintroduction of effective traditional methods, such as temporary 
closures. 
In the alternative models, local knowledge substitutes for, or 
complements, scientific data, while local planning substitutes for, or 
complements, fisheries department planning. 
The need for inshore management plans is most pressing in some 
of the smaller islands and atolls where greatly increased fishing effort 
on fish stocks is jeopardising the supply of essential protein to rapidly 
growing populations (Dalzell et al. 1995). The harvesting of 
commercial invertebrates such as trochus and beche-de-mer (which in 
many cases have been severely depleted) can also come under local 
management arrangements. 
The importance of institutional arrangements 
We saw how UNCLOS is fundamental to the management of 
industrial fisheries in that it has enabled the coastal states to exclude 
or license foreign fishing and thus control fishing efforts in their EEZs. 
However, the main species of tuna are common to the South Pacific 
and are migratory. Therefore, the size of local catches of tuna are 
determined to some extent by the fishing of the same species in other 
EEZs. The commonality and the mobility of stocks dictate the need for 
a regional approach to tuna management. 
Fortunately, regional institutions are already in place to give effect 
to regional planning. The FFA in Honiara acts on behalf of members in 
generating fishing policy options and providing a regional forum for 
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their discussion, while the SPC in Noumea collects, analyses, and 
disseminates catch and effort data (for tuna and other species) to its 
members. These institutions will have an indispensable role to play in 
maximising the benefits to Pacific island countries of their marine 
resources and in the development and implementation of regional 
resource management plans. 
It needs to be emphasised, however, that presently there is no 
regulation of the level of tuna catch by species. The participants in the 
industrial fisheries have every incentive to maximise their harvests. A 
regional plan would need to apply not just to EEZs but to high seas 
where the common regional stocks are found and where fishing effort 
by industrial distant water fleets is considerable. 
At the local (inshore) level, just as in the case of EEZs, tenure and 
access rights to marine resources should be clearly defined, otherwise 
there is a tendency for open access to prevail (Hunt 1996). The tenured 
group can then make access arrangements and exclude unwanted effort. 
A powerful incentive for local groups to restore and enhance 
customary marine tenure is the acknowledgment of their jurisdiction 
by local and central government, and the endorsement of their plans. 
In some cases the acknowledgment of tenure and plans means that the 
local group has recourse to the law of the country in upholding local 
access rules. 
I nternational cooperation 
While there are significant industrial fishing operations based in Fiji, 
American Samoa and Solomon Islands, the migratory tuna stocks are 
mainly exploited by distant water nations supplying markets in the 
United States and Asia. Through the licensing vessels under these 
flags Pacific island countries receive about US$70 million from a 
fishery worth some US$1 .5 billion. The dominant fleets are those of the 
United States, Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea. 
The Pacific island countries have jurisdiction over their EEZs and 
their collective jurisdiction covers much of the tuna fishing grounds of 
the central, western and south Pacific, while the FFA and the SPC 
allow the exercise of collective power. Despite this, there is only one 
multilateral fishing agreement in place-the one between several 
Pacific island countries and the US tuna fleet. 2 All other foreign fleet 
access is through bilateral negotiation between individual island states 
and the representatives of the various national fleets. 
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While the FFA has developed harmonised terms and conditions of 
fishing and effected economies of scale in regional monitoring and 
surveillance, there is still variation in the level of licence fees as a 
proportion of value of catch (Maxwell and Owen 1994). The Pacific 
island countries put themselves in weak negotiating positions in that 
the distant water nations can threaten to walk away and take their 
fishing fees elsewhere. They are also particularly vulnerable to 
persuasion that access fees to tuna should be concessional because of 
the level of aid being supplied. Japan has consistently rejected 
multilateral frameworks on this latter ground (Doulman 1989; 
Tsamenyi and Mfodwo 1995). 
A major constraint on the development of a united approach to 
negotiations with the distant water fleets is the unwillingness of some 
island states that depend heavily on fishing fees, for example Kiribati 
and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), to adopt the 
cooperative model. Both have been vocal in their opposition to 
multilateral agreements (Pacific Report 1995, 1996; Islands Business 
Pacific 1994) although they have not ruled out united sub-regional 
approaches to negotiations by the tuna-rich countries under the Palau 
Agreement. 3 
The limitation of sub-regional approaches are illustrated by the 
recent rejection by Taiwan of specific attempts by Pacific island 
countries to negotiate a sub-regional agreement.4 If all FFA countries 
-including FSM and Papua New Guinea, which host considerable 
Taiwanese fishing efforts (SPC 1994a)-have given weight to the 
negotiations, there would have been a far greater probability of the 
conclusion of a beneficial sub-regional longline agreement. 
The FSM fears that it could be worse off under multilateral 
agreements and sees present bilateral arrangements as providing more 
opportunities for domestic fisheries development. It will confine 
regional approaches to the setting of umbrella terms and conditions 
under which bilateral deals are made. 
In the face of the difficulty in negotiating increased access fees with 
distant water nations, the policy adopted by Pacific island countries to 
achieve greater economic benefits from their tuna stocks is one of 
trying to develop local fishing operations. The development of 
domestic tuna industries is taking two forms. First, by the 
encouragement of local short-trip longlining operations that supply 
sashimi export markets (short-trip longlining has the potential to 
confer substantial benefits on Pacific island countries (ESCAP 
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forthcoming; South Pacific Project Facility 1995)) .  Second, through 
regional arrangements that encourage purse-seine vessels to base 
locally, instead of at foreign ports.5 
The economic benefits of the second thrust of localising purse-seine 
vessels has not been demonstrated. A preliminary analysis suggests 
that the fishing rents or profits of distant water vessels would be 
curtailed by localisation as would their consequent ability to pay 
fishing royalties. 
Local cooperation 
As mentioned above, there are several factors which are tending to 
break down the customary marine tenure that previously enabled the 
conservation of inshore (as opposed to offshore) marine resources. The 
introduction of cash benefits in exchange for access by industrial or 
commercial fisheries is one of these factors: this is evident in Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands and Fiji. Narrow 
groups or spokespersons, not fully representative of the traditional 
descent groups, have been able to appropriate rents for their own use 
(Crocombe 1994, Turner 1994, Hviding 1996). 
While acknowledging that customary marine tenure may present 
impediments to governments undertaking industrial fisheries 
development, I would argue that strengthening customary marine 
tenure, rather than weakening it, should often be the preferred policy. 
The reasons are threefold. 
First, in many countries, subsistence fishing dominates and the 
local communities that are dependent on the resources for their 
livelihoods should be in a position to manage those resources. Second, 
the development and resilience of management and conservation 
plans for commercial resources by governments in cooperation with 
communities is facilitated by clear access rights. Third, where 
commercial exploitation of local resources is a possibility, for example 
in the cases of trochus or beche-de-mer, strengthened customary marine 
tenure puts the local communities in a more advantageous position in 
negotiating with traders. In some Pacific island countries, customary 
marine tenure is already reinforced by central governments. For 
example, local rights are recognised by the Fiji Fisheries Commission 
(Cook 1994), and in Solomon Islands (over both land and fisheries) 
through the Provincial Government Act of 1971 (Crocombe 1994, Pulea 
1993). 
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Central governments have been prone to ignore the difficult 
process of clarifying customary marine tenure and carrying out 
development or conservation through 'top down' approaches. 
However, the resilience of any development or conservation 
arrangements is heavily dependent, in the Pacific, on local people 
being involved in decision processes and receiving rents from any 
arrangement. 6 
Cooperative models 
The arrangements for intergovernmental cooperation in tuna 
management are analysed in the following chapter by Oh. Here I 
simply summmarise the advantages of cooperation. 
Intergovernmental cooperation 
• should generate higher royalties by increasing Pacific island 
countries' negotiating power, and breaking the nexus 
between fishing access fees and development aid 
• facilitates the introduction of control of fishing effort on 
regional tuna stocks by 
input controls (gear and/ or vessels numbers), or 
output controls (quotas) 
• reduces transaction costs to both sides 
• makes the content of agreements transparent, compared 
with bilateral arrangements 
• facilitates co-management arrangements with other coastal 
states (outside existing forums) in the region that exploit the 
common tuna stocks 
• facilitates co-management arrangements with distant water 
fleets in the region that exploit the common tuna stocks. 
For inshore areas, however, the thrust should not be so much in the 
documentation of customary marine tenure but in its definition and 
strengthening so that it can be effective in developing local 
arrangements, and can integrate more effectively with planning and 
policy, for marine resource management and conservation, of central 
governments (Hyndman 1993). 
A cooperative approach between communities, acting in their local 
interests, and governments, acting in the national or public interest, 
has much to offer. Strengthened customary and local resource 
management arrangements, albeit based of necessity on customary 
practices rather than scientific fisheries management principles, can 
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assist the central government in its overall policy of conservation of 
marine resources (as set out, for example, in National Environmental 
Management Strategies) . 
An example of where the strengthening of customary marine 
tenure has assisted the declaration of a protected area is provided by 
the work of Tacconi under an Australian Council for International 
Agricultural Research project in Vanuatu. 
A very significant step in biodiversity conservation in Vanuatu is 
the development of provincial legislation, under the national constitu­
tion, enabling local groups to strengthen their property rights and 
hence their ability to protect and to manage their natural resources. 
This step was the direct result of Tacconi's negotiations with the 
Attorney General's department and using a draft by-law (obtained 
from Santa Y sabel province, Solomon Islands) as a model. 8 Such 
legislation has been adopted in principle by the local government 
councils of Santo and Malekula, and has been enacted in Efate 
(Bennett 1996). 
In 1994 the local government region of MALAPA, which includes 
Malekula, was empowered to create protected areas by the passage 
through the Vanuatu Parliament of the Bill for Decentralisation and 
Local Government Regions, Act No. 1, of 1994. MALAPA was now 
able to introduce by-laws that 'outline create and draw up regulations 
governing the environmental protection zones (natural parks, natural 
reserves or tourist-attraction areas in the national interest' (Act 1 ,  
Section 20[9]). 
Tacconi subsequently assisted MALAPA in drawing up a by-law 
that facilitates planning by local ni-Vanuatu (Tacconi 1995a) . Features 
of the by-laws are as follows. 
• Areas are protected on the basis of custom, amenity, and 
livelihood provision. 
• The regional council by-laws (under national legislation) 
strengthen customary tenure by making it an offence to 
contravene the rules governing a protected area. 
• The term of the by-law is specified by the landowners. 
• Amendments may be made by landowners to a by-law at 
any time. 
• For every declared protected area a committee of 
management is set up, representative of both landowner 
interests and community interests (through chiefly 
representation). 
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An important feature of the by-law legislation is that it is distinct 
from, but complements, the Vanuatu National Parks Act, No. 7 of 1993. 
This latter act is designed to protect unique ecosystems, habitats of 
threatened species or areas possessing outstanding features. The by­
law, in contrast, allows the protection of natural areas that are 
significant in the support and maintenance of livelihoods (Tacconi 
1995a). 
An important characteristic of the protected areas that have arisen 
under by-laws is that they often incorporate several different eco­
systems. At the same time they may stipulate degrees of conservation, 
given that livelihoods must still be derived from the protected areas. 
For example, in the case of the declared protected area of the Wiawi 
coastal community on Malekula, the forest is protected but the forest 
zone also includes plantations and gardens, while protection straddles 
the coastal zone, conserving turtle as well as reef zone resources 
(Tacconi 1995b).The eight kilometres of protected coast is currently 
subject to bans on the collections of trochus and green snail and to 
closure to fishing on six days a week. 
Other conservation arrangements that depend on local jurisdictions 
exercising their customary rights include that of a Cook Island Council 
enforcing limited trochus harvesting. The arrangement features 
individual transferable quotas and inspections upon landing (World 
Bank 1995) . In Solomon Islands, the maintenance of the Arnavon 
Marine Conservation Area depends on the cooperation, and coordina­
tion through the provision of rangers, of three village councils on 
Choisel and Y sabel, with the support of governments and non­
government organisations, to enforce bans on the harvesting of turtle 
eggs. 
Such inshore conservation regimes are most applicable in rural 
rather than peri-urban areas, where traditional authority is still strong. 
And the communities must be able to substitute alternative sources of 
subsistence and cash income during closures (World Bank 1995) . 
Notes 
The author has benefited from the comments of Transform Aqorau 
but any omissions or errors are the author 's sole responsibility. 
1. This paper deals generally with the countries served by the SPC 
and in the case of industrial fishing by the FFA. 
The island member countries of the FFA are: Cook Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
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Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 
The 22 island members served by the SPC are: American Samoa, 
Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, 
Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, New Caledonia, 
Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn 
Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, 
and Wallis and Futuna. 
2. The US fee is set at US$18 million for 10 years under the 1993 
regional agreement. The US Tuna Boat Association receives a 
subsidy from the US government of US$14 million and itself contri­
butes US$4 million. The fee of US$18 million implies a rate of 
payment of 9 to 14 per cent of the value of tuna caught-this is a 
subsidised rate. Under the multilateral treaty with the United 
States, US$1.8 million is paid annually into a project development 
fund administered by the FFA, 15 per cent of the balance is shared 
equally among the parties, and the remainder is divided between 
the parties according to the weight of catch taken from their EEZs 
(FFA 1996) . 
3. Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. 
4.  In 1995 an attempt was made by a group of Pacific countries, Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Niue, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Vanuatu and 
Western Samoa, to negotiate a sub-regional agreement with 
representatives of the Taiwanese fishing interests that operate 
freezer longline vessels in the Pacific (FFA 1995) .  The group 
expressed dissatisfaction with the poor level of compliance in catch 
reporting and transhipment displayed by Taiwan vessel operators 
in the region. The resulting suspension of bilateral arrangements by 
some Pacific island countries in the group had caused part of the 
Taiwanese fleet to relocate to the eastern Pacific and the Indian 
Ocean. A sub-regional annual access fee of US$870,000 for 75 
vessels, and US$650,000 for 50 or less, was proposed. However, the 
Taiwanese rejected the proposal out of hand on the grounds that 
the fee was too high when considered along with the impositions of 
prohibition of transhipment at sea (which was objected to) and 
compliance with observer programs and reporting. 
5. This latter encouragement is through a cooperative arrangement by 
Pacific island countries party to the Nauru Agreement and the 
Palau Arrangement, and takes the form of licensing priorities and 
concessional access to purse-seine vessels prepared to invest, 
provision, and employ locally. An additional incentive to achieve 
the latter is a phased reduction in the number of licences available 
to foreign vessels while the number of licences available for 
localised vessels is increased. 
1 60 I The governance of common property in the Pacific region 
6. In the PNG bait fishery the allocation of part of the rents to a trust 
fund and to the provincial government, rather than to local groups, 
became a bone of contention (Turner 1994). 
7. For every 1 per cent increase in collective access fee, an extra US$15 
million would flow to Pacific island countries (given the value of 
catch by distant water fleets was approximately US$1.5 billion in 
1995). If royalties could be increased to a level equivalent to 10 per 
cent of the value of catch, income to Pacific island countries would 
double, to some US$150 million. 
8. Awareness of the potential for local management of marine 
resources had already been raised by an education program 
conducted by the Vanuatu Fisheries Department and the 
Environment Unit. 
9. Personal communication, Chief Trmothy Nehapi, Wiawi 
Community, Malekula, Vanuatu, 20 June 1996. 
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Com mon property m anagement of 
hig h ly migratory fish stocks : tuna 
in the Pacific 
Janal ine O h  
The purpose of  this chapter is to  consider possibilities for sustainable 
management of highly migratory tuna fisheries in the Central and 
Western Pacific-specifically the area covered by the 200 nautical mile 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of South Pacific Forum member 
countries and contiguous high seas areas. The chapter adopts a 
definition of common property as property that is controlled collect­
ively by a defined group of decision-making units, rather than as no 
property or open access. Sustainability is defined as management that 
will enable long-term harvesting of the fisheries resources at their 
maximum sustainable yield. This chapter does not attempt to consider 
issues of biological diversity nor of the social aspects of sustainable 
development. 
Changes in international law over the past decade have affected 
the international legal and political environment for fisheries 
management. I do not enter into the debate over the role of fisheries in 
economic development for Pacific island countries, other than to 
acknowledge that the development aspirations of those island 
countries have a strong bearing on the way in which they are likely to 
approach fisheries management and access issues. The interactions 
discussed in the chapter refer to government to government 
negotiations on international fisheries issues. Although inshore 
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communities are important in decisions relating to fisheries manage­
ment, for the deep sea tuna fisheries considered in this chapter, it is 
governments (represented by their officials) who undertake negotia­
tions and reach agreements which must then be implemented 
domestically. Finally, the chapter concludes that a common property 
approach is the only feasible way of developing a conservation and 
management regime for highly migratory fish stocks in the Pacific, 
and that such an approach entails an essentially political process. 
The natu re of the fishery: framing the problem 
The tuna resources of the Central and Western Pacific, which covers 
the zones of the independent Pacific island countries, represent one of 
the few remaining internationally significant tuna fisheries. The 
principal tuna species are skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis), yellowfin 
(Thunnus albacares), bigeye (Thunnus obesus) and albacore (Thunnus 
alalunga). The region supplies over 50 per cent of the world's canning 
tuna (Maxwell and Owen 1994). These fisheries also provide a 
significant foreign exchange and government revenue earner for 
Pacific island countries, particularly the Micronesian countries which 
have few other resources available for development. The economic 
benefits to island countries come mainly in the form of licence fees for 
access from distant water fishing nations under bilateral or multi­
lateral agreements. Some benefits are generated through domestic 
fisheries and onshore processing and associated activities, or through 
employment of Pacific island nationals on deep sea tuna boats. Atoll 
countries, in particular Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia and 
Marshall Islands, aspire to develop their domestic fisheries to increase 
the economic benefits, including in terms of employment, and to 
reduce reliance on licence fees from distant water fleets. This affects 
their approach to access to fisheries within their fishing zones, and to 
regional fisheries management. 
The tuna stocks of the South Pacific region are in good health, with 
scientific assessments indicating that harvesting remains within 
sustainable levels, although some uncertainty exists for bigeye tuna 
stocks. This contrasts with a number of significant collapses of fish 
stocks in other regions of the world, for instance the Grand Banks cod 
off the coast of Canada. The reasons stem from the low rates of 
harvesting of tuna in the region, well within the sustainable harvesting 
range, the rapid growth and strong recruitment for the tropical tuna 
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species (compared with temperate tuna such as southern bluefin 
tuna-Thunnus maccoyii), and the region's relative isolation from major 
markets, which reduces the rate of return from fishing operations. 
The Central and Western Pacific tuna fisheries present an opport­
unity for coastal states in the region to demonstrate that sustainable 
management of highly migratory fish stocks is possible. An important 
factor in the outcome will be the ability of coastal states to cooperate 
with distant water fishing nations within a management regime. 
Property rights: some defi n it ions 
Before going further, it  would be useful to state some definitions 
underlying the arguments of this chapter. First, this chapter adopts the 
view that property rights do not exist objectively, but rely upon a prior 
social contract whereby others recognise one's right to that property 
(Bromley 1991:6). Second, it takes Bromley's definition that a 'right' is 
'the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one's claim to 
a benefit stream' (1991 :15) .  
In other words, the property is not the object (in this case, the fish), 
but rather the benefit stream arising from the resource. This is 
important in the context of tuna fisheries because the coastal state's 
right to charge foreign fishing vessels to fish in exclusive economic 
zones was not recognised by distant water fishing nations until a 
relatively late stage in the negotiations of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The definition of 
property as a benefit stream is significant to the distribution of benefits 
from a fishery that spans the fishing zones of several coastal states, 
and further includes distant water fishing fleets. This is relevant to the 
Central and Western Pacific where most fishing operators are from 
distant water fishing nations rather than coastal states in the region. 
Bromley identifies four types of property rights within these broad 
definitions: individual property rights, where one clearly defined 
entity (a person or a corporation) holds the right; state property rights, 
where a government or other administrative authority holds the right 
on behalf of society; common property rights, where a clearly defined 
group of decision-makers holds the rights and acts collectively in the 
exercise of those rights; and open access or no property rights 
(1991 :23). Bromley then notes that different types of property rights 
also entail responsibilities. This is important for fisheries access under 
UNCLOS which requires coastal states that cannot exploit their 
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fisheries resources to the full total allowable catch to allow others to fish 
in their zones (United Nations 1983: Article 62)-although this has not 
been fully applied in practice. It is also relevant to fisheries management 
when one looks at those parts of UNCLOS that require fishing states 
(both coastal states and those fishing on the high seas) to undertake 
measures for the conservation and management of a resource. The Law 
of the Sea Convention does not itself define property rights explicitly, 
but Bromley's definitions describe the assumptions of property rights 
that underlie those parts of the Convention that relate to fisheries 
exploitation, conservation, and management. 
Commercial fisheries management within individual countries has 
tended to rely on a mixture of state property rights and individual 
property rights, where states have powers over licensing or total catch 
quotas, and individuals can hold fishing rights through tradeable 
licences or individual transferable quotas. Fisheries management 
involving more than one country, especially where the fishery also 
operates on the high seas, has tended to bear more relation to a com­
mon property regime, where the governments of the countries involved 
have acted collectively or through negotiation to manage the resource 
(Tsamenyi and Kaye 1994 review some of the existing international 
agreements for cooperative fisheries management) . In this case, the 
individual governments behave in a way analogous to community 
elders managing a village resource: the collective decision-making 
body (whose membership is clearly defined) exercises control over the 
resource with respect to individual units (in this case fishing opera­
tors) . This has been the case in the Central and Western Pacific. 
Access and management1 
At this point it is worth distinguishing between access to fisheries and 
management of fisheries. A management regime must include 
controlling effort within a fishery, which may also involve limiting 
access. Access relates to who is allowed to participate in the fishery, 
whereas management seeks to ensure that those who are participating 
behave in a way that is consistent with the long-term sustainability of 
the resource. Indeed, when one talks about management of the fish 
resource, one is really talking about management of those who are 
exploiting that resource: we are not managing the fish, but rather the 
fishing operators (Bromley 1991 :21). 
The principal means of controlling access to stocks used by 
individual countries, or collectively by groups of countries, has been 
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through licensing in domestic fisheries or negotiating fleet access by 
foreign operators. Access is generally based on: considerations of 
sustainability (are there enough fish?); distribution of benefits 
(capturing the resource rent); and allocation of quotas (where 
necessary). Under the Convention for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna, for instance, there is a provision for catch quotas to be 
allocated between the fleets of the Parties, currently Australia, Japan 
and New Zealand (DFAT 1993: Article 8[3]) .  
Within the context of a particular management regime, the use of 
economic instruments has been adopted in some countries to 
maximise the economic efficiency of the fishery. In particular, the use 
of individual transferable quotas within a total allowable catch, has 
been shown to have met general criteria for economic efficiency 
(Ministry of Fisheries 1996) .  Duncan and Temu (1996) have proposed 
the auctioning of tradeable licences in Pacific island countries. There is 
still some debate within fisheries management circles as to whether 
output controls such as catch quotas or input controls such as limits on 
vessel numbers (for instance through licensing) or gear restrictions are 
more effective in ensuring fisheries management. Input controls seek 
to control catch level by placing limits on effort, while output controls 
place limits on catch. Under both systems, limits on effort that 
compromise biological imperatives are either prescribed or proscribed. 
A key part of this debate is the effectiveness of monitoring and 
enforcement. While some argue that output controls are a more 
reliable means of controlling stock levels, they also raise significant 
potential compliance problems, such as high grading (where lower 
quality or smaller fish are discarded, but nonetheless killed), which 
can have detrimental effects on the status of the fish stocks. They also 
require significant resources for monitoring, control and surveillance. 
Input controls such as limits on vessel numbers (for example, through 
licensing) are the alternative means of controlling the exploitation of 
the resource, and can place overall physical constraints on the 
harvest-without the incentive to high grade, there is a physical limit 
to the amount of fish that one vessel can catch within a given amount 
of time. Input controls are, however, vulnerable to changes in tech­
nology. More efficient gear or fishing techniques can extend the 
physical constraints on a vessel's catch per unit of effort. 
Management, however, involves considerably more than control of 
effort. Regardless of whether one opts for input rather than output 
controls, there remains a requirement for significantly better regional 
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surveillance and compliance enforcement than is currently available. 
While Forum member countries are exploring the possibility of 
applying a regional vessel monitoring system, which will enable both 
location monitoring and the entry of catch and effort data, there are 
still significant issues to be negotiated, such as the application of the 
vessel monitoring system on the high seas. 
Other issues important for management include the provision by 
vessels of verifiable catch and effort data, which is essential for stock 
assessment and thus for an understanding of whether the stocks are 
being over-fished; the capacity to enforce management measures; and 
the role of flag states in controlling the activities of their nationals 
fishing in other countries' fishing zones or on the high seas. 
Procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes are also important 
both for the confidence of fishing operators that their vessels will not 
be subject to arbitrary harrassment, and for the assurance of coastal 
states that they can apply legal measures to protect the resource from 
illegal behaviour on the part of fishing operators. 
The international legal envi ron ment 
Common property management of fisheries in an international context 
has been developed and codified in international law through the 
United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea, the third of which 
culminated in 1982 with the adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention. 
UNCLOS now provides support under international law for coastal 
state claims to the benefits from fishing zones beyond their territorial 
seas, and an agreed legal framework for common property manage­
ment of international fisheries. The Law of the Sea negotiations, which 
took well over a decade to complete, covered a range of issues from 
boundaries to innocent passage, and from fisheries management to 
sea-bed mining, in recognition of their interdependence (United 
Nations 1983) . The focus on conservation and management of fisheries 
resources acknowledged that countries could not individually manage 
fish stocks that either straddled fishing zones or the high seas, nor 
stocks that migrated beyond individual fishing zones (Doulman 1995) . 
UNCLOS did not come into force until 1994, twelve years after its 
conclusion and opening for signature. Partly because the Convention 
was adopted by consensus, however, its provisions were recognised 
internationally well before it came into force, and it has long been 
established in customary international law. 
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Two aspects of the Law of the Sea that are pertinent to this chapter 
are the definition of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) not more than 
200 nautical miles (nm) from a coastal State's territorial sea baseline 
(United Nations 1983: Articles 55-9), and provisions for the manage­
ment of ocean resources for conservation and optimum utilisation, 
both within EEZs (United Nations 1983: Articles 61-7) and on the high 
seas (United Nations 1983: Articles 116-20). All South Pacific Forum 
member countries have now declared either exclusive economic zones 
or fishing zones at 200 nm from their baselines. The combined fishing 
zones of Forum countries (including eastern Australia) amounts to 
around 20 million sq km, or around 80 per cent of the area serviced by 
the FFA, the rest being high seas (Maxwell and Owen 1994:2). All 
Forum countries except Kiribati and Palau are signatories to UNCLOS 
(or have acceded) and most have ratified (United Nations 1996) . 
UNCLOS has two important consequences for the (mostly) newly 
independent island countries of the Pacific. Firstly, it confers upon 
coastal states a property right to fisheries resources within their EEZs. 
UNCLOS provides only qualified fishing rights both within EEZs and 
on the high seas. Article 56 defines for coastal states 'sovereign rights' 
(but not 'sovereignty') and jurisdiction with regard to installations, 
marine scientific research and protection of the marine environment, 
but it also stipulates that 
[i]n exercising its rights and performing its duties under this 
Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state shall have 
due regard to the rights and duties of other states and shall act in a 
manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention (United 
Nations 1983: Article 56[2]) .  
Similarly, all states have a right to fish on the high seas, but only 
subject to 'the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal 
states' (United Nations 1983: Article 116). 
Secondly, it confers upon coastal states and fishing states the 
associated responsibility to manage marine resources for conservation 
and optimum utilisation. UNCLOS sets out detailed requirements for 
coastal states to conserve fisheries resources through the determination 
of allowable catch on the basis of the best available scientific advice 
(Article 61), to allow others to fish in their EEZs if their nationals lack 
the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch (Article 62) and to 
cooperate with others in managing shared and straddling stocks 
(Article 63) and highly migratory species (Article 64). States fishing on 
the high seas are moreover required to take measures to conserve 
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fisheries resources (Articles 117 and 119), and to cooperate in the 
conservation and management of high seas resources (Article 118). 
The provisions of UNCLOS, and particularly Articles 63, 64 and 
117-19, are important for the Pacific islands region. All four of the 
major tuna species harvested in the region are listed in Annex I of 
UNCLOS as highly migratory species. Under UNCLOS and its asso­
ciated Implementing Agreement (UN 1995) there is an international 
legal requirement on Parties to cooperate in the conservation and 
optimum utilisation of the stocks. The Implementing Agreement, 
which was opened for signature in December 1995, and has been 
ratified by the United States, Saint Lucia and Tonga, details the 
application of those Articles of UNCLOS (63, 64 and 117-19) that 
relate to management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, 
in particular in relation to the respective responsibilities of coastal 
States and distant water fishing nations (Doulman 1995) .  It also 
requires the application of the precautionary principle, where a 
conservative approach must be taken in the absence of conclusive 
scientific evidence (United Nations 1995: Article 6). 
Many specific measures for fisheries management have been 
incorporated into the UN Implementing Agreement, which provides 
for the establishment of limit and target reference points to be applied 
to catch quotas, according to the best estimates of maximum sustain­
able yield (Annex Il); provision of catch and effort data and verification 
of that data (Annex I); elaboration of the responsibilities of flag states 
to control the operations of their fleets on the high seas (Articles 18 
and 19); surveillance and enforcement procedures both within EEZs 
and on the high seas (Articles 19-23); and procedures for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes between countries (Articles 27-32). 
The Implementing Agreement further provides that, where a 
regional or sub-regional organisation or arrangement has been 
established for conservation and management of straddling or highly 
migratory fish stocks 
[o]nly those states which are members of such an organization or 
participants in such an arrangement, or which agree to apply the 
conservation and management measures established by such 
organization or arrangement, shall have access to the fishery resources 
to which those measures apply (United Nations 1995: Article 8(4)). 
The capacity to exclude from fishing those who refuse to apply 
measures agreed within a regional conservation and management 
arrangement is a significant step in minimising the possible third state 
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problems in regional fisheries management identified by Tsamenyi 
and Kaye (1994) . It is also significant in further limiting the traditional 
Grotian notion of the freedom of the seas: while the Law of the Sea 
Convention limits this by qualifying the right of states to fish on the 
high seas (Tsamenyi and Kaye 1994), the UN Implementing Agreement 
further suggests that states can be excluded from fishing in certain high 
seas areas if they are unwilling to comply with conservation and 
management measures that others have agreed to apply in those waters. 
It also raises questions about the application of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties which provides that states are not bound by 
obligations they have not signed onto (DFAT 1974: Article 34) .  It is not 
clear whether a non-Party to the UN Implementing Agreement can be 
excluded from high seas fisheries for which a conservation and 
management arrangement has been agreed. 
Existing regional arrangements for management 
Concerns about the management of the highly migratory fish stocks in 
the Pacific are not new to the region. South Pacific Forum members2 
have a long history of cooperation in the management of their fisheries 
resources, based on common property concepts. The Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FFA), comprising a Committee and Secretariat, was established 
in 1979 when its Convention was opened for signature at the 1979 South 
Pacific Forum (OPA 1995: Vol I, 1979 Forum Communique). The 
Committee was �to promote intra-regional co-ordination and co­
operation' in inter alia fisheries management policies, interactions with 
distant water fishing nations, and surveillance and enforcement (FFA 
1979: Article V). Since then, FFA member countries have put in place a 
number of cooperative arrangements affecting regional fisheries 
management. The Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the 
Management of Fisheries of Common Concern was adopted in 1982, 
and the Parties to the Nauru Agreement3 have since formed an 
influential sub-regional grouping within FFA on fisheries access and 
management issues. 
In 1987, the US government signed a treaty with FFA member 
countries governing fisheries access for the region. This ended a 
decade-long dispute between the United States and FFA members 
over fisheries access, where the United States had refused to recognise 
fishing zones beyond territorial seas (Bergin 1994) . The Treaty 
provides for significant management controls, including the presence 
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of observers, paid for by vessel operators, catch and effort data 
provision both within fishing zones and on contiguous high seas, and 
cooperative enforcement procedures. The Treaty also provides for a 
flat rate access fee and a limit on vessel numbers (FFA 1994: Articles 3-
5 and Annex I). The Treaty was seen as a significant step towards 
regional fisheries management and similar arrangements were 
subsequently sought with other distant water fishing nations (OPA 
1995: Vol II, 1994 Forum Communique). Since the Treaty was 
concluded, however, no multilateral agreement on access has been 
concluded with another distant water fishing nation, although 
negotiations are underway between some FFA member countries and 
the Taiwan Deep Sea Tuna Boatowners' Association over access to the 
albacore longline fishery (FFA 1996) . 
Other legal instruments that have been adopted in the region 
relating to fisheries management include the Palau Arrangement for 
the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery (1992), 
which provides for cooperative action on limiting the number of 
licences for foreign purse seine vessels. Although the licences are then 
made available for domestic operators, it acts as a limit on total vessel 
numbers as domestic fishing operators are not in a position to take up 
the additional licences. Limiting the number of licences available to 
foreign fishing vessels was also intended to increase competition for 
those licences to raise the licence fees. The number of licences allowed 
under the Palau Arrangement is higher than the existing number of 
operative licences, but the Arrangement's provisions remain generally 
constraining on foreign fishing effort within member countries' EEZs. 
The Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law 
Enforcement in the South Pacific Region provides a head agreement 
under which member countries can enter into bilateral subsidiary 
agreements to share surveillance and enforcement assets, such as 
patrol boats and personnel. Tuvalu and Tonga are the only two 
countries that have concluded a subsidiary agreement. 
A significant development in regional fisheries management was 
the adoption in 1991 of the Minimum Terms and Conditions for 
Fisheries Access (MTCs).  These provide for the positioning of 
observers on boats at the expense of vessel operators, catch and effort 
data provision (including for fishing on the high seas where that was 
part of a trip that included fishing within EEZs), prohibition of 
transhipment at sea, and registration on the Regional Register of 
Fishing Vessels held by the FFA Secretariat. The Regional Register 
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gives status of 'good standing' that can be withdrawn for serious 
transgressions, whereby a vessel without 'good standing' will not be 
allowed to fish in the zone of any FFA member country (FFA 1993) . 
FFA members have gradually incorporated the MTCs into bilateral 
access arrangements. Although they have no separate standing under 
international law, the MTCs and the Regional Register have contri­
buted to management through regional cooperation. The ban on 
transhipment at sea, which took effect in mid-1993, led to a significant 
improvement in catch reporting and compliance, and the risk of losing 
'good standing' on the Regional Register has encouraged transgressing 
vessel operators to settle disputes expeditiously and out of court 
(Bergin 1994). 
Sustai nable management for the futu re? 
FFA member countries have acknowledged the need for a cooperative 
approach to future management arrangements for regional fisheries 
(FFC 1996) . The 27th South Pacific Forum in Majuro agreed to convene 
in mid-1997 a second High Level Multilateral Consultation on the 
Conservation and Management of Fisheries Resources of the Central 
and Western Pacific, involving coastal states and territories in the 
region and distant water fishing nations (South Pacific Forum 1996) . 
The first High Level Multilateral Conference on South Pacific Tuna 
Fisheries was held in Honiara in December 1994 (FFC 1996) . 
The highly migratory nature of the resource and its importance to 
island countries proscribes consideration of regional fisheries manage­
ment in isolation from its political and social context. Treatment of 
Central and Western Pacific tuna fisheries under a system of individual 
property rights (as separate fishing zones governed by countries 
acting independently) is unrealistic because of the highly migratory 
nature of the stocks. Furthermore, the coming into force of the Law of 
the Sea Convention and the adoption of the UN Implementing 
Agreement creates an international legal obligation on coastal states in 
the region to cooperate with each other and other fishing nations in 
fisheries management. On the other hand, the kind of open-access 
regime where no property rights are established, such as occurred in 
international waters (beyond territorial seas) prior to the Law of the 
Sea, is inimical to the sustainability of the stocks. Although the 
creation of property rights can assist the exploitation of a terrestrial 
resource (implying that an absence of property rights can impede 
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exploitation), the experience of fisheries has been that unrestricted 
access has led to resource depletion. This threat is increasing in the 
Central and Western Pacific where distant water fleets are expanding 
rapidly without explicit management constraints. The common 
property management approach that has been taken to date in the 
Forum would thus seem to be the only one feasible: indeed, this is 
why collective management approaches to international fisheries 
issues have been pursued all over the world. 
The island countries of the Forum region are by no means uniform 
in their fisheries interests. The tiny atoll states of Micronesia, and 
Tuvalu, have enormous fishing zones but little else in terms of 
potential foreign exchange earnings and development opportunities. 
The larger Melanesian countries have significant fisheries resources 
(from time to time, depending on the migration of the stocks), which 
are important sources of income, notwithstanding other development 
options and a better natural resource endowment. In contrast, most of 
the Polynesian countries do not have substantial pelagic fisheries 
resources: whereas over 70 per cent of reported catches of the 
northerly yellowfin and skipjack tuna in the region are caught within 
EEZs, the more southerly albacore and bigeye fisheries involve a 
higher proportion of high seas activity. The significant differences in 
fisheries endowments and the relative importance of fisheries to 
different island economies has an obvious influence on the approaches 
that island countries take to regional fisheries management and access 
arrangements, and will have a bearing on the cohesiveness of their 
approach to fisheries negotiations with distant water fishing nations. 
Despite commitments in the Forum in favour of multilateral access 
arrangements, the benefits from a US Treaty-style arrangement with 
other distant water fishing nations are not uniformly distributed 
between island countries. The US Treaty fees are distributed according 
to a formula by which all Pacific island parties (including Australia 
and New Zealand) receive an equal share of 15 per cent of the fee, 
with the residual (after deduction of administrative costs) divided up 
between countries according to the proportion of catch taken in their 
zones. Thus, those countries with little or no catch taken in their zones 
are in effect subsidised by the others. The resource-rich Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement countries might then have some justification in 
feeling that they could negotiate higher fees bilaterally than through a 
similar arrangement. This is particularly the case for the Asian 
distant water fishing nations, which have already made clear that, 
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unlike the United States, they will not subsidise their fleets to boost 
licence fees. On the other hand, the less resource-rich FFA member 
countries argue with justification that the generous fees obtained 
through the US Treaty would not have been forthcoming without their 
cooperation in negotiating the agreement, and that collective 
bargaining by all FFA member countries has brought concrete 
dividends in the form of higher fees that have benefited all members, 
and particularly those with significant catches in their fishing zones. 
Notwithstanding their differing fisheries interests, which might 
affect their individual attitudes towards access arrangements with 
distant water fishing nations and their aspirations to develop their 
own domestic fishing industries, Forum island countries have a 
common interest in the conservation and sustainable management of 
regional fisheries. The challenge before them now is to find similar 
common interests with distant water fishing nations and other coastal 
states that share the fisheries resources, and to negotiate a 
management regime that ensures the long-term viability of the 
resource while still meeting their economic needs and development 
aspirations. 
Recent changes in international law, with the conclusion and 
coming into force of the Law of the Sea Convention and the adoption 
in December 1995 of the UN Implementing Agreement, lend 
considerably more support now in international law for collective 
management between countries of highly migratory resources. 
Associated with the support afforded in international law comes an 
increased obligation on Forum island countries to cooperate with 
distant water fishing nations and non-Forum coastal states and 
territories in fisheries conservation and management: in effect to 
negotiate a common property management regime that extends the 
existing cooperation between coastal states in the region. 
Impl ications for common property 
The process that Forum leaders have committed themselves to in 
calling the second High Level Multilateral Consultation on regional 
fisheries conservation and management will provide another test of 
the ability of countries with widely varying interests, endowments, 
and levels of development to cooperate in the common property 
management of a resource that is important to all players. It is a classic 
example of a common property situation, where the decision-making 
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units (the governments of the countries involved) interact at a level of 
at least nominal equality. The developing coastal states in the region 
are small and have little international political clout, but have a 
history of collective action and a right acknowledged in international 
law to the benefits of the rich fisheries resources within their exclusive 
economic zones. For some, the resources represent the principal 
opportunity to achieve their development aspirations. By contrast, the 
distant water fishing nations include the two largest economies in the 
world who have considerable international political and economic 
weight-including the capacity to use their aid funds as leverage-but 
who nonetheless view the resource as significant to at least certain 
influential sections of their societies. It is a situation in which significant 
negotiating power resides with the politically and economically weak 
island countries in the form of rights to the benefits of their exclusive 
economic zones. The test lies in the ability of all parties to ensure that 
the strong interests apparent on all sides in the resource work towards a 
collective management outcome rather than dissipating into a conflict 
that could threaten the future of the fisheries. 
The advent of the UN Implementing Agreement is also important 
in altering the boundaries of the resource.4 Whereas the Law of the Sea 
Convention is based on the individual property rights created for 
countries through the declaration of exclusive economic zones, the 
Implementing Agreement blurs that distinction in its application. The 
Agreement is to apply to 'the conservation and management of 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks beyond areas 
under national jurisdiction' (Article 3), except that the general 
principles of the Agreement (Article 5), the provisions relating to the 
application of the precautionary approach (Article 6) and to the 
compatibility of conservation and management measures (Article 7) 
are to be applied by coastal states within areas of national jurisdiction. 
The provisions for compatibility outlined in Article 7 arose from 
the recognition by the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks that national and international measures 
for conservation and management needed to be compatible in order to 
be effective (Doulman 1995:9). From a common property perspective, 
however, the effect of this eminently sensible management approach 
has been to soften the boundaries between the individual property 
rights exercised within EEZs ('sovereign rights' as characterised in 
UNCLOS and the Implementing Agreement) and the high seas areas 
where a common property regime is to apply. 
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The compatibility provisions have the additional effect of 
potentially strengthening the position of coastal states in determining 
common management measures. The first criterion for compatibility 
required states to 
take into account the conservation and management measures 
adopted and applied in accordance with article 61 of the (Law of the 
Sea) Convention in respect of the same stocks by coastal states within 
areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that measures established 
in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine the 
effectiveness of such measures (United Nations 1995: Article 7(2a)). 
This implies that, if coastal states apply conservation and 
management measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
UNCLOS (Article 61), they are in a strong position under international 
law to require distant water fishing nations to apply compatible 
measures under a common property regime on the high seas, or at 
least to apply measures that do not undermine the management 
regimes that apply within their EEZs. In the Pacific, this could have 
practical implications for the outcomes of negotiations on regional 
management measures for tuna stocks. 
Conclusion 
The capture of economic rent by individual coastal states within the 
context of an agreed conservation and management regime is within 
the bounds of those states' sovereign rights to benefit from the 
resource, and the mechanisms for maximising that benefit can be 
developed unilaterally. The most difficult task facing coastal states in 
the South Pacific Forum region is to agree on a management regime 
whereby distant water fishing nations (and their fleets) bear their 
share of the responsibilities of conservation, and in which catch 
allocation and access to the resource is structured in a way that both 
maximises the benefits to island countries and distributes those benefits 
in an acceptably equitable way. These issues are not unique to the 
Pacific, but are being played out in fisheries forums in the Indian Ocean 
and the Antarctic. The experiences of each set of negotiations will, over 
time, inform and influence each other in providing precedents and 
models for common management of common resources. 
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Notes 
The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and not 
necessarily those of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Canberra. 
1. I am grateful to Jonathon Barrington of the Commonwealth 
Department of Primary Industries and Energy, and to Ian 
Cartwright and Tony Kingston of the Forum Fisheries Agency for 
elaborating the fisheries management concepts in this section. 
2. South Pacific Forum member countries are Australia, Cook Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. 
3. Parties to the Nauru Agreement are Federated States of Micronesia, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. 
4. I am grateful to Transform Aqorau of the University of Wollongong 
for alerting me to the implications of these provisions of the UN 
Implementing Agreement for common property. 
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Com mon property confl ict and 
resolution:  Aborig inal Austral ia and 
Papua New Guinea 
Kilyal i  Kal it and Elspeth Young 
It  is  often assumed that customary concepts of common property must 
hamper development, and must be eradicated in favour of more indi­
vidualistic ownership which promotes entrepreneurial approaches and 
wealth generation. Such assumptions are not new. History presents 
some strong supporting evidence for their validity, but also raises 
questions, particularly in relation to equity in resource distribution. In 
Scotland, for example, the transformation two centuries ago from the 
communally based run-rig system to the enclosure of the land into 
individual plots laid the basis for land improvement, agricultural 
intensification and the introduction of new crops and livestock. 
Without such changes the population could not have sustained itself, 
and these new forms of resource management fostered wide-ranging 
development. However there were also some disadvantages. Many 
people became landless and were forced either to seek subsistence land 
elsewhere, usually in ecologically marginal areas, or to migrate to 
distant lands such as Australia or Canada. More commonly, they moved 
to the cities to become factory workers in the burgeoning industries of 
the period. While many of those displaced reaped undoubted economic 
benefit these changes certainly caused some social dislocation which, 
although healed by time, must have initally made a significant impact. 
This agricultural intensification also generated some long-term changes 
which have been detrimental to the Scottish environment as a whole. 
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Commitment in today's industrialised world to the positive benefits 
of individualisation of property is almost universal. However this 
doctrine also has wider implications. Because resources are traded on a 
global scale, the interests and ideas of the industrialised world directly 
impinge on people from other societies where industrialisation is still a 
relatively recent process. As Baines (1989) points out, there is wide­
spread feeling among agents of economic development that such a 
process is constrained by traditional systems of land and sea tenure and 
that customary resource management systems are largely irrelevant. In 
the Pacific pressures to transform common property resource holdings 
to more individualistic forms of ownership are strong and are causing 
concern for indigenous peoples. Key stakeholders in resource use--the 
state and, through its arrangements with external financial agencies, 
organisations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary 
Fund, development companies and other interested non-indigenous 
people-have been the main instigators of change. In Papua New 
Guinea, for example, the World Bank in collaboration with the govern­
ment has worked tirelessly to encourage conversion of customary 
group tenure into some form of freehold, involving legislation for 
customary land registration. Although efforts towards conversion of 
customary land started in the 1950s the process has never been finally 
resolved. The most recent attempt (in 1996) under the auspices of the 
Land Mobilisation Program had to be called off even before making it 
to Parliament, due to outright rejection by the public, demonstrated 
through violence and loss of life. 
Such concerns and conflicts are not restricted to Melanesia, 
Micronesia, and Polynesia. They are also supremely important in the 
industrialised Pacific countries of Australia and New Zealand, both of 
which have indigenous minority populations which have retained a 
strong commitment to common resource property concepts and whose 
customary tenure systems have received only limited recognition 
under the laws of the state. 
Key questions concerning the change from common resource 
property concepts to more individually defined resources include the 
following 
• who would benefit most from these changes-indigenous 
customary landholders, the developers, or the state? 
• would these changes lead to better or worse distribution of 
development benefits Gobs, income, control over resources) 
within the customary landholding group? 
• is the type of development driving these transformations-
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capitalistic/ individualistic rather than communally-based 
with sustenance derived from both monetary and non­
monetary activity-ultimately the most sustainable for such 
Pacific indigenous societies? 
• can these concepts of resource property be reconciled so that 
development is supported? Can viable alternative solutions, 
recognising both systems, be created? 
This chapter focuses primarily on the last of these questions. It 
refers to local level examples of how indigenous communities have 
responded to the demands of both communal and individual property 
definitions, and it examines these within the broader regional frame­
works required for people to make these adjustments in ways that 
promote the future sustainability of their societies. While the two 
Pacific indigenous groups referred to here (Aboriginal Australians in 
remote areas and Papua New Guineans) are very different, some 
common themes can be identified. These relate to the definition of 
common property resources and traditional ecological knowledge, 
pressures to change these exerted by commercial resource develop­
ments, and the methods devised by indigenous people for coping with 
the ensuing conflicts. 
Relevant common resou rce property concepts 
Concepts of resource property lie on a continuum ranging from 
unfettered resources, which users may exploit freely for their own 
benefit with no consideration for others or for longer-term 
sustainability, to absolute private ownership, in which a single individual 
exercises complete exclusionary control over the use of the resources 
(Bromley 1991) .  Between these two extremes are communally-owned 
resources (the group uses the resource according to agreed rules 
designed to sustain all its members and maintain the future viability 
of the resource), publicly-owned resources (under state or national 
jurisdictions), and leased resources (individuals or groups hold tenure 
for an agreed limited period and are subject to certain restrictions on 
how to use these assets) . 
For Australian and Pacific indigenous societies communal owner­
ship is the principal form of common resource property holding. This 
contrasts with the principal forms of tenure recognised in industrialised 
societies-public, private and leasehold tenures. The latter forms of 
resource ownership are largely individualistic. Australian and Pacific 
indigenous societies have not, despite many misconceptions, held 
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their land as a free good, the uncontrolled use of which was seen to 
lead to the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 1968) . Their common 
property concepts follow distinct rules agreed to within that particular 
society. Incoming settlers, then largely of European and Anglo-Celtic 
origins, generally ignored the prior existence of these forms of tenure, a 
basic failure which has been a common characteristic of colonial occu­
pation over the last five centuries (see, for example, Bromley 1991; 
Berkes and Farvar 1989, Grima and Berkes 1989, and Ostrom 1990). This 
failure, a major source of conflict, has had dire consequences. 
Colonial settlers in Australia wrongfully assumed that the land was 
terra nullius, a place that belonged to no one and was therefore free to 
be taken over by any interested settler. For over 200 years the resource 
rights and beliefs of indigenous Australians have been largely dis­
counted and they have had little opportunity to share in the benefits 
flowing from resource development. Only in recent decades, following 
passage of Land Rights legislation in the Northern Territory in 1976, 
have some Aboriginal people been able to regain control over cus­
tomary land and negotiate for a share in monetary benefits from 
development. And it has only been in the 1990s, with the Mabo 
decision and subsequent passing of the Native Title Legislation, that 
the fundamental misconception of terra nullius has been legally 
overturned. While this clearly has implications for resource develop­
ment the practical consequences are still to be clarified, although 
mineral resources will still be subject to separate claim by the state. 
In Papua New Guinea, in contrast, customary property rights, 
explicitly recognised under the country's legal framework, extend 
over at least 97 per cent of the country's land area and most of its 
forest. The remaining area is 'referred to as alienated land because it 
was bought or taken away from its customary owners' (Clarke et al. 
1996:1) .  Indigenous kinship groups control land use and natural 
resource management. As in Australia the state also claims interest in 
mineral rights over both customary and non-customary land. 
Pressures to suppress the detrimental characteristics of common 
resource property regimes in favour of more individually-defined 
systems are strong. Both countries also demonstrate that forms of 
resource tenure--communal, state and private--can overlap, and 
reconcilation of the differences between them becomes very difficult. 
As Berkes and Farvar (1989) suggest, finding satisfactory ways of 
dealing with such overlap is a key challenge to resolving resource 
development conflicts. 
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Underlying all of these questions is the key point of how common 
property concepts and rights are defined. As far as commercial resource 
development is concerned, the main issues concern the spatial 
definition of boundaries between property groups, the determination of 
membership of the groups, and the characteristics of various mechanisms 
by which these groups exercise control over their resource. Unless these 
issues are clearly understood no practical resolutions can be devised. 
Boundaries and group membership 
The perception that Australian Aborigines did not define their territo­
rial boundaries but were 'aimless wanderers' was, from early Euro­
pean settlement, a remarkably persistent myth. On the contrary, as 
later anthropological and linguistic studies (such as Tmdale 1972, 
Peterson 1976) have demonstrated, Aboriginal groups held communal 
responsibility for broad but distinct areas of land and resources and 
exercised that responsibility through both traditional ecological 
knowledge and their cultural and spiritual knowledge. Recent land 
rights recognition and legislation, based primarily on establishment of 
proof of the customary ownership of claimants (Young 1992b), has 
brought the issue of spatial definition of these 'countries' into sharp 
focus. As a result, non-indigenous understanding of Aboriginal 
boundary parameters has greatly increased. As Sutton's recent explo­
ration of boundary issues reveals (Sutton 1995), researchers have 
become increasingly convinced both of their overall complexity, and 
less willing to see them as rigid lines dividing different 'countries' 
from one another. Similar complexities have emerged in attempts to 
define group members, commonly called 'traditional owners'. Here, as 
Hiatt et al. (1984) discuss, the lineage group remains the core of those 
claiming to hold customary responsibility for a particular 'country'. 
However, there is, and probably always has been, some fluidity in 
group membership, reflecting demographic changes in pre-contact 
times and, more recently, population changes resulting from disposses­
sion and mobility. As with spatial boundaries it is the decision of the 
group itself which counts in determining who does, or does not, belong. 
Papua New Guinean indigenous societies also define their spatial 
boundaries but, as continuing inter-group conflicts show, areas of 
contention have always been present and still remain. Systems of land 
tenure in Papua New Guinea are complex and vary greatly. Highland 
societies, for example, distinguish between territory and property­
'territory is a group resource, whereas occupied or improved land, 
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used for gardens, houses, and other individual or group purposes, is 
property' (Brown 1978: 113). As this implies, while the whole is com­
mon resource property, there are degrees of difference in the way that 
ownership is demonstrated. Through regular use, land-inevitably the 
most fertile--can become individual property. This obviously has 
implications for resource development, whether through cash-crop­
ping, forest logging or claims for mineral development compensation. 
Membership of the extended kin group responsible for the whole 
region is inextricably linked into such tenure systems through 
reciprocity and resource sharing. That membership, in terms of rights 
to land, can be extended beyond the immediate lineage to include 
other long-term residents who originally were granted only temporary 
resource rights (Brookfield and Brown 1967) . Banks's (1996) recent 
discussion on compensation and relocation payments for the Porgera 
gold-mine in Papua New Guinea shows that the incorporation of these 
more broadly defined lineage groups into the agreement has posed 
very difficult questions for the company concerned. 
Control 
A common characteristic of indigenous regimes in both Papua New 
Guinea and Aboriginal Australia is the existence of distinct control, 
both on group activities and on individual use of resources within the 
group's area. In addition, this control was exercised through internally 
upheld rules and behavioural norms with which all responsible members 
of the group were familiar. As Gibbs and Bromley (1989) comment, such 
control is essential if common resources are to be properly managed. 
Transgression against the agreed rules, such as allowing your livestock 
to devastate your neighbours' crops (in Papua New Guinea) or visit­
ing spiritual sites from which, for gender or group affiliation reasons, 
you should be excluded (in Aboriginal Australia) were punishable. 
Thus control was internally defined and exercised, a situation which, 
as Ostrom (1990) has stressed, provides much greater group cohesive­
ness and stability than one in which control is externally imposed, 
such as from the state. 
Common resource property defin ition and development 
Increased recognition of the complexities of boundary and group 
definitions has been accompanied, somewhat ironically, by increased 
pressure to make firm decisions on these parameters. Davis and 
Prescott's (1992) analysis of Australian Aboriginal frontiers and 
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boundaries provides an obvious example of how one resource 
developer has tried to exert such pressure. This research study, 
financed by a major mineral development company, set out to map 
and define contemporary Aboriginal territories, with a view to 
providing a definitive text which could be used by both present and 
future developers in determining with whom they must negotiate over 
shares in resource rights. As Sutton's (1995) detailed expose of this 
study describes, not only did this study include glaring inaccuracies in 
definition but it also raised ethical problems because it imposed 
external control over systems which should be internally determined. 
Development companies in Papua New Guinea have also been 
eager to determine rigidly which common resource properties will be 
affected by their activities (such as from mining), and would prefer 
that their negotiations with traditional owners be restricted to the 
members of core groups. This would obviously, as Power (1995) 
argues, suit them better. He suggests that the rightful landowners 
should be identified as early as possible, before a project begins. He 
feels that this would avoid the proliferation of claims of ownership 
and demand for increased royalty shares once high levels of 
production are achieved, as has occurred in the Kutubu project. 
However, rigid definition of affected areas and of those deserving 
compensation has its pitfalls. It may well cut out people whose claims 
are well-founded. Subsequent problems arising with compensation 
from large-scale mining developments such as Ok Tedi or Porgera 
show that the dangers of such approaches are very real. 
Abori gi nal Austral ia:  common resou rce property and 
development 
The history of land tenure change in Australia can be classified, as far 
as Aborigines are concerned, into two distinct periods. First there was 
the period of alienation and privatisation, during which large-scale 
dispossession occurred and direct evidence of Aboriginal common 
resource property was hidden 'underground'. Second, there was the 
period of land rights recognition, reinforced by legislation, when 
Aboriginal concepts of landownership came firmly back into focus. 
Both of these periods emphasise not only the importance of land 
tenure transformation in relation to economic use and control over 
natural resources but also, as Sutton (1995) has recently stressed, the 
highly political nature of these changes. During the first period, which 
lasted from first contact until around 1970, state and private forms of 
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property ownership prevailed and indigenous interests in resource 
development benefits were ignored and went uncompensated. It is the 
second period, commencing approximately 25 years ago with the 
adoption by the Federal government of policies supporting Aboriginal 
land rights, which is of greatest interest in this discussion. This period 
has seen significant concessions on Aboriginal Land Rights (over 15 
per cent of the Australian continent, primarily in remote areas, is now 
under Aboriginal ownership-Figure 12.1-but also the beginning of 
processes which have spread resource development benefits more 
equitably to customary owners. It has also shown how common 
resource property concepts and more individual forms of ownership 
might be reconciled. The following discussion focuses on the pastoral 
sector, with brief references to human settlement, which pervades all 
resource use. 
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Settlement 
The use of land for settlement is the most basic form of resource use. 
The last 25 years have seen a marked reoccupation of many of the 
remotest parts of Australia by Aboriginal groups who have regained 
legal title to their customary lands which they had earlier been encour­
aged and sometimes forced to leave (see, for example, Young 1992a; 
Australia 1987; Cane and Stanley 1985) .  Centralised administrative 
settlements, a prime instrument of earlier assimilation policies, have 
declined as people have returned to the land, establishing well over 
200 'outstations' or 'homeland centres' in central Australia alone. As 
Taylor (1992) has demonstrated for the Northern Territory, this has led 
to a marked dispersal of population. The locations of these outstations 
accord as closely as possible with customary human/land linkages. 
However, because of the need to accommodate to non-indigenous 
systems of land tenure and to meet modem demands for services, they 
do not fit completely with these patterns. Thus, for example, people 
may have been unable to establish their new camps at a chosen 
waterhole either because that waterhole lay on land now legally 
alienated to the state or a non-indigenous developer or landholder, or 
because the water resource was neither large nor predictable enough 
to support the returning group. Attempts to find alternative ground 
water supplies were often frustrated because drilling in the chosen site 
was unsuccessful or the water supplies were non-potable because of 
their high salt content. The existence of roads and tracks, services such 
as schools and clinics, permanent houses and the provision of electric­
ity, telecommunications and other increasingly vital attributes of 
modem lifestyles have also influenced site choice. Administrative 
pressures for centralisation rather than dispersion have been strong, 
with persuasion sometimes applied through legal restrictions on land 
settlement and less directly through introducing user-pays programs 
for electricity and water at price rates which are beyond the pockets of 
most Aboriginal outstation dwellers. Many outstation sites are there­
fore compromises, located on or near customary land but accessible to 
externally provided services. 
The use of the land around outstations also reflects this compromise. 
Subsistence hunting and foraging is practised as closely as possible to 
customary norms with particular individuals holding detailed knowledge 
and responsibilities. But other outstation residents with less obvious 
traditional claims to these resources are not excluded. Over time, they 
may well gain most of the basic spiritual and ecological lore already 
held by the recognised customary landholders. They may even, as 
Common property conflict and resolution I 1 9 1  
traced for the Anmatyerre people to the northwest of Alice Springs 
(Young 1987) be fully accepted as customary resource owners. And 
physical access for vehicles, vital to the success of contemporary 
hunter-foragers, inevitably means that track networks also play a 
significant role in determining where people go and what they harvest. 
These compromises present challenges to the Aboriginal groups 
concerned, and also to the administrative authorities charged with 
providing them with basic services. For the people the challenge has 
been to approximate their chosen customary settlement patterns as 
closely as possible. For the administrators, it is the need to deal 
efficently with scattered, highly mobile populations who still have 
prime needs for services such as power, education, and health to be 
satisfied (Young and Doohan 1989) . 
Pastoralism 
Government policies fostering Aboriginal development have generally 
followed the paradigms of the industrialised world, stressing 
monetary economic gain as the only path to the future. In the pastoral 
industry commercially-oriented development, in which Aboriginal 
groups would acquire properties and run them, like their non­
indigenous neighbours, as successful money-making ventures has been 
generally promoted. For many complex reasons-historical, political, 
environmental, social and cultural-few Aboriginal properties have 
fulfilled that promise (Young 1995). 
Over the last 20 years more than 40 pastoral properties have been 
acquired by Aboriginal groups, primarily through government land 
purchase funding. Although encouraged, and sometimes coerced, into 
managing these properties commercially, many new Aboriginal 
owners have had different priorities for the use of the land, priorities 
which demonstrate adaptation between common resource property 
regimes and more individualised forms of tenure. As recorded in a 
number of studies conducted in the decade from 1978 (Young 1988a 
and 1988b), properties in the Northern Territory were able to convert 
themselves to freehold title through claims lodged through the North­
ern Territory Aboriginal land rights legislation. Once released from 
restrictions imposed through leasehold regulations, the people could 
therefore use the land as they wished. Their earlier common resource 
property regimes often began to surface. This resulted in the dispersal 
of extended family groups from centralised homestead settlements, 
where they had worked for the former non-indigenous owner, to 
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scattered 'outstations' located in the traditional country of each group; 
the development of multiple small-scale cattle enterprises, ecotourism 
ventures and arts and craft ventures focusing on these outstations; the 
re-emergence of subsistence hunting and foraging as a major activity; 
and the maintenance of cultural activities. In the case of Mt Allan (Fig. 
12.2), following a successful land claim the Anmatyerre people split 
into three major groups, one centred on the existing homestead and 
the others, associated with honey ant and emu dreaming respectively, 
in new outstations located within their customary 'countries' and 
accessible to important cultural sites about which they were concerned. 
As discussed elsewhere (Young 1987) the Aboriginal interpretation of 
responsibility for the country within the former Mt Allan pastoral 
Figure 1 2.2 Anmatyerre and non-Aboriginal delineations of property 
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lease focuses on a number of ancestral beings whose activities trace 
'tracks' in the landscape. Non-indigenous concepts of land tenure in 
the same area, in contrast, emphasise introduced boundary and 
infrastructure definition-fences, roads and substantial permanent 
buildings. 
In some cases, such as the former Utopia cattle station to the 
northeast of Alice Springs, significant reduction in stocking rates has 
led to a marked regeneration of natural vegetation and the rehabilitation 
of wildlife habitats, with a resultant improvement in the potential of the 
country for subsistence hunting and foraging. Here most of the 
Alyawerre people abandoned the former centralised settlement in 
favour of a number of outstations located in the traditional country of 
each group concerned. Many established reputations as artists both in 
the national and international scene (NT Department of Primary 
Production 1983). To many non-indigenous people, including 
pastoralists and government officials, developments such as those on 
Mt Allan and Utopia have been wholly negative because they under­
mine the continuing advancement of commercial pastoralism. However, 
they have had a positive effect on many Aboriginal families, now living 
lifestyles which they find much more attractive than their former ones. 
Even outside the Northern Territory, where legislation allowing the 
conversion of these leases to freehold title has not been established, 
adaptations have occurred. Aboriginal pastoralists in the Kimberley, 
for example (Davies and Young 1995, 1996), are increasingly exploring 
land management regimes which combine subsistence hunting and 
gathering with commercial cattle production and the development of 
tourist enterprises. Cattle production has become more intensive, 
emphasising the production of smaller numbers of larger, more 
valuable animals in the more accessible parts of properties, while the 
remainder of the land may be spasmodically used for subsistence 
fishing and wildlife hunting; and tourist expeditions to the spectacular 
ranges, gorges and waterholes of this remote far northern region. 
An interesting prospect for a region such as this is the possibility of 
actual land redistribution to reflect these changes in use. Where there 
are adjoining Aboriginal cattle stations, communities might negotiate 
to remove their lease boundary fences and amalgamate their 
accessible lands along the road to form an intensive cattle production 
section. The 'backblocks' could then be devoted to subsistence and 
other alternative uses (Sullivan 1995) . These new multiple use efforts 
are usually based on Aboriginal concepts of the common resource and 
1 94 I The governance of common property in the Pacific region 
the diversification which they have introduced is arguably better for 
many marginal grazing lands (Young and Ross 1994) . 
Common property and individual resource tenure:  ach ieving 
resolution in Aboriginal Australia 
Common themes in the above examples suggest some factors essential 
for the reconcilation of the differing constraints which common 
property and individualised forms of tenure have imposed on Abo­
riginal groups. These include 
• the determination of the group itself, operating from a 
grassroots level, to establish its own priorities and select 
what they want from both systems 
• the existence of a political climate which allows for effective 
decision-making on these issues within the community 
• the provision of facilitating mechanisms, including regional 
supporting organisations, to enable community landholding 
groups to talk to, and negotiate with, outside stakeholders to 
ensure that their interests are taken into account 
• the provision of funding, both to establish and maintain such 
buffer organisations and to support the efforts of the local 
community groups. 
In each example, the Aboriginal groups concerned were very 
highly motivated in their search for re-identification with customary 
land from which they had been at least partially dislocated. They 
deliberately sought resource management strategies which would 
emphasise traditional cultural and economic values, seeing these 
generally as more important than resource harvesting for economic 
gain. And these strategies were adopted during the time when the 
political climate overtly supported Aboriginal self-determination. 
Moreover these were very coherent communities, strongly linked 
through kinship and with a clear view of their status and role as 
customary landholders. Decision-making accorded closely with 
traditional value systems and pressures to oppose these were rela­
tively weak. Such characteristics foster coherent community decision­
making. There is, however, no guarantee that they will continue to be 
maintained. Contemporary emergence of arguments about who has 
the right to speak for land, who belongs to the group, and over 
whether Native Title has survived or been extinguished by subsequent 
land alientation, suggest that the disruption of such approaches is now 
much more obvious. 
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The pastoral and settlement land management strategies adopted 
by these groups were also supported by a number of outside agencies, 
both government and non-government. Principal government agencies 
included federal and state departments of Aboriginal Affairs, in some 
cases enthusiastic about encouraging outstation development and 
solving remote-area service delivery problems. More recently, resource 
management agencies have begun to develop programs designed to 
assist the specific needs of Aboriginal land managers. The latter have 
included programs which undoubtedly recognise the importance of 
strategies which combine common property regimes with more 
individual forms of tenure-community management of endangered 
wildlife species, community programs to eradicate feral animals and 
introduced plant species, and programs to support subsistence-type 
pastoral projects rather than stressing commercial viability. These 
developments have been very positive. However, it must be 
acknowledged that government support for these initiatives has often 
been quite grudging and there are many key individuals in these 
agencies who see such efforts as unnecessary pandering to indigenous 
interests. 
Non-government agencies have been principally the Aboriginal 
land councils. Over the last decade these organisations, funded by 
government and, where royalty agreements have been negotiated, 
through the proceeds of resource development on Aboriginal land 
(normally from mining), have extended their original focus on the 
conduct of land claims to include land management. Many of these 
approaches have been quite innovative. The Alice Springs-based 
Central Land Council, for example, has established a continuing study 
of how Aboriginal environmental perceptions of the arid zone differ 
from those commonly held by others (Rose 1995). These include 
Aboriginal concern over wholesale eradication of feral animals such as 
rabbits and cats, now often part of their 'bush tucker '; their interest in 
the short-term effects of seasonal climatic change (such as what plants 
thrive, and where animals congregate after rain) rather than recogni­
tion of the long-term consequences of erosion stemming from over­
grazing and other misuse of the environment; their belief that failure 
to maintain customary use of fire, particularly obvious in areas from 
which the Aboriginal presence has been discouraged, is responsible 
for turning the country to 'rubbish'; and, of universal importance, the 
need to recognise and respect the cultural value of the land, not only 
at specific 'sacred sites' but also in its entirety. In all of these cases 
common property resource concepts are paramount. 
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The Central Land Council has also established a pilot project in 
culturally and environmentally appropriate land assessment, a move 
which offers new potential for improving Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
communication on rangeland valuation. This project exemplifies the 
possibilities arising from blending Aboriginal traditional ecological 
knowledge with scientific approaches and technologies (Mahney et al. 
1996) It also highlights in a practical way the benefits from encourag­
ing collaboration between scientists and Aboriginal resource managers. 
Both of these efforts have been supported by tapping into government 
funding resources such as the National Landcare program and the 
Land and Water Research and Development Corporation. Not all 
Aboriginal agencies can hope to do this and the struggle to obtain 
sufficient support to extend such initiatives to other parts of the 
country remains intense. 
Papua New Guinea: custom and the capital ist system 
Most of Papua New Guinea's population continue to live in rural 
communities, not effectively linked to the major urban centres by 
communication or transport infrastructure. The essential government 
services are inadequate and in some cases non-existent. This means 
that most of the people continue to derive their livelihoods from their 
land and its associated resources. In these communities, custom 
continues to play a key role in the management of common property 
resources. 
Despite relative isolation, many of these communities are 
undergoing a massive transition from a subsistence to a monetary 
economy. Large-scale resource exploitation projects are being 
established in commercial agriculture, fisheries, forestry, minerals and 
petroleum. These projects are all having a significant impact on 
traditional social structures and customary resource management 
systems. They have been welcomed by rural communities in the hope 
of development. For a villager in Papua New Guinea, development is 
seen in terms of employment opportunities, spin-off business 
opportunities, funding, and the opening up of access roads, aid posts, 
and primary schools, and hard cash (perhaps from resource royalties) . 
Project agreements signed between the developer and the local 
landowning clan specify benefit packages. These packages, however, 
vary between and within sectors, with greater benefits on the whole 
flowing through some large-scale mining agreements than occur 
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under smaller-scale forestry agreements. Although people know that 
resource exploitation has had a negative impact on traditional social 
structures and has irreversibly damaged the environment, their 
patterns of thinking and subsequent actions in approving projects is 
very rational. Without these agreements some of these communities 
would never have the opportunity to see any positive changes at all, 
or even be able to send their children to school. Thus, as Hayne states, 
'they will take those actions which they think will yield them the 
largest net advantage' (1994:5). 
Resolution of the contradictions between customary land tenure 
and the individualisation of resource property is essential if the 
problem of providing Papua New Guineans with sustainable 
livelihoods for the future is to be solved. Attitudes towards this are 
ambivalent. Legal and official policy statements uphold customary 
tenure, but consecutive governments in the last twenty years have 
advocated economic development through the capitalist or free 
market system. This poses a development dilemma which is crucial 
for the future of Papua New Guinea (Baines 1989:273). 
In some cases appropriate programs for administration, marketing, 
and credit have been established to promote export-oriented agri­
cultural production on communally-owned land. This has encouraged 
individualisation of common property resources, especially for the 
establishment of permanent tree crops such as coffee. Smallholders 
produce much of Papua New Guinea's pyrethrum and well over 60 
per cent of the total volume of coffee. 
Forestry provides a different example. Here development is pre­
ceded by the Government Forest Authority signing a Forest Manage­
ment Agreement with a Incorporated Land Group (ILG), incorporated 
under the I.and Groups Incorporation Act of 1974. The Forestry Act itself 
sets out a preference for resource owners to form representative group­
ings in line with this Act. Despite the ILGs being officially recognised as 
the instruments for utilisation and conservation of natural resources, 
government assistance in this area is minimal. Landowners have to take 
responsibility for their own incorporation, and in general they are 
forced to seek assistance in this process from the developers themselves. 
This gives the developers a strong hold over the ILGs. The landowners 
are left vulnerable to outside influences and may be rushed into making 
decisions that are not mutually beneficial to other members of the com­
munity or their tribe. Primary rights may be denied and in most cases 
secondary right-holders are excluded from participation, involvement, 
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and benefit sharing. In the resultant conflicts, relations between the 
landowners themselves, with the government, and with investors 
often deteriorate and are increasingly becoming areas of concern. 
Land reform, involving the individual registration of customary 
land, presents an alternative to the promotion of development under 
existing customary tenure. This has so far failed and indications are 
that prospects for Papua New Guinea's development through land 
resource utilisation seem poor. 
The government is caught in a contradictory situation. The Land 
Mobilisation Program (LMP) was designed to contribute to economic 
growth through productive use of the land resources throughout the 
country, whilst promoting equity, employment, participation and 
social stability (World Bank 1989). This assumes that land resources 
are now inadequately utilised and that outputs generated from 
customary land are insufficient. As the dominance of smallholder 
production in pyrethrum and coffee shows, this is questionable. Papua 
New Guinean communities have adapted very well in meeting the 
demands imposed on them by the capitalist system. The other under­
lying assumption is that customary tenure is the prime constraint to 
economic development. Other structural problems that hinder 
development include availability of credit; provision of appropriate 
extension services; poor market access; lack of efficient technology; 
and poor communication and infrastructure. Even if all the customary 
land were registered, there is no gurantee that rural production would 
increase. These structural problems would also need to be addressed. 
As the outright public rejection of land mobilisation suggests, 
pursuing this approach is not a realistic option. Instead the 
government needs to undertake a massive awareness program on the 
existing legal and policy provisions on customary tenure and explain 
why the registration of customary land is necessary. By educating 
landowners on these issues people might make more informed 
decisions on the conversion of customary land. In other words, working 
within the existing policy and legal framework, which explicitly 
recognises customary tenure, is to be preferred (Kalit 1996) . This, in 
turn, will depend upon recognising and dealing with some threats and 
constraints to the overall sustainability of Papua New Guinea's rural 
communities. The current ad hoe approach to development is a prime 
example. In most cases it is local leaders and the educated elite who 
invite the government or introduce potential developers to possible 
projects. This unplanned and uncontrolled approach, which is already 
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leading to the approval of many projects in Papua New Guinea, is 
potentially very damaging both to the country's overall sustainability 
and to the welfare of many of its people. 
Sustainable resource management: a new approach 
As most of the resources of Papua New Guinea-its land, forests and 
fisheries-are common property resources owned by kinship groups, 
any sustainable development effort must focus on assisting the resource 
owners to manage their resources on a sustainable basis. The customary 
tenure means that sustainable development is only practicable when it 
is endorsed by local communities and groups (Redclift and Saga 
1994:13). One of Papua New Guinea's National Development Goals 
states that development should take place primarily through the use of 
indigenous forms of social, political and economic organisations. In 
reality, the government has failed to advocate development through 
this approach. Colonial and independent governments have only paid 
lip service to resource owner involvement in decision-making, in 
management and control and in sustainable resource management 
(Holzknecht 1995:24). While the government's 1994 approval for the 
development of a National Sustainable Development Strategy offers 
some hope for the practical implementation of these earlier national 
goals much needs to be done, particularly in the realm of indigenous 
involvement in resource management. Recent reforms to the provincial 
government system, which target greater empowerment, involvement 
and participation of local people as well as delivery of services, are a 
positive move. It will take some time for the restructured system to 
work and even then it is questionable whether it will be efficient. 
Meanwhile local landowners will continue to pursue their endeavours 
on an ad hoe basis. Innovative systems need to be put in place immedi­
ately to assist the landowners to better manage their resources. An 
approach for promoting sustainable management of forest resources 
through customary means is discussed below. 
A case for a forest resource owner development agency 
Forest resources have significant value to the clan groups whose land 
has always provided materials for housing, decoration, gardening and 
more recently a means of gaining cash. Papua New Guinea is now 
facing an era where there is a global interest in the marketing, and at 
the same time conservation, of its forests. 
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The demand for forest resources is expected to grow as supplies 
from the other Southeast Asian and South Pacific countries dwindle 
and it is hoped that this feature will enhance Papua New Guinea's 
bargaining power in the future. From 1991 to 1995 the National 
Forestry and Conservation Plan, under the auspices of the 
internationally supported Tropical Forest Action Plan, has provided 
the impetus for reformation of the forestry sector. Now a new policy, 
legislation and administrative structure for ensuring proper 
management of these resources is in place. 
The 1994 National Forestry and Conservation Plan Review, while 
acknowledging that the Program had been successful in achieving its 
objectives at the national government level, found that it was less 
successful in enhancing resource owner involvement and field 
operations (UNDP 1994a:5). This review made specific recommendat­
ions to assist landowners during its second phase, including 
• rationalisation of an accelerated landowner awareness/ 
mobilisation program 
• strengthening local level capacity in forest management 
• non-timber forest products, and biodiversity products and 
service evaluation. 
The Landowner Involvement component of the Forest Manage­
ment and Planning Project (Holzknecht 1995) proposed a range of 
ways to increase people's participation in, and management of, their 
forest resources. The key emphasis was on establishing and operating 
the Incorporated Land Groups. It also focused on mechanisms for advice 
and information sharing by landowners. The 1994 UNDP Mission 
Report on Sustainable Development also made recommendations for 
reformation of policy and institutions to cater for empowerment and 
active participation by the rural people. One mechanism suggested 
was the establishment of a Rural Trust to support non-government 
organisations and local initiatives (UNDP 1994b ) . 
Papua New Guinea's National Forest Authority will have an 
important extension function in teaching landowners the principles 
and practice of sustainable forest management. But who will discuss 
what non-logging options, such as conservation or agricultural 
development, they have? Who can help them carry out such ventures? 
And what will happen to the large flows of funds derived from 
logging, much of which already goes to wrong people or is wasted on 
immediate consumption or inappropriate investments? Who can 
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advise landowners on how best to invest these revenues in sustainable 
agriculture or other investments to secure their future needs? (World 
Bank 1993) . 
These issues could be dealt with under a forest revenue system 
through which some of the revenues earned from logging would be 
distributed to landowners to be spent however they wished, and the 
remainder deposited in a trust fund to be devoted to longer-term 
projects. Despite the political sensitivity surrounding this proposal, it 
seems worth suggesting that the funds be administered for the 
landowners by an independent organisation. 
Such a Trust Fund could only be effectively operated if there were a 
competent agency to help landowners prepare and appraise project 
proposals. There is a strong argument for setting up an independent 
and visibly landowner-oriented statutory corporation, with its trust 
fund, which would clearly be divorced from the regulatory and 
enforcement activities of the National Forest Authority 
(World Bank n.d.). 
The proposed agency might have four components. 
1. A development Trust Fund, which would primarily be 
financed from logging revenues, but could also be readily 
used to channel funds, as matching grants, from any other 
sources (such as external donors). The Trust Fund would be 
administered as a single fund, although a separate account 
would be established for each ILG, which would maintain 
exclusive ownership of such funds. 
2. An executive board (with suitable representation from 
Government, private sector, non-government organisations 
and landowners) to approve the use of these funds. 
3. A technical secretariat, whose functions would be to help 
landowners incorporate new Land Groups; negotiate project 
agreements; prepare suitable projects and to present them to 
the board for approval. The secretariat would act as a 
catalyst, helping landowners to mobilise technical support 
from government line agencies and private consultants. But 
it would also require core in-house expertise. 
4. A trust fund administrator (probably an international 
accounting firm) of sufficient repute to be acceptable to both 
landowners and donors. 
It is envisaged that the agency would have the capacity to offer 
technical ad vice to ILGs on a full range of options on how best to use 
their logging revenues. These might include: reafforestation, 
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agriculture development, community services (health, education and 
water supply), fisheries development and infrastructure development 
(roads and bridges). 
The corporation would have an assured source of funds, if the 
suggestion for withholding a portion of forest revenue is accepted. If 
not, it is possible that landowners might voluntarily entrust a portion 
of their revenues to such a fund, particularly if some kind of matching 
grant were available to supplement their own funds. In either case, the 
agency would need to perform well to maintain landowners support. 
The lack of a mechanism for helping landowners to manage their 
resources is also recognised as a constraint in other sectors such as 
agriculture and mining (Holzknecht 1995, Samana 1993). Landowners 
need incentives to conserve areas of biological interest. These 
incentives could be in the form of 
• alternative income opportunities 
• social services tied to conservation covenants 
• direct compensation (rent) payments for maintaining 
conservation areas. 
Similar needs occur in mining, petroleum, fisheries and agriculture, 
where there are no agencies competent to assist landowners in 
managing their resources on a sustainable basis. It would nevertheless, 
be sensible to pilot the proposal in the forestry sector first before trying 
to expand it to other sectors. 
Lessons from comparison 
Comparison between the initiatives described in Aboriginal Australia 
and the options currently open to customary landholding groups in 
Papua New Guinea show the following to be of prime importance. 
First, landowner awareness is now well established for many 
remote Aboriginal groups but still requires substantial effort in Papua 
New Guinea. Landowners need to know all the development options 
they have, the reasons behind any major changes in these options, and 
all the existing facilities and mechanisms for encouraging sustainable 
resource management. 
Second, governments should accept their role in assisting land and 
resource management in culturally appropriate ways which incorpo­
rate common property resource concepts. They should demonstrate 
this commitment by allocating more technical and financial resources. 
The government in Papua New Guinea has yet to move in this direc­
tion. In Australia, while some positive initiatives have been taken to 
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support the efforts of Aboriginal Australians, the framework, particularly 
in current climate of government cutbacks and economic rationalism, is 
very fragile. 
Lastly, there is a need to establish and fund 'buffer ' organisations 
which can stand legally between people, governments and developers, 
with responsibility to all stakeholders and with the expertise to give 
advice as required. An innovative development approach like that 
proposed above for Papua New Guinea gives serious attention to 
landowner participation. Aboriginal organisations in Australia, 
particularly the Land Councils in the Northern Territory and Trust 
Fund organisations provide some interesting models. 
Although the contrast between the operation of such organisations 
in an industrialised country like Australia and a country with limited 
industrialisation like Papua New Guinea is marked, many of the 
principles remain the same. The developers and the government 
should transmit significant amounts of the profits from resource 
exploitation not only directly to the affected landowners, but also to 
organisations designed to assist those landowners to make informed 
decisions about their future. 
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In a region where mining, forestry, fish and other primary 
resources are so basic to income, employment and 
national prosperity, an understanding of rights to land, 
water and minerals is fundamental. Tenure regimes in 
the Asia-Pacific region are vastly more diverse and 
complex than in those of any other part of the world for 
comparable population numbers. These studies will 
overcome the simplistic misunderstandings that have 
obscured understanding in so many instances. 
This book provides an up-to-date overview of the 
main patterns of indigenous property rights, particularly 
those held by corporate groups, in the South Pacific 
Forum region (Australia, New Zealand and the 
independent Pacific island nations) plus a valuable 
comparative chapter on Canada. It explores the relative 
success and failure of a variety of approaches to the 
management of these complex systems, and offers 
insights and suggestions for the amelioration of present 
and likely future stresses in the systems. It is a valuable 
contribution to the understanding of both governance 
and property, and to the effective sociopolitical 
development of the region. 
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